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Abstract 
This research investigates the theoretical foundations of EU competition tying 
law. While tying prohibitions have existed in the EEC Treaty since 1957 the 
theoretical foundations of tying are not well understood. This thesis provides 
crucial insight into the theory and theoretical validity of tying law. 
 
This thesis focuses on answering three questions in relation to tying: One, 
what was the original economic theory underlying the prohibition on tying? 
Two, how has this changed and on what economic principles is tying law 
currently based? Three, are these principles appropriately aligned with the 
current state of economic thinking? In order to answer these three questions 
this thesis considers three leading schools of thought in competition law 
(Ordoliberalism, the Chicago School of antitrust analysis and post-Chicago 
antitrust analysis) before analysing the jurisprudence of the EU Commission 
and courts and establishing which theory forms the foundation of EU tying law. 
 
This research makes an interdisciplinary contribution through the use of both 
legal-historical analysis and legal-economic analysis. This yields important 
results on the historical development of tying law in Europe and also provides 
an economic analysis of the validity of EU law, assessing whether the aims of 
the law are economically valid and effectively applied. Where there are 
failures in the application of the law, normative proposals are given in order to 
demonstrate how the law and its application can be improved. 
 
The result of this analysis is to establish two distinct periods of theoretical 
influence (the author calls these the mono- and di-theoretical periods). A 
novel analysis of the tying decisions made in the software market is also 
presented and a new theory of foreclosure proposed that explains the 
decisions made in that market. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the theoretical, doctrinal and 
practical application of tying law in the European Union (EU). The prohibition 
on tying by undertakings in a dominant position was written into the Treaty of 
Rome 1957 and has been retained in each subsequent treaty.1 The relevant 
provision is Article 102 (d) TFEU 2  that states that abusive behaviour is 
prohibited; in particular abusive behaviour may consist in:  
 
“making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.” 
 
In the early years of the European Union3 there were relatively few tying 
decisions and cases on tying and little commentator attention was dedicated 
to the subject. This changed in 2004 when Microsoft I4 was released and 
Microsoft was given a fine totalling € 497,196,304.5 Since this point tying law 
has been considered far more controversial. As a consequence of the 
controversy surrounding the Microsoft I decision, a number of questions have 
become highly significant in relation to EU tying law. First, what was the 
original economic theory underlying the prohibition on tying? Second, how has 
this changed and on what economic principles is tying law currently based? 
Third, are these principles appropriately aligned with the current state of 
economic thinking? The answers to these questions are significant for two 
main reasons: The first is the need for legal certainty. In order for dominant 
undertakings to be able to act in accordance with the law they, or the law firms 
advising them, need to be able to understand how the law is applied and what 
behaviour/harm it is seeking to prevent. There is a need for business to have 
confidence in the EU competition rules, which play a key role in market-
building. The second reason is one of economic efficiency. Without 
understanding clearly the economic theory that underpins the law, it is not 
                                            
1
 Currently Article 102(d) TFEU 
2
 Originally Article 86 (Treaty of Rome) and Article 82 (EC). 
3
 Or European Economic Community and European Community as it was initially 
4
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965 
5
 This figure also includes a fine for infractions relating to withholding interoperability 
information 
3 
 
possible to evaluate whether it is meeting its objective, or even if the objective 
is valid, when considered in light of modern economic theory. It is therefore of 
great importance to analyse the law on tying in order to answer these 
questions. 
 
Therefore the analysis of this thesis focuses around three primary issues that 
will be investigated using an interdisciplinary approach encompassing both 
legal-historical and legal-economic approaches.6 These are: ascertaining the 
theoretical foundations of tying law and its aims, analysing how the approach 
has changed since the foundation of the Treaty7 and finally assessing whether 
the approach follows the latest economic thinking and pursues economically 
justifiable aims. While there is much discussion regarding the use of economic 
theory in EU competition law there is a distinct gap. The current debate either 
focuses of the theoretical foundation of EU competition law generally or, 
where it applies specifically to tying, it focuses only on the most recent tying 
case law. There is a real need for a thorough analysis of tying as a specific 
area of competition law. It is into this gap that this thesis makes its 
contribution. By focusing more on this specialised topic it is possible both to 
assess the economic schools of thought that exist in regard to this area of 
competition law and also compare them to the decisions of the European 
Commission and Union courts. Further by starting the analysis from the very 
earliest tying cases and working forward, this not only allows themes that 
were present in earlier decisions to be established but further it allows a clear 
progression to be identified in the law that provides a basis for predicting the 
reasoning of tying decisions in future. This paves way for the final contribution 
of this thesis which is to provide practical guidance to dominant undertakings 
on how to plan or adjust their commercial behaviour in such as manner as to 
avoid the negative attention of the European Commission, national 
competition authorities or even competitors by acting in breach of Article 102 
TFEU. 
 
                                            
6
 The interdisciplinary approaches are discussed in greater detail below. 
7
 The Treaty of Rome 
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By carrying out thorough analysis, this will also allow the author to highlight 
where the decisions made by the Commission and EU courts have caused 
confusion within the law or failed to achieve their intended aims. Where this 
has occurred the author will make normative proposals in order make the law 
clearer and applied in a more effective fashion. Two normative proposals will 
be provided by this author (that are discussed further below) one that would 
improve the test for tying and one that provides examples of new, innovate 
remedies can be used to strengthen competition in situations such as those 
present in the Microsoft I8 decision. 
 
As such this thesis will be divided into two sections. The first three chapters 
will consider the three main economic schools of competition (or antitrust) 
thinking. These are Ordoliberalism, the Chicago School and post-Chicago. 
These economic schools of thought are set out in the first three chapters so 
that it can be seen which of them is most likely to be the foundational theory 
underpinning tying law in the EU and further provide a base of comparison for 
the second part of the thesis. In the second part of the thesis, that is chapters 
four to seven, the decisions of the EU Commission and courts will be 
analysed and assessed. These chapters will provide an insight into where 
each theory has been either incorporated, rejected or ignored by the decisions 
and judgments of the European Commission and Union courts. By analysing 
the law over three different periods, these chapters will also demonstrate how 
the approach to tying has changed over time within the EU. Both parts of the 
thesis will rely upon an interdisciplinary legal/economic approach. 
 
Chapters one, two and three combine two different interdisciplinary 
approaches that have been adopted. Chapter one takes a legal/historic 
perspective tracing the path of Ordoliberalism, from esoteric economic theory 
to a major influence that shaped the direction of German and ultimately EU 
competition policy. Chapters two and three will place less emphasis upon 
historical development and greater emphasis upon the economic aspects of 
the Chicago and post-Chicago approaches. 
                                            
8
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965 
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Chapter one focuses on the Ordoliberal or Freiburg School of competition 
analysis. Although this school has been traditionally been thought to have 
influenced EU competition law due to the work of Gerber,9 this link has been 
challenged in recent years.10 In order to determine whether the law on tying is 
related to Ordoliberalism, research was carried out at Freiburg University11 by 
this author to determine when tying was first prohibited in Germany, how tying 
law in Germany developed and was influenced by Ordoliberalism, and how 
this law came to be reflected in the provisions of Article 102(d) TFEU. 
 
Chapter two begins by providing the historical setting for the development of 
the Chicago school of antitrust analysis (hereafter “the Chicago School”), 
showing the great significance of its legal-economic arguments when 
compared with the previously established thinking on competition in the 
United States where the predominant influence was that of the Harvard 
School of thought. It will focus on the Chicago contribution to tying analysis, 
showing that Chicago took a significantly different view of tying than was 
accepted at the time. This explanation is very important as it will be shown 
later in Chapter four how this approach to competition law, while not expressly 
rejected, has not been followed by the Commission and Union courts. Further, 
arguments put forward by parties before the courts that appear to have been 
derived from the Chicago School’s views have been rejected. In later chapters, 
the views of scholars of the Chicago School will be used as a lens to critique 
the EU approach to tying after which, the author will argue that the approach 
of the EU is economically justified. 
 
Chapter three will examine and assess the contribution of post-Chicago 
analysis to tying thought. The chapter will present the very latest theories12 
                                            
9
 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus 
(first published 1998, OUP 2001) 
10
 Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the long-lost soul of art.82 EC’ (2009) 29 OJLS 267; see also 
Pinar Akman, Hussein Kassim, ‘Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The 
Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy’ (2010) 48(1)  Journal of 
Common Market Studies 111 
11
 Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg 
12
 The earliest post-Chicago theories began to be published in 1990 
6 
 
that have established the circumstances in which tying can cause anti-
competitive effects in the relevant market. Again, this analysis will provide an 
essential theoretical foundation for later chapters, particularly chapters six and 
seven, in which it will be argued that post-Chicago theory is now being 
incorporated into the Commission’s assessment of tying, and will be important 
in determining the approach of the competition authorities in future tying 
decisions. 
 
Chapters four, five, six and seven represent the qualitative doctrinal analysis 
of EU competition law. The tying law of the EU is broken down into four 
separate chapters representing particular periods of EU jurisprudence. 
Chapter four covers the period between the very first cases on tying and 2004, 
just before the publication of the Microsoft I decision. The fifth chapter covers 
the Microsoft I decision itself and the sixth chapter covers the remedy 
imposed in that decision. Chapter seven analyses the tying decisions and 
Guidance issued since the Microsoft I decision. These three periods have 
been selected because the author believes the Microsoft I decision represents 
a watershed of the EU Commission and General Court’s approach.13 The first 
period that lasts until 2004 will be referred to as the “mono-theoretical period”, 
the second period consists of only the Microsoft decision and remedy and the 
third period consists of the post-Microsoft period.14 They will accordingly be 
referred to as the mono-theoretical period, Microsoft and post-Microsoft 
periods. This thesis relates to tying generally, that is to say both non-
softeware/technology tying markets and software/technology markets. 
However, all the judgments that were handed down during the mono-
theoretical period relate to classical ties and in the Microsoft and post-
Microsoft periods the decisions that have been made all relate to 
technological tying. Nonetheless, it will be argued (in Chapter 7) that the 
changes in the Commission and courts’ approach to tying during the Microsoft 
                                            
13
 The Court of Justice of the European Union has yet to have the opportunity to approve of 
this new direction 
14
 Both Microsoft and post-Microsoft represent “di-theoretical” periods. The di-theoretical 
period represents the period in which the Commission and EU courts approach to tying law is 
informed by both Ordoliberal and post-Chicago theory. 
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and post-Microsoft period are likely to apply to both classical and technical 
tying situations. 
 
Chapter four presents the results of the analysis of tying decisions made by 
the Commission, EU courts and Advocate Generals’ Opinions during the 
mono-theoretical period. This assessment articulates the approach of the EU 
competition authorities and demonstrates the economic concerns that tying 
law was intended to meet and the aims that tying law was intended to achieve. 
These economic concerns and aims are then compared with the economic 
theories set out in the first three chapters in order to show that tying law 
during the mono-theoretical period displays concerns that are consistent with 
Ordoliberal theory. Further deepening the law and economic analysis, the 
approach used by the EU competition enforcement authorities will then be 
criticised through the lens of the Chicago School. It will be argued that the EU 
approach to tying is economically justified as it pursues valid economic goals, 
namely protecting the freedom of the customer to choose the most efficient 
combination of products and protecting competition in markets that are 
already subject to limited competition. 
 
Chapter five assesses Microsoft I itself. Using primary legal sources this 
chapter will show how the test in Microsoft I was not a mere reformulation of 
previous law but included two significant changes. The first of these changes, 
the use of the term “separate products”, will be shown to be a departure from 
the terminology of previous case law. While only a semantic change it will 
show that this change not only makes the aim of the law less clear but further 
opened the Commission and EU Courts up to criticism. The second major 
change will be shown to be the inclusion of a requirement of foreclosure. This 
will show that the Microsoft I case was a turning point in the law, where the 
Commission began to take a di-theoretical approach. That is to say that the 
law began to incorporate elements of economics taken not only from 
Ordoliberalism but also from post-Chicago.  
 
8 
 
Chapter six assesses the failure15 of the remedy ordered in the Microsoft I 
decision. The chapter explains the circumstances present within the case that 
caused the failure before presenting a normative proposal consisting of a 
selection of remedies that could have been offered in the place of the actual 
remedy. In each instance the economic and legal benefits and drawbacks that 
would be present will be put forward. The assessment will take into account 
what the economic impact, such as any cost to competitors or consumers 
would be, what impact on competition it may have and what burdens it would 
place upon the dominant undertaking and any practical problems preventing 
or hindering its effective implementation. One of these potential remedies will 
be a new model that is inspired by the aims of Ordoliberalism. This normative 
proposal provides a novel method of ensuring that Microsoft’s dominance 
does not provide it with the opportunity to foreclosure the market, while 
providing a relatively minor commercial burden upon Microsoft itself. Another 
benefit of this remedy is that it uses the market price mechanism to aid the 
implementation of the remedy rather than working against it or requiring the 
Commission or national competition authority or  court to determine particular 
service or product values. This is a particularly significant contribution as 
despite the attention that the Microsoft I decision has garnered and the broad 
acceptance of the failure of its remedy, there has been very little discussion 
directed towards what the remedy could or ought to have been. This chapter 
then is an important contribution in not only considering the reason behind the 
failure of the Microsoft I remedy but further presenting new potential remedies 
that are substantially unlike any of the remedies that have since been 
considered and it is argued will engender greater compliance with Article 102 
(d) TFEU. 
 
The final chapter focuses on the Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now 102 TFEU)16 to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings and the Microsoft II 
                                            
15
 The remedy required Microsoft to provide a version of Windows without Windows Media 
Player. This version was subject to insignificant demand. 
16
 Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 
of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (Communication) 
(2009) OJ C 45/02 
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commitments decision.17 That is to say it covers the period since the Microsoft 
I decision was handed down to the present (2014). This chapter will briefly 
examine the debate leading to the publication of the Guidance before 
assessing its impact on the tying law, in particular, taking careful note of the 
incorporation of economic theory. Drawing on the economic theories set out in 
chapter three it will be shown that the Guidance makes deliberate reference to 
the economic theories of competitive harm that have been developed mainly 
by the post-Chicago authors. Finally, through qualitative analysis of the 
Microsoft II decision and assessing it in light of Microsoft I, a new theory has 
been proposed by the author. This theory is based on the argument that the 
Commission applies a specialised test to the software market unlike that 
which it applies to other markets. It will be argued that this is due to the unique 
characteristics of software markets. It will be shown that the concern of the 
Commission is the “evasion” of customer choice. It will further provide novel 
guidance to dominant software undertakings that will explain the behaviour 
that will concern the Commission, explain the underlying reasoning and direct 
such undertakings on how to avoid proceedings being issued by the 
Commission and lead to more effective compliance with the EU competition 
law rules. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis is ambitious in the sense that it adopts a number of different 
research methodologies within the broader context of a law and economics 
approach to the regulation of tying in the EU.  It employs theoretical, 
normative and empirical elements where appropriate.  
 
Normatively, the work will propose alternative remedies that could have been 
implemented in the Microsoft I decision (Chapter Six). This is a great value 
due not only to the lack of success experienced by the actual Microsoft I 
remedy but also due to the dearth of literature that has proposed alternative 
remedies or careful consideration of the impact of such remedies. These 
                                            
17
 Microsoft (tying) (Case COMP/C-3/39.530) 
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remedies strengthen competition and help bring the foreclosure caused by the 
tie to an end. 
 
Empirically, the thesis will use a legal historic analysis to establish the manner 
in which certain legal systems have incorporated economic theory into their 
law. In particular, this will include the German competition law system and the 
gradual influence of Ordoliberalism. Further it will include the development of 
antitrust law in the US and its development through a number of stages, when 
it has absorbed economic theory from a number of schools of thought. This 
historical empirical analysis provides insight into how the law of EU and US 
has progressed from early stages of the development of the competition law 
rules where judgments appeared to make little reference to economics, to 
periods where the law was and is increasingly influenced by economic theory. 
The information used here includes that which was gathered while in 
Germany, where both primary and secondary sources unavailable in the UK, 
were evaluated to establish the theory underlying German and EU competition 
law. 
 
Theoretically, the thesis includes discussion of the three main schools of 
competition thought: Ordoliberalism, the Chicago School and post-Chicago. It 
will assess the impact of these theories within the three time frames 
established. A central element of this thesis will be to establish which school 
of thought the EU approach to tying most closely resembles. It will further 
establish where more than one school of thought starts to permeate the EU 
approach. Lastly, it will establish a theoretical explanation for the 
Commission’s approach to tying within the software industry. This is of 
particular utility as it is not only a new legal theory but gives an explanation as 
to why this approach is used and how undertakings can direct their behaviour 
to avoid enforcement proceedings or litigation. With the increasing digitisation 
of markets it is also likely that this approach to software based markets will 
remain a focal issue within the EU competition authorities’ enforcement of 
tying law, making its explanation all the more significant. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Ordoliberalism and its influence on EU tying law 
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1.0 Introduction 
While until relatively recently Ordoliberalism or “the Freiburg School” remained 
a relatively understudied subject1 within the last few years it has become an 
area of increasing legal and historic interest. Debate has arisen between 
commentators such as Gerber,2 Akman,3 Warlouzet4 and others5 about the 
origin of EU competition law and its theoretical and historical foundations. 
Much of it has focused around the question of how much of an impact 
Ordoliberalism has had on EU competition law. This links to the desire to 
modernise European Competition Policy, which has created a need to 
understand the original foundational theories behind it, spurring greater 
interest in Ordoliberalism.6 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to further build on this work and establish a 
theoretical point of reference for an analysis of EU tying law in later chapters. 
In relation to the historical aspect of this chapter, whereas the works of the 
commentators mentioned above have focused on establishing the links 
between Ordoliberalism, German competition policy and EU competition 
policy generally, this work focuses more specifically on tying and its 
theoretical foundations. 
 
In relation to the thesis as a whole the purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that tying law in the EU has roots inspired by Ordoliberal thought. 
This is important as without understanding the theoretical roots underlying EU 
tying law it is not possible to know if the tying law prohibitions are themselves 
                                            
1
 Nicola Giocoli, ‘Competition versus property rights: American Antitrust law, the Freiburg 
School, and the early years of European competition policy’ (2009) 5 JCL&E (4) 748; Razeen 
Sally, Ordoliberalism and the Social Market: Classical Political Economy from Germany (1996) 
1 New Political Economy 2 233-257 after 50 years’  
2
 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus 
(first published 1998, OUP 2001) 
3
 Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the long-lost soul of art.82 EC’ (2009) 29 OJLS 267; see also 
Pinar Akman, Hussein Kassim, ‘Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The 
Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy’ (2010) 48(1)  Journal of 
Common Market Studies 111 
4
 Laurent Warlouzet, ‘The Rise of European Competition Policy, 1950-1991: A Cross-
Disciplinary Survey of a Contested Policy Sphere’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/80 
5
 Discussed further below 
6
 Christian Ahlborn and Carsten Grave, ‘Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism: An Introduction 
from a Consumer Welfare Perspective’ (2006) 2 CPI 2 Autumn 198 
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economically rational. This chapter will establish a link between 
Ordoliberalism and EU tying law and prepare a position from which to assess, 
in chapters four to seven, what the economic reasoning underpinning EU tying 
law is and whether it is valid. Where appropriate this will also allow argument 
to be made for what the law ought to be and how it could be improved. 
 
To this end this chapter will be divided into five parts as follows: 
 the historical context of Ordoliberalism; 
 the general principles of Ordoliberalism; 
 the Ordoliberal influence in post-war Germany; 
 the historical development of tying law in the German legal system; 
 the transition of Ordoliberalism from German law to EU competition law. 
 
First, it will be demonstrated that the historical context of Ordoliberalism and 
its influence in post-war Germany demonstrates that the Ordoliberals were, 
due to their support for the free market and their opposition to the Nazis, well 
positioned to make a major impact on the economic thinking of the German 
nation. The post-war influence of the Ordoliberals shows that the Freiburg 
school went from what was an essentially academic tradition to one that not 
only influenced but was strongly involved in the development of post-war 
German competition law. Second, the general principles of the Ordoliberal 
School will be explained so that it will be possible to identify in later chapters 
the Ordoliberal themes and principles that are expressed in EU competition 
law tying decisions. Third, the chapter will focus specifically on the law relating 
to the practice of tying and set out its earliest developments in Germany. This 
contribution will show that the first tying prohibitions came about through the 
application of very general principles of law based on the German Civil Code. 
These were applied by judges to business transactions that restricted 
economic freedom. These broad provisions appear to have been based on 
moral judgements rather than economic theory. It will then be explained that 
after World War II the legal tradition of the United States began to have an 
impact on German competition law through the introduction of laws in the 
British and US allied zones. But, most importantly from a current EU 
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perspective, it will be argued that one of the primary laws against restraints of 
competition in Germany was based upon Ordoliberal principles and that this 
law is strongly reflected in the Treaty of Rome Article 86 (102 TFEU) tying 
provisions, suggesting that the tying provisions within the original EEC Treaty 
are related to the German Act against restraints of competition and as a result 
are influenced by Ordoliberal legal economic thought.  
 
This is an important contribution to the state of EU Competition law knowledge 
as, by establishing the theoretical and economic basis of tying law, it provides 
a starting point from which it can be assessed whether the economic theory 
underpinning tying law had previously or has presently economic validity. This 
theoretical link will also serve as a point of comparison when analysing the 
tying decisions of the Commission and the European Union (EU) courts, to 
show that their decisions are consistent with the theory and therefore provide 
an insight through which greater understanding of EU tying law can be gained. 
This understanding will then help provide a basis on which to predict future 
decisions with greater accuracy. 
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2.0 The historical context of Ordoliberalism:  the 
Birth of Ordoliberalism 
In Germany 1933, the National Socialist Party was just taking control of the 
German Federal Government. At around the same time, 800km away in 
Freiburg, three scholars, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Hans Grossmann-
Doerth, came together, and found that  they were all concerned about the 
failing of the Weimar Republic and had similar thoughts about what ought to 
be done in response to this.7 Walter Eucken was the Professor of Economics 
in Freiburg University, Hans Grossmann-Doerth came to Freiburg in 1933 to 
receive a Chair in Law where his major interest was the problem of private 
economic power.8 Franz Böhm came to Freiburg in 1933 to teach law after 
working in German cartel law enforcement in the German Ministry of 
Economics. These three started working together and found that they had 
much in common. Böhm said “we focused together [on] ... the issue of private 
power in a free society”.9 All three had considered this to be the fundamental 
cause of the failure of the Weimar government, politically and economically. 
 
Given the libertarian and free market nature of the views of the Ordoliberal 
School, it is quite surprising that they were able to survive the period of the 
Nazi regime. When the Nazis seized power in 1933, almost half the 
economists and social scientists at German universities and other research 
centres were dismissed.10 Eucken and his circles provided resistance to the 
Nazi regime, not least at the Erfurter Rektorentag in 1933 where they tried to 
convince the German Universities to stand up to Hitler11 (unsuccessfully). Yet, 
despite this, the Freiburg school was not disbanded. Although members of the 
Freiburg School were arrested, imprisoned and dismissed from their jobs, 
                                            
7
 Gerber (n 2) 233 
8
 Hans Grossmann-Doerth, Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaftordnung und staatliches 
Recht (Freiburg i.B., 1933) 
9
 Böhm, ‘Forschungs- und Lehrgemeinschaft’, 162 
10
 Heinz Rieter and Matthaias Schmolz, ‘The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938-45: 
pointing the way to a new economic order’ EJHET 1:1 Autumn 1993 91 
11
 Irene Oswalt-Eucken, ‘Freedom and Economic Power: Neglected Aspects of Walter 
Eucken’s Work’, Journal of Economic Studies; 1994; 21, 4 38 
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generally they remained free from severe interference from local officials.12 It 
has been suggested by Gerber that this was largely due to Freiburg’s strong 
liberal tradition and lack of strategic importance that allowed the University to 
“minimise” Nazi influences for as long as possible.13 This allowed them to 
focus on their main aim, which was to provide a new basis for German society 
after the war had finished.14 This new basis would, much like their resistance 
to National Socialism itself, be inspired through a morality and social concern 
based upon their Christian beliefs,15 to the extent that they were also involved 
in producing a programme to serve as a basis for discussion at an ecumenical 
world conference of churches after the war was over.16 
 
Although the economic objections to Nazism may now appear diminutive in 
contrast to the moral objections, nonetheless the Freiburg School was 
opposed to both stances of the Nazis. Eucken noted that the economic order 
that existed in Germany during the time of the Second World War could not be 
a permanent order (Dauerordnung). Three reasons were given for this: First, 
the centrally planned economy that existed served one main purpose; war. 
When the war finished central planning would not be suitable for serving the 
needs of the many differing priorities; Second, fixed prices meant that 
companies were calculating costs on prices that did not accurately reflect the 
scarcity of those goods; Third, credit expansion had created discrepancies 
between total purchasing power and supply.17 
 
Eucken noted that these issues could not just be solved with laissez-faire 
classical economics, such as the non-interventionist approach favoured at the 
time in the US, but rather if free market principles were applied to the German 
economy without an appropriate framework then there would be severe 
                                            
12
 Gerber (n 2) 235 
13
 ibid 235 
14
 ibid 
15
 ibid and Heinz Rieter and Matthaias Schmolz, ‘The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938-
45: pointing the way to a new economic order’ EJHET 1:1 Autumn 1993 97  
16
 The Arbeitskreis Freiburger Denkschrift (Working Group on the Freiburg Memorandum; 
Kluge 1988: 27-9) 
17
 Walter Eucken, Wettbewerb als Grundprinzip der Wirtschaftsverfassung. In Schmölders, G. 
(ed.), Der Wettbewerb als Mittel volkswirtschaftlicher Leistungssteigerung und 
Leistungsauslese (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1942) 31-33 
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problems. This was due to excess money, in one part, and the huge 
concentrations of power in the hands of German industrial companies that had 
occurred due to the actions of the Nazis during the war.18  Should these 
concentrations be left intact without any framework to control them, then there 
would actually be a lack of freedom rather than a real increase.19 It was this 
freedom, that could be obtained by sharing economic power or by preventing 
its concentration, which was so important in the Ordoliberal school of 
thought20 and was a central tenet in their work. 
 
In addition to the founding members, the Ordoliberal School drew other 
prominent followers. These include: Adolf Lampe, associate Professor and 
economist in Freiburg; Constantin von Dietze, who joined Freiburg University 
in the summer of 1937, agricultural scientist, lawyer, economist and 
theologian; Friedrich A Lutz, Eucken's 'most outstanding student';21 Bernhard 
Pfister, co-contributor in Ordoliberal works; Rudolf Johns, Freiburg economist 
and later Professor; Karl Friedrich Maier; Paul Hensel, student of Eucken;22 
Leonhard Miksch, economist and University professor; Ludwig Erhard 
economist and later from 1949 to 1963 Federal Minister of Economics , 1963-
1966 second Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and 1966/67 
CDU chairman; and Fritz W.Meyer who worked at the Federal Ministry of 
Economics. 
  
                                            
18
 Walter Eucken, Wettbewerb als Grundprinzip der Wirtschaftsverfassung. In Schmölders, G. 
(ed.), Der Wettbewerb als Mittel volkswirtschaftlicher Leistungssteigerung und 
Leistungsauslese (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1942) 35-36 
19
 Eucken (n 17) 36-37 
20
See Eucken in: Peacock, A.T. and Willgerodt, H. (Eds), Germany’s Social Market Economy, 
(London, Macmillan 1989) p35; Walter Eucken, (1948/1982). The social question and Böhm, 
Forschungs-und Lehrgemeinschaft’, 162 and Nils Goldschmidt, Michael Wohlgemuth, ‘Social 
Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations’ CPE (2008) 19 269. 
21
 Harald Hagemann, Germany after WWII: Ordoliberalism, the Social Market Economy, and 
Keynesianism (presentation) 
22
 <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.5885/> accessed 16 April 2014 
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3.0 General principles of Ordoliberalism 
3.1. Economic power 
One of the fundamental focuses of the Ordoliberal school was the 
accumulation, exercise and abuse of economic power and on the opposite 
side of this, economic freedom. The consideration of economic power formed 
the basis upon which one could understand economic behaviour. Eucken 
stated, “To understand economic reality past, present and probably 
throughout the future, it will be necessary to understand economic power and 
to perceive the striking uniformities in the method of groups struggling for 
power.”23 This matter was of great importance in the Ordoliberals’ minds as 
they had seen how the influence of cartels had damaged so much of Germany 
in the Weimar period.24 As a result, the Ordoliberals believed that the state 
needed to protect the economy. Without the protection of a strong democratic 
state, private enterprise was able to acquire such high levels of economic 
power that they could undermine and eliminate competition.25 Therefore it was 
the stance of the Ordoliberal school that the state must either control private 
economic power or it will be controlled by private economic power. 
3.2. Competition 
To the Ordoliberals, competition is to a certain extent the weapon with which a 
strong government is to moderate the acquisition of economic power. This is 
best summarised by Eucken, who stated “Only in one form of market does 
economic power disappear completely, that is, under conditions of perfect 
competition.”26 Competition was not some abstract or vague concept which 
was not scientifically and objectively defined. To Eucken, economic study 
could not be carried out effectively using poorly defined words. 27  Perfect 
competition or Vollständiger Wettbewerb28 was defined as a market where no 
firm has the power to coerce conduct by other firms, that is to say, to each 
                                            
23
 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in English 
1950) 263 
24
 Gerber (n 2) 251 
25
 ibid 250 
26
 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in English 
1950) 269 
27
 ibid 24-25 
28
 Which is often translated as perfect/complete/full competition. 
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firm the market price of a good or service is taken as a given, so increasing or 
decreasing production will have no expected effect on the price of goods 
being bought or sold. 29  Consequently, no one company can significantly 
influence the cost of goods and services using their own market power. 
 
This competition was very important to the Ordoliberals, for with it no on in the 
market has power to influence price or structure, or in reality, everyone has a 
very small share of the power and as such it is far more difficult for it to be 
misused to manipulate the legislature or cause other destructive effects. The 
Ordoliberals believed that whether or not private economic powers or state 
powers could take advantage of society depended mainly on the moral and 
religious stance of the leaders, but in addition to that, unscrupulous striving 
after profit flourished most where the majority of the community were largely 
powerless.30It is in this that Ordoliberalism considered competition as an end 
in itself, not just a means to an end.31 It was a state in which economic and 
political freedom was achieved.32 
The way private economic power is treated is where classical liberalism and 
Ordoliberalism diverge. At the heart of liberalism is the view that the power of 
the state needs to be limited and the antitype of that power is freedom from 
the interference of the state. This was taken further by the Ordoliberals who 
then stated that “competition is necessary for economic well-being and that 
economic freedom is an essential accompaniment to political freedom”. 33 
Competition would help maintain a minimum of private power, and this 
minimum would help maintain the freedom of the many. This diverges from 
classical liberalism in that it requires not a weak state, but a politically strong 
                                            
29
 Gerber (n 2) 245 and Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first 
published in English 1950) 139, 140 
30
 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in English 
1950) 263 
31
 Ian Rose, Cynthia Ngwe, ‘The Ordoliberal tradition in the EU, its influence on Art 82 EC and 
the IBA’s comments on the Art 82 EC Discussion Paper’ (2007) 3 Competition L.Int’l 8 
32
 It will be seen in later chapters that economic freedom is a primary principle in the EU tying 
law approach. 
33
 Gerber (n 2) 240; emphasis added as economic freedom will be revealed as a fundamental 
theme in EU competition tying law in later chapters. 
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state to ensure that the economic conditions required for economic freedom 
and thus political freedom, are maintained.34 
3.3. The basis of economics 
The Ordoliberals, particularly Eucken also criticised the basis upon which 
economics was analysed at the time. Although educated in the historical 
school, Eucken rejected this approach as it failed to provide useful abstract 
principles to help understand economics.35 He believed that if one focused too 
much on the abstract then economic theory would no longer relate to reality 
and if one focused too much on context and historical facts then no useful 
rules would be revealed. This he called the great antimony.36 To resolve this 
antimony Eucken would start by considering direct problems and questions in 
the real world. 37  This included looking at the actual plans of directors of 
economic units,38 this included anyone who made economic decisions for an 
economic entity, from a warehouse manager to a housewife. Eucken stated 
that the economic plans were created in a different fashion depending on the 
form of the market, monetary system and monetary economy.39 Further the 
decisions were based on the expected reactions of customers (eg. buying or 
seeking to buy elsewhere) and price data.40 
 
At this point Eucken’s work broke from earlier models prevalent at the time by 
producing effective objective standards for different forms of market. The 
scientific basis for each market was how the market actors behaved with 
regard to the price of their product when compared to other substitutable 
products in the market. Using this behaviour, Eucken defined the following 
types of market: 
 
                                            
34
 Werner Bonefeld, 'Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism' (2012) 17(5) 
New Political Economy 633, 647-651 
35
 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in English 
1950) 38-40 
36
 ibid 41 
37
 ibid 25 
38
 ibid 117-118 
39
 Ibid 133, 134 
40
 ibid 136 
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 Monopoly: where there is only one company that takes no account of 
other firms when deciding its price; 
 Partial monopoly: One large firm and many small firms, where the small 
firms all follow the price set by the large firm;41 
 Oligopoly: Where from previous experience a market actor counts on a 
particular response to his actions from his competitors;42 
 Competition: Where “owing to the considerable size of the market and 
the negligible size of his supply or demand, the individual does not 
reckon with any such reaction in his economic plan, but takes the price 
as a planning datum and acts accordingly”.43 
 
Through this method Eucken managed to break down any number of markets 
into a few specific types.44 This provided the law with actual paradigms on 
which to base its deliberations. This provides a basis for economic definitions 
to be incorporated into the law, allowing the law to apply in different ways 
depending on the economic circumstances in each market. This was an 
astounding departure from the historical school and provided a new basis on 
which to develop further legal-economical questions. The specific uses of 
these definitions will be highlighted later45 when comparison is drawn between 
EU competition law and Ordoliberal principles. This approach is also relevant 
when considering later (in chapter 5) how EU competition law has been 
criticised for not being rooted appropriately in economic evaluation, due to its 
focus on form. It is important to note here, at the very beginning of the 
Ordoliberal School no less, that a focus on market specific conditions and 
economic analysis was fundamental to the methods, particularly Eucken, 
employed. 
                                            
41
 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in English 
1950) 138 
42
 ibid 147 
43
 ibid 140 
44
 Monopoly (singular and collective), partial monopoly, oligopoly, partial oligopoly and 
competition; Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in 
English 1950) 150 
45
 See Chapter Four 
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3.4. Economic Constitution 
One aspect of the Ordoliberal school of thought that has been widely 
recognised is the need for an ‘economic constitution’. This is likely to be 
because it is this tenet that creates a strong distinction between classical 
liberalism and Ordoliberalism.46 Eucken argued:  
 
“It has become obvious that the modern industrialised world does not of 
itself produce an effective economic system, but requires certain 
controlling constitutional principles as a foundation ... Legal thought 
and practice will to an increasing extent have the task of co-operating 
in the building and establishing of this economic constitution.”47 
 
Various areas of law such as company law, taxation, employment law, patents 
etc would have to comply with the economic constitution, therefore their 
content would flow from the constitution. Also in the courts the economic 
constitution would act as an aid of interpretation of the other laws.48 
3.5. The independent monopoly office 
The independent monopoly office is the concept of an independent 
government entity that would enforce the general principles of complete 
competition.49 This would abolish and restrict monopoly positions. Also where 
monopolies exist they would regulate them in such a fashion that they are 
                                            
46
 Sonja Eibl, Jorg-Martin Schultze, ‘From Freiburg to Brussels and back again? The seventh 
revision of Germany’s competition law. (2005) ECLR 526, 527; Lawrence H. White, ‘The 
Postwar German “Wonder Economy” and Ordoliberalism’ (2010) Working Paper 10-50, 33; 
Heinz Rieter, Matthias Schmolz, ‘The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938-45:pointing the 
way to a new economic order’ (1993) 1 EJHET 1 87, 103 and Böhm, F. Die Ordnung der 
Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung (Stuttgart and Berlin, 
W. Kohlhammer 1937) in Viktor J. Vanberg, ‘The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and 
Ordoliberalism’ (2004) Freiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics 04/11. 
47
 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics (William Hodge, first published in English 
1950) 315, Interestingly, considering the importance attached to this element, the requirement 
of an economic constitution was only really established in the last pages of the conclusion of 
Eucken’s work The foundation of economics and hardly noted whatsoever in the body of the 
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48
 ibid 315; This aspect of Ordoliberal thought seems to have remained largely without 
criticism; in fact, it appears to have been corroborated by the later work of Buchanan on 
constitutional economic, see; Heinz g. Grossekettler, ‘On Designing an Institutional 
Infrastructure for Economies: The Freiburg Legacy after 50 years’ (1994) 21 JES 4 p24 
49
 Gerber (n 2) 251 
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required to satisfy the ‘as if’ test, that is they are required to behave ‘as if’ 
there is competition in the market, even when there is not.50 
 
This has been described as “perhaps the most unrealistic and faulty aspect of 
Eucken’s work and that of the early Freiburg School”.51 Hayek noted that it is 
unrealistic to think that costs could be so readily calculable and that the result 
of competition so easily predicted that a company could be caused to act in an 
‘as if’ manner.52 This is criticism is understandable. Although many regulators 
exist for regulating natural monopolies it is often difficult for them to prove if 
and when a price rise is justified. Proving that wages are higher than normal 
or that a company is overstaffed can easily degenerate into a circular 
argument: is the company’s wages/costs/salary bill higher than industry 
average because the company has market power, or does the company have 
market power because they attract the best talent/spend the most on 
product/service development etc? It can be easy for a dominant company to 
justify price increases if there is not a sufficiently similar competitor to provide 
a base of comparison, and the more comparable competitors in the market 
place, the more likely that market is to be competitive. So the ‘as if’ standard 
is of limited use when considering whether a price is too high. 
 
There are also issues with regard to another benefit of competition; innovation. 
Once again there is a distinct difficulty when considering how a company can 
be required to innovate ‘as if’ it is subject to competition. Research and 
development budgets can be allocated, but once that is done, it is not 
immediately obvious how an independent regulatory organisation, such as a 
monopoly office could ensure that the capital is used as efficiently and 
intensively as it would be under competition in order to develop new products 
or services or make the provision of current products or services more 
efficient. It is not possible to know in what ways a company would innovate if 
under competition, or predict what new goods, services or production methods 
                                            
50
 Leonhard Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe: Grundsätze einer Wettbewerbsordnung (2ed, 
Godesberg, 1947) and Leonhard Miksch, Die Wirtschaftspolitik des Als Ob’ 105 Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1949) 310. 
51
 Razeen Sally, ‘Ordoliberalism and the Social Market: Classical Political Economy from 
Germany’ (1996) 1(2) New Political Economy 233, 241 
52
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it would generate. As a consequence there is no standard against which to 
assess whether a company is innovating ‘as if’ subject to competition. A 
dominant company cannot be held to a standard that does not yet exist; 
neither can a monopoly office condemn a company for not discovering the 
undiscovered. 
 
There is a manner in which the ‘as if’ standard does make sense however. 
This is in preventing dominant companies from employing behaviour that 
benefits them only because of their market dominance. So if a company 
subject to competition would actually lose market share by, for example, tying 
two products together, but due to their dominance and market power within 
one particular market they can actually exclude competitors through this 
behaviour, then they will be prohibited from pursuing this behaviour. This is 
because they are not behaving ‘as if’ they are subject to competition.53 This 
interpretation of the “as if” test would avoid the criticisms noted above. 
4.0 Ordoliberal influence in Germany 
 
After the fall of Germany and with it Nazism in 1945, Germany was left 
economically and structurally in ruin. Nevertheless, at a time when Germany 
faced extensive reparations after the second humiliating defeat in a 
generation, with fresh knowledge of the horrific truth of the holocaust being 
revealed, there were those who believed that Germany could be restored to a 
position of economic strength. In this environment it was clear that Germany 
needed to be legally, economically, as well as physically rebuilt. As already 
mentioned the Ordoliberals had spent their time under Nazism focused on 
establishing a new basis for society in Germany after the war had finished.54 
The Ordoliberals had known that once the war was over, a “complete 
reorganisation” would be necessary. 55  Therefore in essence, the Freiburg 
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 In chapter 5 it will be possible to see where the courts and Commission of the EU have 
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 Gerber (n 2) 235 
55
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circles were poised for the situation, having committed their time to developing 
a plan for what to do in these very circumstances. 
 
The allied zones in Germany, particularly those run by the United Kingdom 
and the United States were seeking to ensure their zones were run in 
accordance with free market principles. This period was the start of the Cold 
War and the United States wanted to use Germany to show off the superiority 
of the free market.56 Therefore the British and Americans were looking for 
leaders with two particular qualities: First they were searching for capable 
men of legal and economic standing; and second those who were capable 
also needed to be un-associated with the Nazi regime. This was difficult 
because, as has already been mentioned, upon the Nazi seizure of power in 
1933, almost half the economists and social scientists were dismissed from 
German universities.57 In light of this, the Ordoliberals were the first and most 
significant economists who came forward who satisfied the criteria. 58 They 
were untainted by Nazism and in addition, the Ordoliberals represented a 
“third way”59 between socialism on the one hand and laissez faire liberalism 
on the other. Liberalism was largely held in contempt by the German 
population who appeared largely intent on establishing some form of socialist 
solution.60 As such the Ordoliberals provided what appeared to be a realistic 
prospect of providing a workable and free market while keeping the majority of 
the public content. This new order and structure took the name and form of 
the “Social Market Economy”. Of this political economic plan, Erhard stated 
that if there was one theory that “gave impetus to both a competitive and 
social economy, then it was the theory created by men known today as 
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neoliberals or Ordoliberals”.61 The Ordoliberals were eminently suited to the 
situation, and ideally placed, being both favourable to the Germans and the 
allied powers. This was the case to such an extent that when the Academic 
Advisory Council was formed to support government policy in 1947 more than 
50% were Ordoliberals.62 
 
When considering the impact of these scholars, it is also useful to note their 
confidence. The conviction of the Ordoliberals drove forward difficult changes 
at a difficult time. This is best demonstrated by a quote regarding Ludwig 
Erhard’s decision to remove most of the price controls and rationing rules in 
July 1948: 
 
“...the top military American commander, General Clay called [Erhard] 
and told him on the telephone: ‘Professor Erhard, my advisors tell me 
that you are making a big mistake,’ whereupon according to his own 
report, Erhard replied, ‘So my advisors also tell me’.”63 
 
Crucially Erhard’s decision was not a mistake, and industrial production in the 
Western zones increased 50% in 6 months to the end of 1948.64 From this 
point on, aided by Ordoliberal ideas, the West German economy continued to 
go from strength to strength; the Wirtschaftswunder65 had begun.66 
4.1. Leading personalities in the implementation of Ordoliberalism 
in Germany 
The founding members of Ordoliberalism have already been mentioned and 
while these men were instrumental in starting Ordoliberalism, there were a 
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great many more who were involved in transposing Ordoliberalism from 
economic theory to political reality. Of the founding members, Walter Eucken 
and Franz Böhm started the Ordo journal in 1948. Eucken also attended the 
Mont Pelerin Society meeting in Switzerland where he argued for the policies 
enacted in 1948 (removal of price restrictions etc). He also advised Ludwig 
Erhard (see below) on the abolition of price controls. Ludwig Erhard was an 
economist who, after the Second World War, became a German politician.  
Initially, he volunteered his services to the American occupation authorities. 
He first worked in Fürth in Northern Bavaria, before becoming the economics 
minister for all of Bavaria. He continued to rise, becoming economics minister 
for the UK-US bi-zone largely due to serendipitous political horse-trading 
between the major Germany parties. 67 Finally, Erhard became Minister of 
Economic Affairs of the West German Government and later Chancellor 
himself for three years. Another advisor of Erhard was Wilhelm Röpke. He 
wrote several books during the war, which Erhard had managed to get hold of 
illegally and “devoured” them.68 Leonhard Miksch worked with Erhard in the 
Economic Administration, and had written his doctoral and post-doctoral 
dissertations under Eucken.69 Alfred Müller-Armack, a professor of economics, 
took on some of the central tenets of Ordoliberalism and incorporated them 
into the ‘Social Market Economy’. This programme became the political 
programme of the Christian Democratic Union, the party in power in Germany 
from 1949 through to 1966. 70  Through the work of these men and the 
circumstances they found themselves in the concepts of Ordoliberalism were 
integrated into German economic policy. 
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5.0 Tying law in the German legal system: the 
historical development 
 
The preceding section has explained broadly how Ordoliberal scholars had an 
impact on the West German government and its economic policies. The aim 
of this section is to consider specifically how tying law developed in German 
competition law and when Ordoliberalism made an impact. It shall be shown 
that the earliest references to tying precede both US/Allied and Ordoliberal 
influence. Over time however the law developed and took on influences from 
US anti-trust law and Ordoliberal theory during the period after World War II. 
This gave rise to the German law which heavily influenced the EEC Treaty’s 
provisions on tying. 
 
The very earliest references to tying precede the Ordoliberals by quite some 
margin. Section 138 of the “Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch” (BGB) or German Civil 
Code stated that contractual restrictions that paralyze (lähmen) the economic 
freedom (wirtschaftliche Bewegungsfreiheit) of a natural or legal person were 
considered void.71 This was originally enacted in 1900. Without going into the 
nature of tying, the German Supreme Court on occasion caught tying under 
this law,72 although the wording of the law is clearly so broad that is could be 
used to apply to a number of different contractual restrictions and was not 
constructed specifically to target tying behaviour. However, later in 1932 the 
“Zugabeverordnung” (or ZugabeVO, enacted 3/9/1932) contained what was 
for the first time a clear reference to a tying prohibition set out in German law. 
It stated in section 1 paragraph 1, sentence 3 the following: 
 
"The same applies (the prohibition set out previously), when another 
product or service is offered for a total price in order to conceal the 
addition of a commodity or service."73 
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This law was enacted prior to the Second World War, and predates 
Ordoliberal influence which only really came to prominence during the allied 
occupation of Germany. Therefore it is possible to see that the very earliest 
tying prohibitions that existed in Germany were unlikely to be the result of the 
influence of Ordoliberal scholars. Rather it developed out of very broad 
sections of the German Civil Code regulating business behaviour using broad 
moral standards and a general regard for individuals economic freedom. It is 
also worth noting that while the Zugabeverordnung describes a tying like 
scenario in German Law, it does not use the terminology to refer to tying that 
is presently familiar in German law.74 These terms only came into the German 
legal vernacular after the Second World War.75 
 
At the end of the Second World War a second stage of competition law 
development came into play in Germany. The terms more widely associated 
with tying in German law currently ("Kopplungsvertrag" or "Kopplungsgeschäft) 
started to appear in the law at this time.76 It was after the end of World War II 
when the Allies, particularly the United States, sought to break up the German 
cartels that these terms came into use.77 The Allied governments enacted 
competition laws in their zone78 that prohibited tying contracts.79 These laws 
essentially followed the American position from section 3 of the Clayton Act80 
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and the German courts even drew upon the US case law in the application of 
this law when necessary. 81  However important differences existed even 
during this time. For example, the German Supreme Court did not follow the 
US Supreme Court and applied a rule of reason approach to tying contracts 
instead of a per se approach.82 This is a significant difference. But the most 
significant competition law event during this period was the implementation of 
the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen or the Act against restraints 
of Competition (GWB 1957). With regards to tying, Section 18 stated that: 
 
(1)The Cartel Authority may declare agreements between or among 
enterprises concerning goods of commercial services to be ineffective … 
insofar as such agreements 
 
1. Restrict one of the parties in its freedom to use the purchased goods, 
or other goods or commercial services, or 
2. Restrict one of the parties in the purchase from or the sale to third 
parties of other goods or commercial services, or 
3. Restriction one of the parties in reselling the purchased goods to third 
parties, or 
4. Commit one of the parties to purchase other goods or commercial 
services which are by their nature or in commercial practice not related 
to the purchased goods or commercial services…[emphasis added] 
 
(2) A restraint is not to be considered unfair within the meaning of sub-
                                                                                                                             
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, 
or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce.” 
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paragraph 1 lit. b, if it is insignificant in relation to the opportunities of supply 
and demand which continue to be available to other enterprises.83 
Here it refers to clauses that oblige one party to purchase goods or services 
not by their nature or commercially associated.84 Further in the government 
draft of the GWB they also specified the right of competition authorities to 
prohibit the conclusion of tying contracts by dominant companies.85 This law is 
strikingly similar to the 1957 Article 86(d) within the EEC Treaty (now Article 
102 (d) TFEU) even using the same terminology and phraseology: 
 
Article 86 (EEC Treaty): (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject 
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, 
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts. 
 
But this raises the question of whether it was the original EEC Treaty86  that 
influenced section 18 GWB or whether it was the negotiations in Germany 
around section 18 GWB 1957 that influenced the drafting of the EEC Treaty. 
After all both were agreed in the same year and they both came into force at 
the same time. Therefore in order to establish if Ordoliberalism is a theory that 
is foundational to the EU competition law approach to tying, the direction of 
influence must be established. This will be considered in the following section. 
6.0 Ordoliberal theory’s transition from German 
law to the EU competition law 
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Ordoliberalism, while initially relatively understudied, 87  has more recently 
become the recipient of much greater academic interest. It has been 
suggested that the original absence of study and awareness of the subject 
was most likely because of the language barriers and the simple timing of the 
formation of the school and interest in subsequent schools of thought. 88 
However, within the last few years interest in this area has been steadily 
increasing. A desire to modernise European Competition Policy has created a 
need to understand the original foundational theories behind it, spurring 
greater interest in Ordoliberalism in the English speaking world.89 From both a 
political and economic perspective, Peck has argued that since the events of 
the economic crisis of 2008, Ordoliberalism may now once again be in favour; 
its ordered liberalism providing an alternative market order. 90  But from a 
competition law point of view, the interest in Ordoliberalism in the English 
speaking world stretches further back, starting in 1998 with the publication of 
Gerber’s seminal work on Law and Competition in Europe. This work was one 
of the first in English91 to suggest that there was a link between Ordoliberalism 
and the theoretical foundations of EU competition law. For 11 years Gerber’s 
work was relied upon and frequently cited by those making reference to a 
theoretical framework underlying EU competition law. Gerber’s work 
suggested that the Ordoliberals had a strong influence in the shaping of 
European competition law. However at the time of Gerber’s writings the 
Official Records had not been made public. 92  There was after all a 
disincentive for publication and investigation of the negotiations early in the 
life of the European project since it could undermine the integration process. 
After all concessions could be seen as failing to protect national interests and 
the association of ideas to certain countries could increase resistance to them 
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and slow down the process of integration. 93  More recently, however, this 
influence has been called into question by the work of Akman,94 who argues 
that the influence of Ordoliberalism had been over emphasised in relation to 
the foundation of competition law in the EU. This conclusion was reached 
following research conducted into the travaux préparatoires of the competition 
rules leading up to the signing of the EEC Treaty in 1957. Akman argues that 
the documents were at times unclear 95  in their support for Ordoliberal 
concepts, on some occasions contrary to Ordoliberal ideals96 and at other 
times the arguments of the German delegation themselves were antithetical to 
Ordoliberal theory. 97  Others such as Warlouzet have considered that the 
actual impact of Treaty of Rome’s negotiations somewhat neutral, but instead 
have suggested Regulation 17/62, agreed after the signing of the EEC Treaty, 
gave the German competition tradition greater impact on EU competition 
law,98 for example, by applying an ex-ante system of approvals rather than an 
ex-post system of enforcement in relation to agreements between firms.99 
 
Most recently however some commentators have focused on determining how 
the seemingly contradictory stories relating to the foundation of EU 
Competition law fit together.100 For example, a group of lawyers and historians 
from various member states101 investigated a number of different areas of 
interest, mainly focusing on the way the Commission and EU courts and 
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Regulation 17/62 shaped the way competition law was applied in the EU.102 
From the perspective of this thesis however the work of this group is less 
significant as it does not focus on how the German/Ordoliberal influence 
entered the EEC treaty in the first place, rather concentrating on events after 
the treaty was agreed. What is relevant here is that when considering the 
influence of the national traditions of the EU members on EU Competition 
law103 they argue that, from an institutional perspective, German competition 
policy was among the most influential in shaping European competition 
policy.104   
 
Therefore it is still important to establish, using the information available, what 
evidence exists to demonstrate that Ordoliberal theory influenced EEC Treaty 
provisions on competition law. Below the various arguments that suggest 
Ordoliberalism has had a major impact on EU competition law will be 
presented, including the result of research conducted in Germany itself. 
6.1. Evidence in support of the Ordoliberal influence 
To evaluate the extent of the German government’s influence, and the 
Ordoliberal influence, on the formation of the Treaty articles on competition 
law the following four avenues will be pursued: The involvement of 
Ordoliberals in the Treaty negotiations; the memoirs of those involved; 
German research; and broader European research. 
 
6.2. The involvement of Ordoliberals in the Treaty negotiations 
To begin then, those involved in the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome on 
behalf of Germany tended to adhere to Ordoliberal ideas. These include 
Walter Hallstein, one of the founders of the European Community, who 
became first President of the Commission. Also Hans von der Groeben, one 
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of the two main drafters of the ‘Spaak Report’105 and later first Commissioner 
for competition policy. Hermann Schumacher, an Ordoliberal economist who 
worked as head of the directorate in charge of cartels.106 In addition Alfred 
Müller-Armack, the German Secretary of State for European Affairs, who has 
already been mentioned 107  and Ludwig Erhard who often put Ordoliberal 
economists in German delegations to (what would become) EEC negotiations 
allowing them to give representation to the Ordoliberal concepts of 
competition. 108  The position of these Ordoliberal scholars during the 
negotiations is of course not conclusive, but when read in conjunction with the 
other points it helps to build up a body of evidence that demonstrates that the 
Ordoliberal school was highly influential in the formation of EU competition law. 
6.3. German Research 
Looking at the commonality between the GWB and the Treaty of Rome, it is 
clear that either the law impacted the Treaty or the Treaty impacted the law. 
There were two major influences on the development of the GWB. The first 
being the influence of the Ordoliberals and the second being the support of 
the Allied Forces, particularly the Americans.109 As a consequence much of 
the work of the Ordoliberals influenced the formation of the German Act 
against restraints of competition (GWB) 1957.110 This Act sought to preserve 
freedom of competition and was considered the constitution of the social 
market economy.111 So this supports the idea that the German competition 
law (GWB) was based on Ordoliberal theory and values. 
 
Authors such as Wegmann have further suggested that these ideas also 
affected the implementation of the competition law provisions of the 1957 EEC 
Treaty. However proving this is more difficult because of the political 
                                            
105
 Paul-Henri Spaak, ‘Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration. The Brussels 
Report on the General Common Market’ (June 1956) 
106
 Within the European Commission 
107
 And had worked with Erhard on the “Social Market Economy”. 
108
 Milène Wegmann, Der Einfluss des Neoliberalismus auf das Europäische 
Wettbewerbsrecht 1946-1965, Von den Wirtschaftswissenschaften zur Politik (2008, Baden-
Baden, Nomos) p 81-82; see also Gerber (n 2) 263 
109
 Wegmann (n 108) p 47-48 
110
 See most recently: K. K. Patel, H Schweitzer (ed), The Historical Foundations of EU 
Competition Law (OUP 2013) p 98 
111
 Wegmann (n 108) p 49-50 
Ordoliberalism and its Influence on EU tying law 
36 
 
manoeuvring that accompanied the implementation of these measures. The 
German delegation to the negotiations wanted a ban on cartels and a 
separate prohibition on abuse of a dominant position within the Common 
Market. This reflected the GWB which was influenced by the Ordoliberals. The 
other delegations from France, Belgium and the Netherlands favoured 
controls that reflected their own national competition laws (whether those laws 
were in force or not). 112  The French, Belgian and Dutch drafts treated 
agreements and monopolies the same. The French wanted to ban both, while 
the Belgians and the Dutch wanted both to be subject to tests of abuse.113 
However it should also be considered that while the countries were trying to 
protect their own national interests, both France and Germany were seeking 
to use competition to either maintain or increase the efficiency of their own 
economies. 114  So there was also common ground. As a consequence it 
appears that in a tactical move, Müller-Armack withdrew the German proposal. 
This allowed the French delegation to bring their own final proposal which 
essentially met the German delegation’s requirements and reflected to a large 
extent the German design.115 This was, of course, accepted by the German 
delegation. As a consequence the political victory was for France while the 
Treaty articles followed the German design.116 
6.4. Memoirs 
There are also memoirs available of those who were involved with the Treaty 
negotiations first hand. Below are extracts from the works of Joseph Van 
Tichelen, former Director General of the Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Alfred Müller-Armack, who has already been mentioned, who worked in 
the Ministry of Economics under Ludwig Erhard and later become Secretary of 
State for European Affairs between 1958 and 1963. These views also provide 
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a valuable insight to the negotiations and also suggest success on the part of 
the Germans in negotiating competition law articles that favoured their legal 
and theoretical tradition. Joseph Van Tichelen writes: 
 
“[Articles 85 to 90]117 well known articles in the legal world and the 
subject of fear to industrialists, were proposed by the German 
delegation. We knew that there was going to be fierce debate. But 
Bonn’s arguments were irrefutable. It was necessary to prevent secret 
agreements re-establishing borders by private agreement after they 
had been removed. The articles in question are constitutional nature, 
therefore they are written in general terms, which were later made 
more specific by the regulations of the Community (regulation 17 in 
particular) and by the decisions of the Court”118 
 
And also Müller-Armack writes: 
 
“the opponents of a cartel policy ... had presented texts that were a 
blatant contradiction of the German viewpoint. ... The French 
delegation, in particular, put up a great deal of bitter resistance until I 
asked them to present their own text. To our surprise, they submitted a 
draft that hardly differed from our concept or from the text used later in 
the Treaty. Without any hesitation, I accepted the French proposal.”119 
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118
 Original quote: “Articles 85 à 90. Règles de concurrence. Ces articles, fameux dans le 
monde des juristes et sujet d'effroi pour les industriels, furent proposés par la délégation 
allemande. Nous savions que nous allions au-devant de fortes hostilités, mais l'argumentation 
de Bonn était irréfutable. Il fallait prévenir qu'après l'effacement des frontières, les opérateurs 
privés ne les rétablissent par accord secret. Les articles en question sont de nature 
constitutionnelle, donc rédigés en formules générales, qui ont été précisées ultérieurement 
par des lois de la Communauté (règlement 17 notamment) et par la jurisprudence de la Cour 
de Luxembourg.” 
From Joseph Van Tichelen, Souvenirs de la négociation du traité de Rome 
http://www.ena.lu/joseph_van_tichelen_souvenirs_negociation_traite_rome-010007163.html 
accessed on 03/2011 
119
 Müller-Armack, Alfred, Auf dem Weg nach Europa, Erinnerungen und Ausblicke. Tübingen 
(Stuttgart, Rainer Wunderlich, C.E. Poeschel, 1971) pp. 106-120. Translated by the CVCE; 
see also Jean Monnet, Memoirs (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1978) 
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This suggests that the Treaty provisions were largely based around what the 
German delegation was seeking, even if it was the French proposal that was 
indeed accepted.120 
6.5. Broader European research 
Most recently greater work has been done to establish the varying levels of 
influence on EU competition law from a wide range of potential sources. With 
regard to the influence of national traditions of competition law further support 
has been given to the idea that the German influence was decisive in framing 
the EEC Treaty’s competition provisions121 and in the drafting of Regulation 
17/62. 122  While the French did secure some provisions, particularly in 
reference to exclusive dealing agreements during the negotiations on 
Regulation 17/62, the general framework of Regulations 17/62 was influenced 
by the German approach.123 This can be seen not least in the ex-ante system 
of enforcement. This required agreements to be notified to the Commission.124 
Additionally, it has been argued that the national competition laws had an 
impact not only on the substantial provisions of European competition law but 
also on the institutional implementation. That is to say, the French 
Commission technique des ententes125 had mostly non-permanent staff and 
the French and Dutch authorities dealt with far fewer cases. The French 
authority, for example, reviewed 19 cases in its first five years while the Dutch 
reviewed only 36 cartels over six years. 126  In contrast, the German 
                                            
120
 For an alternative view point see; Ian S. Forrester, The Modernization of EC Antitrust 
Policy, Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security (2000) Florence, June 2/3 pp 4-5, although 
once again this opinion applies to Article 85 (101) not 86 (102) and therefore has limited 
application to tying practice. 
121
 K. K. Patel, H Schweitzer (ed), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 
2013) p 110 
122
 Regulation 17/62 will not be a focus in this work as it relates to the implementation of 
procedural rules regarding Article 85 (now article 101). Therefore while an understanding of 
the Regulations may give light as to further German influence on European competition law it 
does not, as a consequence, relate to tying. 
123
 K. K. Patel, H Schweitzer (ed), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 
2013) p 110-111 
124
 This has since been altered by Regulation 1/2003 creating a directly applicable exception 
system. Notably this modification was strongly objected to by German Lawyers, see; Birgit E. 
Will, Dieter Schmidtchen, 'Fighting Cartels: Some Economics of Council Regulation (EC) 
1/2003' Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Discussion Paper No 2008-02 (July 16, 
2008) p 3 
125
 Predecessor of the “Autorité de la concurrence” the French competition authority 
126
 K. K. Patel, H Schweitzer (ed), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 
2013) p 109-110 
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Bundeskartellamt had a permanent staff of 180 members and made 1500 
decisions in the first three years it existed.127 Therefore from an institutional 
perspective German competition policy was very influential in shaping 
European competition law. 
 
When drawn together then, the preceding sources seem to point towards the 
same conclusion. While there was French influence during the early formative 
years of EU competition law, the greatest influence was that of the German 
delegation and as a consequence the influence of the Ordoliberals. This also 
suggests, in reference to tying, that it was the German law against restraints 
(GWB) that was followed by the EEC Treaty. Particularly when there is 
suggestion that although the GWB was only adopted in 1957 the “essential 
components” were already in place by 1956. 128  Further it should be 
remembered that even those who consider the German influence to be over 
stated accept that the final provisions of the Treaty of Rome’s competition 
provisions represent a compromise between the delegations, with “the 
Germans having their way more than any other delegation”.129 Therefore it 
appears that Ordoliberalism is the economic theory upon which Article 85 
(now 102 TFEU) and its tying prohibition are based. 
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 K. K. Patel, H Schweitzer (ed), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 
2013) p 109-110 
128
 Robert O'Donoghue, Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Oxford, 
Second Edition, Hart Publishing 2013) p 59 
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7.0 Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that Ordoliberalism was formed at a time of failing 
democracy and ascending fascism. An economy with power concentrated in 
the hands of the few had helped undermine a weak democratic government. 
As a consequence the Freiburg school expounded a doctrine that required a 
strong state that used its strength to maintain the economic freedom of the 
people, the economic freedom of the entrepreneur. It was this economic 
freedom that would help maintain the conditions of political freedom. This 
would be protected by an economic constitution and where monopoly did 
persist it would be regulated by an independent monopoly office. 
 
This thinking was welcomed in Germany at a time when laissez-faire 
capitalism was seen as insufficient by the German public and socialism was 
seen as undesirable by the victorious allied powers. As a consequence of 
their training, their respected positions, their general opposition to the Nazi 
regime and their careful planning and desire to rebuild Germany after the war, 
many Ordoliberals entered government and began to influence policy making 
directly. As a consequence of this both German competition law and EU 
competition law began to reflect aspects of Ordoliberal thought. This is also 
reflected in the law on tying. 
 
The Ordoliberals placed importance on a number of principles. These include 
a strong democratic government using competition to control private economic 
power, the use of economically defined market states to aid in the application 
of law, the institution of an economic constitution to protect the economic 
freedom of the individual and where necessary an independent body to 
require those with market power to act ‘as it’ subject to competition. 
 
In relation to the law on tying specifically, it has been shown that tying 
prohibitions existed prior to World War II in Germany. These prohibitions first 
came about through the use of very general principles of commercial law 
based on the German Civil Code that were applied by judges to business 
transactions that restricted economic freedom. At this point these transactions 
Ordoliberalism and its Influence on EU tying law 
41 
 
were apparently based on moral standards rather than economic theory. After 
World War II the legal tradition of the United States began to have an impact 
on German competition law through the introduction of laws in the British and 
US allied zones. This brought with it the nomenclature that is associated with 
tying in Germany presently. Most significantly it has been argued that the EEC 
Treaty provisions on tying are essentially based upon the same foundation as 
the GWB provision against tying. As a consequence of this and the 
corroborating evidence discussed above this suggests that the EEC Treaty’s 
competition delegations, negotiations and consequently provisions were 
influenced by Ordoliberal economists and lawyers, and therefore it is argued 
that the theoretical basis of early EU tying law is Ordoliberal in nature. 
 
In relation to the thesis as a whole this chapter demonstrates that tying law in 
the EU was at its inception linked to the Freiburg school of thought. This is 
important because it establishes a link between Ordoliberalism and EU tying 
law and also gives a basis from which to analyse decisions of the Commission 
and the EU courts to see if and when they reflect Ordoliberal thinking. This in 
turn builds foundation from which to assess what the economic reasoning 
underpinning tying law is and whether that reasoning is valid. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The Chicago School of antitrust analysis is a relatively modern School of 
thought beginning in the 1950s. Initially considered a lunatic fringe,1 within a 
few decades, it became increasingly influential and its impact reached the US 
Supreme Court.2 This chapter will explain how the Chicago School became a 
strong influence in US antitrust thinking and will explain the main substantive 
principles that have been expounded by its followers. The role of this chapter 
within the thesis is to provide a foundation for the evaluation of the decisions 
of the EU Commission and courts and to allow the author to compare the 
theoretical foundations of those decisions with the Chicago School’s approach 
(along with Ordoliberalism and post-Chicago). Later chapters will demonstrate 
that the EU competition enforcement authorities show little evidence of 
following Chicago School thinking and, at times, expressly reject arguments 
that would be considered valid from a Chicago School perspective. 
 
The first section of this chapter sets out the historical context of antitrust 
development within the United States. It will explain how antitrust law first 
began to be applied in the United States and the concerns that motivated its 
implementation. It will be seen that in the early stages of US antitrust 
development, the primary concern was for the opportunity and freedom of the 
US citizen to make their own way through their own labour and hard work. 
There was also a further concern that antitrust was intended to address, which 
was manifest in the congressional debate surrounding antitrust legislation,3 
namely the protection of democracy from being undermined by private 
economic power.4 At this time competition was viewed as a natural order that 
had the consequence of producing a just society consonant with God’s will 
and morality. US antitrust law then started to take on more economic thought 
                                            
1
 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis (1979) 127 U.Pa.L.Rev 925, 
931 
2
 Michael S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative foundations of antitrust economics (1995) 74 
N.C.L.Rev 219, 220, 236-237 
3
 See the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C and particularly the Clayton Antitrust Act 1914 
38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 
4
 It is interesting that in both Germany (see chapter one) and the United States one of the 
principle concerns associated with competition law/antitrust was the effect on democracy of 
powerful concentrations of economic power. 
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due to the work of the Harvard School of Antitrust analysis. This School5 
argued that the structure of a market affected its performance and that 
concentration in industry resulted in inefficient markets. But this school of 
thought began to be challenged in the 1950s by a new line of thinking, the 
Chicago School. 
 
The second section relates to the substantive elements of the Chicago School. 
It will be seen that the Chicago School sought to base antitrust law and policy 
exclusively upon the aim of economic efficiency and sought to understand the 
market by viewing the actions of market actors through price theory. They also 
believed that in an unregulated market there were few barriers to entry. It will 
be explained that these views meant that they argued against the hostility 
displayed by antitrust authorities towards resale price maintenance, predatory 
pricing, vertical integration and tying, arguing that such hostility was 
unwarranted as there was little a firm could do to on its own to increase their 
market power. Instead the Chicago School argued that only mergers that 
create monopolies and price fixing cartels should be pursued as a matter of 
antitrust policy. The importance of this section within the chapter is to set out 
the Chicago School’s main principles and arguments so that they can be 
referred to in later chapters concerning the EU approach to tying. In later 
chapters where the approach of the EU Commission and courts is considered, 
the substantive principles provided here will be contrasted in order to 
demonstrate that EU jurisprudence does not follow a Chicago School line of 
thinking. In relation to the thesis this is an important step in finding out which 
economic theory or theories the Commission and courts rely upon in making 
their decisions. 
 
Third and finally two elements of criticism of the Chicago School will be put 
forward.  The first, the author’s own criticism, argues that the work of certain 
                                            
5
 Lisa Gormsen, The Parallels between the Harvard Structural School and Article 82 EC and 
the divergences between the Chicago school and post-Chicago Schools and Article 82 EC 
(2008) 4 European Comp Journal 221; Michael S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative 
foundations of antitrust economics (1995) 74 N.C.L.Rev 219; William E. Kovacic, The 
intellectual DNA of modern U.S. competition law for dominant firm conduct: The 
Chicago/Harvard double helix [2007] Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Warren S. 
Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An integrated handbook 9-10 (2nd ed. 2006) 
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Chicago scholars, such as Posner, advocate an interpretation of barriers to 
entry, particularly access to capital, which is narrow and ignores the potential 
for dominant firms to hinder market entry from firms that do not have 
significant access to capital. Posner argues that access to capital for example 
is not a barrier to entry, and that capital costs, in reality, make up a very small 
percentage of a manufacturer’s costs. It will be argued that the facts of the 
market place as represented by Posner are open to alternative interpretation. 
The facts given by Posner can equally be interpreted to suggest that only 
those firms that are able to secure finance on favourable terms are willing to 
enter new markets or finance institutions will only lend to those who have 
sufficient resources to allow them to lend on favourable terms. This is relevant 
to the issue of tying because tying can be used in increase the amount of 
capital needed to enter a market, and therefore if access to capital is a barrier 
to entry this supports the view that tying can be used strategically to hinder 
entry into certain markets. 
 
The second criticism will begin to explain how Chicago has come to be viewed 
by some as far more ideological and less logically and mathematically robust 
than first thought. It will also be explained that while Chicago was seen as 
mathematical and scientific, and tended to portray opponents as subjective 
and vague, this reputation, as early as the mid-1980s, began to be 
questioned6 and the theories of Chicago are now seen as more uncertain, 
taking into account that they are at least in part based on unproven 
assumptions. This second criticism leads into the next chapter which is on 
post-Chicago antitrust analysis. This criticism of the Chicago School is 
significant because it assists in demonstrating that there are economically 
justifiable reasons why the Commission and courts do not follow the Chicago 
School of antitrust analysis in their decisions. 
 
                                            
6
 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy after Chicago, (1985) 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 232; John 
J. Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, (1981) 12 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
335, 339-40; Michael S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative foundations of antitrust 
economics (1995) 74 N.C.L.Rev 219, 234 
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2.0 Historical Context and Development 
1880-1950  
2.1.  Historical Context 
US antitrust analysis has gone through a number of stages in its development. 
Unlike the Freiburg School, the historical developments that have shaped 
American antitrust law have been researched and are well known.7 However, 
to paint a fuller picture of the context in which the Chicago School of thought 
originated and developed, the history of US antitrust must be briefly 
summarised. Without doing so, it is possible to miss the marked transition 
periods and to be under the false impression that antitrust in the United States 
has always been seeking to serve the same, or similar, goals. 
 
The Sherman Act 18908 was the first competition statute of the United States. 
It was a novel and monumental legislative instrument, but its creation was not 
spontaneous, either legally or in concept. Opinions of the US courts, like that 
of Justice Stephen Field in 1884, capture the zeitgeist before the Sherman Act 
was enacted. In one particular case,9  he emphasised the interrelationship 
between liberty, labour and property, and referred to the Declaration of 
Independence itself to support the ideal that it is a right to be able to pursue 
one’s own happiness through lawful business and vocation.10 This opinion, 
and others like it at the time, sought to legally protect private opportunity as a 
right that was as essential to individual freedom as any other. But even at this 
early stage there were others who voiced concerns regarding the interference 
of the state favouring one group over another in acts of “misguided 
paternalism”.11 At this time competition itself was seen as the natural order. It 
was seen by many as essential, or to put it in the words of Walker, the first 
president of the American Economic Association: 
 
                                            
7
 James May, Antitrust in the Formative era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional 
and Antitrust analysis, 1880-1918, (1989) 50 Ohio State Law Journal 257, 259 
8
 Sherman Act 1890, 26 Stat. 209 
9
 Butchers’ Union Slaughter House & Live Stock Landing Co. V Crescent City Live-Stock 
Landing & Slaughter-House Co 11U.S. 746, 754-60 (1884) 
10
 May (n 7) 264 
11
 ibid 264-266 
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“…rightly viewed perfect competition would be seen to be the order of 
the economic universe, as truly as gravity is the order of the physical 
universe, and to be not less harmonious and beneficent in operation.”12 
 
Further, academic and popular texts often stated that competition tended to 
produce results that were just and in accordance with God’s will and 
morality.13 So the original concern for competition was born of natural law. 
This belief meant that judges and the populous at large were concerned with 
two major issues at this time. First, the maintenance of economic liberty, 
including the competitive process, and second, the protection of the people 
from interference either from the government or private activity. 14  This 
concern for the competitive process was further accelerated as 
industrialisation of the United States changed the pattern of business and 
production. Increased ability to produce combined with the ability to distribute 
effectively to larger areas meant that firms sought protection through mutual 
co-operation, including through mergers, cartels, pools,15 holding companies 
and “trusts”.16 
 
This led to the Sherman Act in 1890, an act that gave legislative flesh to the 
concerns that had been brought before the courts in the preceding years. This 
was because, in the words of Senator Sherman himself: 
 
“It is the right of every man to work, labour, and produce in any lawful 
vocation and to transport his production on equal terms and conditions 
and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and lies at the 
foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges”.17 
                                            
12
 F. Walker, Political Economy (3
rd
 ed 1888) 263 
13
 May (n 7), 271 
14
 ibid 283 
15
 Pools were arrangements between groups of firms to fix prices and divide business in order 
to maximise profits. 
16
 Trusts were a way of giving control over a number of competing firms to a board of trustees. 
These trustees were then able to use their power, should they choose, to reduce competition 
between those firms, < http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/616563/United-
States/77809/Industrialization-of-the-US-economy?anchor=ref612906> accessed 19/08/2014; 
James May, Antitrust in the Formative era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional 
and Antitrust analysis, 1880-1918, (1989) 50 Ohio State Law Journal 257, 284 
17
 2 Cong Rec 2461 (1890) 
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It is noteworthy from a developmental point of view that Congress delegated 
“extraordinary broad authority to the courts to develop a common law of 
competition.” 18  This was to ensure antitrust law would suppress anti-
competitive acts rather than a particular form of behaviour. The Sherman Act 
and later legislation intended to buttress antitrust law, such as the Clayton Act 
1914,19 also produced a great deal of congressional debate focused upon the 
concern of private economic power controlling and subverting republican 
institutions. It was this concern for individual economic freedom and the 
potential misuse of private economic power that antitrust law in the United 
States was originally designed to address and not any particular view of 
economists.20  
2.2. The Harvard School of Antitrust Analysis 
As the Sherman Act became more market and industry oriented, a line of 
thinking developed called the “Harvard structural School” 21 . However the 
exact identification of this school of thought is made more difficult by the 
number of names that have been given to the approach. These names include 
“the Harvard School of Industrial Organisation”,22 “structuralist”,23 “industrial 
organisation”, the “traditional school”, or “traditionalist”.24 What is known is 
that from the 1940s to the 1950s, a school of thought was flourishing that 
considered that there were many aims to competition law and that they were 
served by ensuring that the structure of the market was maintained in a 
                                            
18
 Gordon B. Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to single firm exercises of monopoly 
power: a response,  (1983) 52 Antitrust L.J. 651, 651 
19
 The Clayton Act (Clayton Act 1914, 38 Stat. 731) was an antitrust Act that, unlike the 
Sherman Act, defined more precisely particular behaviours that were prohibited, often on the 
condition they lessened competition. Examples of such behaviour include price discrimination, 
exclusive dealing and tying 
20
 May (n 7) 287 
21
 Gormsen (n 5) 222 
22
 Michael S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative foundations of antitrust economics (1995) 74 
N.C.L.Rev 219, 227 
23
 Barbara A. White, Countervailing power- Different rules for different markets? Conduct and 
context in antitrust law and economics, (1992) 41 Duke L.J. 1045, 1055 
24
 William E. Kovacic, The intellectual DNA of modern U.S. competition law for dominant firm 
conduct: The Chicago/Harvard double helix [2007] Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 23 (footnote 63); 
see also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An integrated 
handbook 9-10 (2
nd
 ed. 2006); Also this school sometimes overlap with the “modern populist 
school”, which by no means aids clarity, see S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative 
foundations of antitrust economics (1995) 74 N.C.L.Rev 219, 220 and compare 227. 
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particular fashion.25 Originally what has been described as “populist” models 
began to take on an element of economics26 through the Harvard School 
mainly based around the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm.27 
This approach suggested that the structure of the market affected the conduct 
and thus the performance of that market. So, for example, it argued that 
oligopolistic markets and overly concentrated markets were likely to produce 
anti-competitive behaviour.28 Another facet of the Harvard School was that it 
believed market entry and barriers to entry were important as difficult market 
entry could lead to concentrated markets where collusion would be 
expected.29 
 
During the 1950s, however, a new line of thought began to develop in the 
United States: the Chicago School. This started under the direction of Aaron 
Director but also included Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Lester Telser, 
Harold Demsetz, John McGee, Ward Bowman, and Meyer Burstein.30 
2.3. The Origin of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis 
The Chicago School started as part of the wider Chicago School of 
Economics. It was not intended from the outset to be a new school of 
antitrust,31 but rather started through the analysis of market behaviour and 
antitrust policy using price theory and the assumption that business men were 
rational profit maximisers. 32 This was in contrast to the Harvard School of 
thought which used the S-C-P paradigm.33 It largely developed out of a single 
research community and therefore shares many of the characteristics and 
adherents of the larger Chicago economics movement.34 It grew from a small 
number of law and economics academics in Chicago grouped around Aaron 
                                            
25
 Gormsen (n 5)  227 
26
 Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and 
Economics, (1984) 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1560 
27
 Gormsen (n 5) 222 
28
 This led to policies that favoured high numbers of smaller firms in a market rather than a 
low number of big firms. 
29
 ibid 223 
30
 ibid 227 
31
 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis (1979) 127 U.Pa.L.Rev 925, 
926 
32
 Ibid 928 
33
 William H. Page, The Chicago school and the evolution of antitrust: Characterization, 
antitrust injury and evidentiary sufficiency (1989) 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221, 1231 
34
 Ibid 1229 
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Director,35 through repeated journal articles whereupon the members would 
cite each other.36 This proved an effective strategy. While the school had 
been initially disregarded 37  by 1980 the arguments of Chicago were 
considered “persuasive” 38  with a perhaps over enthusiastic Judge Bork 
declaring only two years later that Chicago had won the “final and irreversible” 
victory.39 While this view is may be biased, given that Bork was himself an 
ardent Chicago School scholar, even non-Chicago scholars accepted in 1981 
that “regard for efficiency40 [was] in the ascendancy”.41 By the late 1980s, 
Chicago was not only the dominant model, but Chicagoans could look to the 
Supreme Court42 and Justice Department Merger Guidelines43 for evidence of 
its acceptance.44 
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 Aaron Director personally published very little, but he is credited by the main Chicago 
School adherents with formulating the key ideas of the school and passing them on orally to 
students who went on to develop them, see; Richard A. Posner, ‘The Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis’ (1979) 127 U.Pa.L.Rev 925, 925-926 
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 William H. Page, The Chicago school and the evolution of antitrust: Characterization, 
antitrust injury and evidentiary sufficiency (1989) 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221, 1229 1230 
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 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis (1979) 127 U.Pa.L.Rev 925, 
931 
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 Michael S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative foundations of antitrust economics (1995) 74 
N.C.L.Rev 219, 220 
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 Robert Bork, Emerging Substantive Standards-developments and need for change, (1982) 
50 Antitrust L.J. 179, 181 
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 Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A new equilibrium, (1981) 66 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1140, 1140; see also Michael S. Jacobs, An essay on the normative foundations of 
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 FTC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2018-20 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1354-60 (1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2857-59 (1985); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619-21 (1985); NCAA v. Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-15 (1984); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 
U.S. 752, 767-71, 775-77 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-
18 (1984) (majority); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 32-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984); Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 
U.S. 1, 9-10, 19-21 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-59 & 
n.21 (1977); Illinois Brick C. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731-44 (1977); United States Steel Corp. 
v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610, 620-22 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977). See Frank H. Easterbrook, ‘Workable Antitrust Policy’ 
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13,102 (June 14, 1982); Robert Pitofsky, 'New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault 
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Some commentators such as Bickel have suggested that the Chicago School 
gained credibility largely due to the fact that many economists and antitrust 
academics believed that economics had reached a point where behaviour 
could be judged mathematically as anti-competitive or not using economics.45 
Further he states that, “the certitude with which many of the [Chicago] 
economists expressed their conclusions and their reliance on various esoteric 
mathematical models were hard to rebut.” 46  Burns states that Chicago’s 
approach was founded on a “seemingly neutral economic model; it is logical, 
internally consistent, and easy to grasp”47 and it gave clear definitive answers 
to questions that confused the judiciary for decades.48 Therefore it appears 
that at least part of the success of the Chicago School was built upon the view 
that it was neutral, impartial and based on objective economic models. 
Simultaneously the Chicago School portrayed the work of those opposed to 
Chicago School thinking as: descriptive, metaphorical, casual with “eclectic 
forays into sociology and psychology”.49 This gave the Chicago School great 
credibility and undermined those who disagreed with their policy arguments. 
3.0 Substantive Elements of the Chicago 
School of Thought 
 
Two of the most fundamental differences between the Chicago School of 
antitrust and previous schools (such as the Harvard School) is that it states 
that, first, economic efficiency50 should be the exclusive goal of antitrust law.51 
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Second, the best tool for assessing economic efficiency in the real world is 
price theory. 52  Chicago argued that antitrust enforcement was hostile to 
business practices, many of which were merely novel and not actually 
damaging. Using price theory they sought to evaluate behaviour and ascertain 
whether or not it affected output and price. 53  As a result of using this theory 
many actions that had previously been considered monopolistic, 54  they 
considered to have normal, rational efficiency reasons for being pursued.55 As 
a result this presented previous antitrust enforcement as harsh, over-zealous 
and out of tune with business thinking. This new, seemingly scientific 
approach appeared more desirable than the previous Harvard thinking that 
had been dominant.56 
 
Easterbrook, a member of the Chicago School himself, described the Chicago 
School as having a number of central tenets. He put forward following eight 
points: 
 
“(1) No antitrust policy should be based on a belief that atomistic competition 
is better than some blend of cooperation and competition. The right blend 
varies from market to market. 
(2) No antitrust policy should be based on a belief that courts and other 
institutions of government can identify the "best" structure of a market... 
(3) Competition is hardier than you think... 
(4) Practices that look monopolistic (because they involve cooperation) may 
be beneficial... 
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(5) No antitrust policy may safely disregard the survival of complex practices. 
We may not know what these practices do, but survival in the face of other 
practices and products indicates that they serve some function... 
(6) No question should be answered without adequate data... 
(7) Until we know what a durable business practice does, no one should 
prohibit the use of that practice... 
(8) Until we know the costs of alternative forms of regulation, we should be 
patient. It is never right to compare the visible costs of reality against a 
presumed cost-free substitute. Every program has costs, and government 
failures may be more troubling than market failures because no competitive 
pressures automatically undermine government failures.”57 
 
These principles are all quite abstract however, but in practice these elements 
work to provide a number of arguments on how competition law should be 
directed. 
3.1. The Purpose of Antitrust Law 
As already mentioned the Chicago school of thought does not believe that 
there is a purpose for antitrust beyond the promotion of economic efficiency.58 
The fact that Chicago scholars have argued that it is within the original intent 
of congress to pursue efficiency as a single goal has come under strong 
criticism,59 but since this has already been dealt by others60 and relates more 
to US antitrust policy than antitrust norms, it will not be dealt with here. 
However, it is important when considering the aims of Chicago to remember 
that it considers the only legitimate aim of competition law to be economic 
efficiency. As consequence this “implies accepting ... that sometimes one 
large firm is best, when that firm can produce most cheaply ... [and that] 
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atomistic competition may not be as efficient as other market structures”.61 As 
such they submit that artificial protection of competitors is inconsistent with 
competition.62 
 
3.2. Barriers to Entry 
One of the main pillars that holds up the Chicago theory is that there are no, 
or few, artificial barriers to entry in new markets.63 Easterbrook states that 
monopoly prices attract new competitors to the market and that if this does not 
happen the answer is not that there has been anticompetitive conduct but 
rather that judges and/or litigants have misunderstood the practice.64 This has 
far reaching consequences if true. After all, if firms cannot erect artificial 
barriers to entry then essentially almost any form of unilateral behaviour 
conducted by a firm will fail to exclude firms from the market for any real 
length of time.65 Consequently, Chicago School scholars believe that there 
are few situations in which a firm can “obtain or enhance monopoly power by 
unilateral action”66 
3.3. Cartels and Price Fixing 
The Chicago School stipulation that there are few barriers to entry has further 
consequences too. If there are no barriers to entry then even firms with great 
monopoly power or cartels will cause no real problem, because as soon as 
the monopolistic firm or the cartel raises prices above a certain level, this will 
attract new market entrants which will cause the price to drop down to the 
appropriate level.67 They also believe that cartels were highly unstable due to 
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the tendency of members to cheat and the inability to prevent the entry of new 
firms into the market, as such cartels would rarely succeed and cost too little 
to warrant public pursuit.68 With this in mind it may be asked, from the view 
point of the Chicago School, what is the point of having any antitrust law, 
since even cartels are not a serious long term threat to competition? Stigler 
carried out work studying when the benefits of collusion (to a cartel firm) 
exceeded the costs of preventing cartel members cheating, again using price 
theory as the tool of analysis.69 He suggested that tacit collusion would only 
be a problem in a market subject to very high levels of concentration. This 
gave way to an accepted Chicago position that only explicit price fixing and 
mergers that would create monopolies or near monopolies were worthy of the 
authorities’ attention.70 Easterbrook says that “the central purpose of antitrust 
is to speed up the arrival of the long run.”71 So even though in theory even 
price fixing cartels would be undermined by market entry, eventually Chicago 
scholars settled that explicit pricing fixing and very large horizontal mergers 
were worth “serious concern”. 72  Therefore they favour “little other than 
prosecuting plain vanilla cartels and mergers to monopoly”.73  
3.4. Resale Price Maintenance 
According to Posner, a leading Chicago scholar, resale price maintenance 
should not be viewed as a way of manufacturers giving vendors a monopoly 
profit and as such is not harmful to competition or consumers. 74 He viewed 
such an aim as irrational from the point of view of the manufacturer and that 
resale price maintenance must serve some other function for the 
manufacturer. Posner suggested that by preventing price competition among 
dealers, dealers would offer other services instead in order to add value. For 
example, the retailer may offer point of sale advertising, show room display, 
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knowledgeable sales personnel etc. He suggested such services may not be 
offered if there was a risk of retailers “free-ridding”. That is, for example, 
where a retailer may undercut the price of other retailers while expecting 
those other retailers to provide presale services to the customer.  
3.5. Predatory Pricing 
Posner did not consider that predatory pricing should be regulated by the 
competition authorities.  In his view, predatory pricing was unprofitable. He 
argued that even in the long run, predatory pricing would not be an effective 
strategy for increasing market share.75 The predator would lose money during 
the period of selling below cost and when they try to raise prices later, when 
the competitor had been driven from the market, new entrants would be drawn 
into the market by the high prices. The price would then be forced down to the 
competitive level and the predator would essentially be back in their original 
position, albeit now with the losses incurred during the period of predation. 
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3.6. Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration is also deemed to be for reasons other than monopoly. If a 
monopoly producer takes over a distribution network they cannot earn 
monopoly profits at both the production and manufacturing level. Since the 
product and its distribution are complementary, increasing the price of 
distribution, when the production is already sold at the optimum monopoly 
price would have the consequence of reducing demand. Two monopoly profits 
could not be obtained. As a consequence, Chicago Scholars postulate that 
vertical integration must be carried out for other reasons than the desire for 
additional monopoly profits.76 
3.7. Tying 
The views of the Chicago School that have greatest relevance to this thesis 
are those on tying. There were a number of reasons why, prior to the Chicago 
School, tying had been argued to be illegal in the United States’ courts. One 
of these regards what has become known as ‘leverage theory’. The concept of 
leverage theory is as follows: a company has a monopoly in good ‘A’. It also 
produces good ‘B’ but the market for good B is competitive. By tying good ‘A’ 
to good ‘B’ the monopolist is therefore able to extend their monopoly over two 
markets. Therefore the monopolist obtains the ability to charge super-
competitive prices in two markets and earns two monopoly profits. The 
potential for extending a monopoly unduly was expressed in various US 
cases77 and the discussion of preventing the extension of monopoly at one 
point “dominated” the US Supreme Court’s analysis of tying cases.78 This 
reasoning based on leverage theory appeared to go unchallenged for a 
number of years as shown by its citation in the Report of the Attorney 
General’s Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws in 1955, where it said that 
tying contracts were for “monopolistic exploitation” and “artificially extending 
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the market for the ‘tied’ product”.79 However, Bowman, a Chicago scholar, in a 
seminal article, criticised this approach and argued that the idea of extending 
a monopoly into another market (whereby production can be reduced and 
prices increased) needed to revaluated.80 He evaluated five tying situations81 
and found that only in one of them was there the possibility to create another 
monopoly in the tied product. This is when the two products are complements 
so that a change in the price of one affects the sales of the other.82 This 
rejection of the traditional leverage theory was taken further again by Posner83 
and Bork,84 who stated that tying was simply not a rational way to acquire a 
second monopoly profit. For this, Posner gives the following illustration:  
 
“If one takes two products, such as a mimeograph85 machine and ink, 
the consumer will not consider the distribution of cost relevant. What 
they will be looking at is the price of buying a mimeographing service.86 
A rise in the price of one element will be seen as an increase in the 
cost of the service as a whole. If the machine is priced at the optimal 
monopoly level in the first place any further increase in the cost of the 
tied product (the ink) will push the price of the service as a whole above 
the optimal monopoly level and as a consequence will lower the 
monopolist’s profits. On this basis there is little point in pursuing tying 
arrangements for anticompetitive reasons and therefore they should 
not be forbidden”. 
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If this view of tying is correct, then almost any sort of tie is irrelevant from an 
antitrust point of view. Any tie will merely alter the customers’ decision from 
“from whom do I buy product A and product B” to “from whom do I buy system 
X” (system X being a combination of products A and B). The customer will 
merely change the calculation from the price of two units to one system and 
compare them accordingly. If there is a non-tied combination of the products 
that is superior in quality, then the consumer will purchase those. The 
inference of this is that a dominant firm will not be able to obtain any greater 
profit by tying than by selling their monopolised product individually. In chapter 
three it will be shown that this view of tying is oversimplified and there are 
ways in which tying can be used to raise prices. There are also other anti-
competitive effects that can be caused by tying beyond increases in price that 
will be discussed in chapters three87 and four.88 
4.0 Criticism of the Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis 
4.1. Barriers to Entry 
As already mentioned the Chicago Scholars do not believe that there are 
many genuine barriers to entry. This raises the question of whether or not 
barriers to entry do or do not exist. Excluding government sanctioned barriers, 
the following are generally considered barriers to entry: sunk costs, 
economies of scale, essential facilities (including access to capital), privileged 
access to supply, a well developed sales network, advertising, network 
effects89 and intellectual property rights. 
 
In the context of tying access to capital is particularly important. This is 
because if access to capital is not a barrier to entry then any commercial 
behaviour employed by a dominant firm that makes market entry require 
greater amounts of capital is not harmful to competition. Correspondingly if 
access to capital is a barrier to entry then behaviour, such as tying, may make 
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access to the market more difficult if it means that new entrants require much 
greater capital reserves. Therefore it is important to consider whether the 
arguments raised by Chicago School in this regard are accurate. 
 
In relation to access to capital Posner states the following: 
“…Suppose that it costs $10,000,000 to build the smallest efficient 
plant to serve some market; then, it was argued, there is a $10,000,000 
"barrier to entry," a hurdle a new entrant would have to overcome to 
serve the market at no disadvantage vis a vis existing firms. But is 
there really a hurdle? If the $10,000,000 plant has a useful life of, for 
example, ten years, the annual cost to the new entrant is only 
$1,000,000. Existing firms bear the same annual cost, assuming that 
they plan to replace their plants. The new entrant, therefore, is not at 
any cost disadvantage after all.”90 
 
And while Posner accepts that a higher premium to obtain capital than 
existing firms may be one genuine disadvantage to new entrants 91  he 
continues to say that he does not believe that such a difference would be 
sufficient to stop firms entering a market where there is a monopoly profit 
being charged. He argues that in most cases, interest and profit are not more 
than ten percent of a manufacturing firm’s sales price and they are usually a 
lot less.92 Further he states that the risk premium is less if the entrant is a firm 
which is already established in other markets, which he considers often to be 
the case.93 
 
It is argued that this view is overly simplistic and falls short of the reality of 
business practice. To begin, most individuals94 simply would not be able to get 
finance for such an expensive project. It would be unlikely that an individual 
would be able to raise funds for an initial investment of $5,000,000, let alone 
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$10,000,000. After all in every business venture there is an innate risk, even if 
it is entirely due to external factors such as the risk of a market down turn. 
Therefore since individuals are unlikely to have $10,000,000 in capital, and it 
would not be easy to raise such funds unless they had assets worth 
$10,000,000 to which a loan could be fixed. So immediately to compete within 
a market that requires $10,000,000 initial investment is not possible for 
individuals. This means for those who are not part of a firm with substantial 
assets, the inability to raise $10,000,000 in finance is in itself a barrier to entry. 
Posner partially acknowledges this when he said that new entrant firms are 
usually established in other markets. There is no reason why individuals and 
relatively new firms would not want to enter new markets, but the fact that it is 
usually only firms well established in other markets that do so suggests that 
this is because they are the only firms able to acquire the requisite finance in 
the first place. 
Posner also argues that the interest paid by firms is usually much lower than 
10% of a manufacturing firm’s sales costs.95 Assuming this is true, the manner 
in which he interprets this fact is rather narrow. His argument appears to 
suggest that because most firms pay substantially less than 10% in interest 
costs, that market entry in unlikely to be hindered by such a small element of 
their costs. This fact can easily be viewed in another fashion. Assuming 
Posner is correct and the vast majority of firms spend far less than 10% on 
capital costs, this could equally indicate that any firm that would need to 
spend near or above 10% of its cost price on finance would consider such a 
venture unviable and therefore either the firm would choose not to enter that 
market, or the firm would be unable to find a source of funding that would 
provide capital on such terms because financiers themselves would view the 
venture as unviable.96 
 
This may be particularly true if it is difficult to ensure the new entrant will have 
time to recoup their sunk costs. The problem of ensuring sufficient time to 
recoup sunk costs has been illustrated by Baker. Using Chicago’s own 
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standard of a rational profit maximising firm, he argues that a firm will not 
enter a market, regardless of how high the super-competitive profits are, if the 
post-entry price will not remain high enough for long enough for that firm to 
recoup their sunk costs.97 Therefore, if a dominant firm convinces those who 
have the potential to enter the market, that such entry will lead to a rapid 
decrease in price, this would make it unpalatable for the rational business to 
enter the market. This applies even if the pre-entry price is monopolistic. This 
threat can take the form of a number of behaviours, not least excess capacity, 
high levels of advertising and contract provisions to meet the price of offers 
from rival firms.98 This behaviour incurs costs, but such costs will be off-set by 
the super-competitive prices the firm can charge when their competitors 
refuse to enter the market because they are aware that the incumbent would 
respond by causing a rapid decrease in price. 
 
Therefore the level of interest a new entrant would have to pay is important 
because assuming a monopolist has either little debt or lower interest capital 
costs, the higher the interest premium a new entrant pays for their access to 
capital, the higher the price a monopolist firm can charge while still preventing 
the new entrant from making profit. 
 
For example: 
 
Monopolist sells product A at £80 but drops the price to £52 on arrival of a 
new entrant (£48 costs, £2 profit £2 servicing capital) 
 
New entrant sells product A at £53 (£48 costs, £5 servicing capital £0 profit) 
 
This issue of access to capital is particularly relevant to tying. This is because 
if capital is difficult to access, the larger the initial outlay required to enter a 
market, the fewer the number of firms that are likely to have access to 
sufficient capital. As a consequence, if a dominant firm can make the initial 
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investment needed to enter a market as high as possible for potential entrants, 
this will minimise the number of entrants able to enter the market. 
 
A dominant firm may try to use tying to increase the capital required to enter a 
market. If the tied goods are complements, or if the vast majority of customers 
require both elements of the tie, then tying the goods together would mean 
that, in the absence of independent suppliers of the tying good, an entrant into 
the market may have to enter both markets simultaneously. As a result, a tie 
may make the initial investment required to enter a market higher as new 
entrants would have to invest in the capacity to make both the tying and the 
tied complement from the outset. If the tying product is expensive to replicate 
this could add substantial costs. When combined with an entrant needing to 
be aware of the monopoly profits in the first place, which may not be easy if 
the market is not transparent,99 such behaviour may severely limit the number 
of firms that are able to enter a market, even when monopoly costs are being 
charged. Therefore it is argued that the Chicago School view on access to 
capital does not consider all the potential interpretations of the facts, and 
therefore ignores how through the use of tying, a dominant undertaking may 
be able to hinder market entry.  
4.2. Challenges to the Chicago School 
Before moving on from the Chicago School to consider post-Chicago antitrust 
analysis in Chapter Three, it is important to consider how Chicago has been 
viewed more recently. At the start of this chapter, it was noted how the 
Chicago School’s success was facilitated by the appearance that it was based 
on sound objective principles that could be proven mathematically. More 
recently this has been challenged. One of the criticisms levelled at the 
Chicago School is that it is in fact more ideological than originally thought. 
Taking for example the matter of judicial capacity; Easterbrook noted how, in 
principle, there is unilateral conduct that can exclude competitors without 
increasing market efficiency, but claims that it is not possible to know when 
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this is happening.100 He goes on to say that even when there is a competitive 
failure, that does not show that regulation is better, or could do better.101 
Instead, he argues that business practices should be left to themselves until 
their effect is truly known, as in his opinion, interference is likely to cause 
greater loss of economic efficiency than the practice itself.102 This approach is 
noted by Jacobs who states that the Chicago School, “acknowledges the 
existence of informational and other market imperfections,” 103  but believe 
judicial consideration would only confuse matters. This assumption is of 
course a value judgement. Deciding whether or not judges or markets are 
better at dealing with unilateral behaviour which, even Chicago accepts can 
exist, depends upon whether the view taken of the market is optimistic or 
pessimistic, and whether the same is true of judicial ability.104  Jacobs further 
states that, “…like other scientists, antitrust economists may wish to deny the 
subjectivity of their enterprise,” 105  and, “…the practical impossibility of 
resolving these fundamental factual questions has effectively disguised an 
ideological argument as a seemingly scientific one.”106  
This has led to criticism that the Chicago School holds ideological beliefs that 
are out of touch with empirical and moral roots and that it seeks to implement 
its own agenda.107 Hovenkamp agrees stating in a far more blunt fashion that 
some commentators now,  “…regard this Chicago School claim of freedom 
from political interest with a good deal of scepticism, and some believe it to be 
simple hogwash, or perhaps even a cover for a very strong, pro-business 
political bias that works to the benefit of the rich.”108 Therefore it is now a far 
more widely held view that some of the foundational tenets of the Chicago 
School are based upon value judgements such as the inability of the judiciary 
to deal with competitive problems effectively and the superiority of the market 
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to correct for competition based deficiencies effectively over time. This has led 
to further criticism aimed at both their general values and also specific 
arguments about particular business practices. These will be explained in the 
next chapter on post-Chicago analysis. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the historical context of antitrust development within 
the United States. It has explained that, even before the enactment of the 
Shearman Act in 1884, the courts of the United States were making decisions 
to protect the liberty to work and sought to defend private economic 
opportunity. At this time, the primary concern was for the opportunity and 
freedom of the citizen to use their effort and labour to produce and provide for 
themselves. The ideal of competition was viewed as a natural order that had 
the consequence of producing a just society.  It was also evident from the 
congressional debate on the Sherman Act, and particularly the Clayton Act, 
that the regulation of competition through legislation was intended to address 
a further concern, namely, the protection of democracy from being 
undermined by private economic power, such as powerful corporations that 
were being formed by combining (in various ways) competitors into virtual 
monopolies. Over time greater study of antitrust gave rise to the Harvard 
School. This largely focused on the structure of a market, as it was believed 
that this affected the conduct of those in the market and consequently 
impacted upon their performance. During the 1950s however the Chicago 
School began to emerge, arguing that the focus for antitrust should 
exclusively rest upon economic efficiency and that the market should be 
understood through price theory. They also believed that in an unregulated 
market there were few barriers to entry. These views meant that they argued 
against the pursuit by antitrust enforcement authorities of many business 
practices including tying, resale price maintenance, predatory pricing, and 
vertical integration. In their view, these business practices did not increase the 
market power of the firm implementing them, even if they held a dominant 
position in the relevant market. Instead the Chicago School argued that only 
mergers that created monopolies and price fixing cartels should be pursued 
as a matter of antitrust policy. 
 
It has been argued that this view of barriers to entry is not necessarily 
reflective of reality. With particular reference to access to capital, it has been 
argued that the facts of the market place as represented by Posner are open 
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to alternative interpretations. Posner asserts that most firms’ capital costs 
make up only a small fraction of their overall costs and that most market 
entrants are already well established in other markets (allowing them to 
secure loans on assets already held). Posner interprets these facts to mean 
that access to capital is not a hindering factor for market entrants because it 
constitutes such a small amount of their costs. An alternative interpretation of 
these facts has been put forward.  It has been argued by the author that only 
those firms that are able to secure finance on favourable terms are willing to 
enter new markets and/or finance institutions will only lend to those firms that 
already have sufficient resources to allow them to lend on favourable terms. 
This being the case, capital access may be a real barrier to entry which, as 
will be discussed later, may have an impact on the strategic use of tying to 
exclude entry into certain markets. 
 
Finally, it has been explained that while Chicago was seen as mathematical, 
scientific and tended to portray opponents as subjective and vague, there are 
a number of commentators who have questioned this veneer and suggested 
that Chicago School theories are based on unproven assumptions, such as 
the inability of courts to make interventions that improve the functioning of the 
market. These issues have only been covered in brief in this chapter as they 
will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter on post-Chicago 
analysis.  
 
In relation to the thesis as a whole this chapter explains the substantive 
elements of the Chicago School so that later chapters, that evaluate the 
theoretical foundations of the decisions of the EU Commission and courts, can 
be compared with Chicago School theory. This will demonstrate that despite 
the widespread influence of the Chicago School in US antitrust law, with 
regard to tying, the EU competition enforcement authorities do not follow the 
Chicago School and at times appear to expressly reject arguments and 
interpret facts in a manner that is contrary to Chicago School thinking. This 
chapter also challenges some of the arguments advanced by Chicago 
Scholars that relate to access to capital and indirectly tying. 
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1.0. Introduction 
This chapter investigates post-Chicago antitrust analysis. The purpose of this 
chapter is to set out what general principles are followed by post-Chicago 
scholars, and also their contribution to economic thought in relation to tying. 
The general principles and tying models that are set out here will in later 
chapters be contrasted with the approach of the EU Commission and courts 
This is important as it will be shown in Chapter Seven that these very same 
models of tying have been incorporated into the soft law of the EU through the 
Commission’s Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 
TEFU.1 Further it will be seen in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 that the EU tying 
approach is increasingly making use of post-Chicago principles and their style 
of analysis, not just their models of harm. This chapter sets a foundation upon 
which later chapters will build to demonstrate that EU tying law is now based 
not only upon Ordoliberal principles but increasingly it has also started to 
combine these principles with post-Chicago economic theory. 
 
This chapter is set out as follows: First, the historical setting will be set out. 
The purpose of this is to show how Chicago School principles began to be 
challenged and undermined by post-Chicago analysis. Second, the general 
principles of post-Chicago will be advanced. It will be seen that post-Chicago 
scholars tend to investigate the individual aspects of each market to find 
if/when anti-competitive conduct is possible, rather than creating general rules 
that are applied very broadly to almost any market. It will be shown that new 
economic theories that go beyond price theory are used by post-Chicago 
scholars to analyse the impact of different types of behaviour on a particular 
market. This is important as, later, this style of analysis will be shown to be 
reflected in recent EU tying decisions. Third, the work of post-Chicago that 
relates specifically to tying will be explained. It will be shown that a number of 
economic models have been developed that show how, under certain 
conditions, tying can be used successfully to exclude competitors from a 
market. This element is important for two reasons: it will set out tying models 
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which will later be seen to be used in the EU Guidance in relation to tying,2 
and it will demonstrate that there are economically justifiable reasons for tying 
being pursued as an anti-competitive practice under certain circumstances. 
Fourth, the criticism that has been put forward against post-Chicago theories 
will be considered. It will be shown that the majority of the criticism of post-
Chicago principles and models has not alleged that they are flawed 
economically but rather has argued that the theories cannot be translated into 
justiciable rules and practically applied by courts. This author will argue in 
response that convincing models for the application of post-Chicago analysis 
have already been put forward by commentators3 and there is no reason to 
prevent such theories from being applied in court. This again is to 
demonstrate that there are economically valid reasons why tying should and 
can be challenged by the courts and competition authorities. 
1.1. The shifting influence from Chicago to post-Chicago 
In 1982, Robert Bork, a fierce proponent of Chicago, felt that he was able to 
say that the Chicago approach was so widespread that it had intellectually 
won the “final and irreversible victory”.4  Yet Pierce states: “Ironically, during 
the same period5 in which the [US Supreme] Court was changing anti-trust 
law to reflect the writing of the Chicago scholars, a new group of scholars 
began to produce an impressive body of literature that is referred to as post-
Chicago economics.”6  Despite claims that the purpose of post-Chicago is to 
enrich the older Chicago theory by providing alternative strategic 
explanations,7 much of the “norm-oriented” perspective of the Chicago School, 
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which focused on promoting only economic efficiency, began to be overtaken 
by the new fact based analysis, which rejected much of the Chicago School’s 
simplistic legal rules in favour of more complex analysis.8 This led Pierce to 
say that, “…the post-Chicago scholars have challenged the conclusions of the 
Chicago scholars with respect to virtually every issue in antitrust law”.9 Not 
only that, post-Chicago scholars have been praised as some of the most 
talented scholars in the industrial organisation field. 10  As a consequence, 
post-Chicago thinking is increasingly influencing the antitrust policy of the 
United States11 and it will be argued in later chapters that it is also impacting 
EU competition policy, including the law on tying.  
1.2. Challenging the principles of the Chicago School 
The basis of Chicago School thinking was that market behaviour could be 
evaluated on the basis of price theory. Using price theory as a filter, the courts 
would be able to remove costly and time consuming factual analysis in many 
antitrust cases and in some areas declare blanket legality on certain 
previously illegal behaviour. However, the Chicago School’s theories, 
although simple and easily applied, lacked a realistic grasp of how varied and 
complex markets really are, or can be, and this was brought unswervingly 
back into view by the work of post-Chicago scholars.12 Information such as 
product differentiation, switching costs, information costs and product use 
proportions could act to make apparently competitive markets anti-competitive 
or at least exploitable. This means that post-Chicago scholars could find the 
potential for abusive behaviour, for example, behaviour that excludes new 
entrants, in certain markets that initially appear to be competitive. The post-
Chicago economists therefore criticised the Chicago School for not taking 
these factors into account.13 Further examples of market characteristics that 
post-Chicago scholars identified as relevant when considering anti-
competitive conduct include the presence of specialised assets, economies of 
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scale, strategic pricing (even above cost) and network externalities.14 All these 
matters needed to be taken into account when considering whether a 
particular behaviour was anti-competitive. In this manner post-Chicago 
scholars demonstrated that whether a market was competitive or not 
depended on many specific circumstances which were not taken into account 
in the simplistic theories of Chicago. 
2.0 General principles of Post-Chicago analysis 
The difficulty that presents itself when considering the tenets of the post-
Chicago view is that in the strictest sense there are very few tenets at all. The 
number and variety of practices that are considered harmful according to post-
Chicago analysis are largely unquantifiable.15 There are as many possibilities 
as there are types of market. Also, since post-Chicago is truly economics and 
evidence based, there is no common ideology running through its adherents 
and so there is often little common opinion.16 If there were to be a tenet of 
post-Chicago, it would be simply that it is not possible to say definitively 
whether or not a behaviour is anti-competitive until the individual 
characteristics of the market have been established. However, although 
generalised tenets are not easily established for all post-Chicago scholars, 
some general principles that have been expressed will be explained below. 
2.1 The Post Chicago method of investigation 
As stated previously one of the greatest differences between Chicago and 
post-Chicago scholars is to be found in their attitude to factual analysis. Many 
of the principles that the Chicago School expounded shortened judicial 
enquiry17 (in the US competition enforcement is conducted largely through the 
courts, unlike in the EU). For example, if there was an accusation of predatory 
pricing the Chicago School would merely ask, is there any realistic prospect of 
recoupment? If there were no barriers to entry (and few are recognised in 
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Chicago School literature18) there was no chance of recoupment of lost profits. 
As a consequence, a Chicago School advocate would recommend a court 
dismiss the case without further investigation. After all, any further analysis 
would be futile if there was no chance of recoupment. This is because from a 
Chicago School point of view, no rational business person would sacrifice 
profit if there was no opportunity to recover it later. Post-Chicago takes a 
different approach. Post-Chicago scholars look to empirically analyse each 
individual market in an effort to understand observed distinctions between 
classical economic models and the specific market under examination at that 
time.19 This, it should be noted, is more like the Harvard School discussed in 
Chapter Two. In short, post-Chicago seeks to view facts in such a way that it 
can identify any reason why general rules, such as those produced by 
Chicago, do not apply in a particular market and thereby to identify potential 
anti-competitive conduct where the Chicago School would, after brief analysis, 
find none. 
2.2 The use of game theory in predicting firms’ behaviour 
Another aspect of the post-Chicago approach is the use of economic theories 
that go far beyond simple price theory.20 Whilst the Chicago School relied 
upon relatively simple market models, post-Chicago scholars instead use 
more complicated market structures and evaluate the market actors’ 
behaviour using game theory.21 The basis of game theory is essentially that 
competitors do not make their decisions in a vacuum. That is to say that when 
making decisions regarding their firms’ future performance and strategies, 
they take into account the likely behaviour and strategies of their 
competitors.22  These decisions are also usually made in the presence of 
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information imperfections, that is to say that those making the decisions do 
not know exactly what the other competitors know and vice-versa. This results 
in new theories of how dominant firms can exclude competitors or hinder 
market entry coming to light that Chicago scholars had previously left 
unconsidered. 
2.3 The measure of welfare 
One of the most novel arguments made by members of the Chicago School 
was that the goal of competition law should, rather than being composed of 
vague generally attractive principles, such as fairness, political democracy 
and the preservation of small businesses,23 be formulated on the precise and 
single aim of “consumer welfare”.24 While the post-Chicago School has not 
challenged the idea that customer welfare should be the sole aim of 
competition law, they have argued that the basis of consumer welfare, as 
defined by members of the Chicago School is flawed. Robert Bork defined 
consumer welfare to mean the combination of allocative and productive 
efficiency. These two together made up the overall efficiency of a society and 
this determined its wealth which Bork equated to consumer welfare.25 As a 
result of this, to Bork, if a firm participated in behaviour that harmed customers 
by “X” amount but saved the firm involved “Y” if Y > X then this would be 
considered acceptable.26 As long as the overall result is a net increase then 
this is considered to be beneficial to society. 
 
Salop, a post-Chicago theorist, has argued that this should not be considered 
as a “consumer welfare” standard, but rather an ‘aggregate welfare 
standard.’27 It is a standard that takes into account harm to consumers, the 
defendant firm and competitors equally.28 Salop states that a “true consumer 
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welfare standard” should be indifferent to the harm to competitors unless it will 
also be likely to harm consumers.29  
 
Salop argued against the aggregate welfare standard because, as previously 
mentioned, applying it would mean that harm to consumers would be 
acceptable assuming that there was a greater benefit to the firms involved 
overall. The example given by Salop is that of an efficient joint production 
facility between all the firms in one particular market.30 He argues that under a 
true customer welfare standard the firms could cooperate in production 
(increasing efficiency) but continue to engage in price competition. If the 
prices paid by consumers did not increase, this would be acceptable: 
production is more efficient, but the consumer pays no more for the product, 
they may, indeed, pay less. If aggregate welfare was the standard however 
the firms could enter the joint venture and also market together, having the 
effect of raising prices for consumers. This would be acceptable under the 
aggregate welfare standard, as long as the price increase for consumers was 
not greater than the efficiency savings experienced by the firms undertaking 
the joint venture. 31  Salop argues that this would be inefficient and 
consequently that the aggregate welfare standard should not be used. These 
are some of the more general principles that can be seen to be advocated by 
those following the post-Chicago approach.32 
[sections 2.4 and 2.5 can be removed in necessary] 
 
There are in addition substantive points that have been made by members of 
the post-Chicago School. By way of example, arguments made in relation to 
the resilience of cartels and the efficacy of predatory pricing will be given 
below, as an illustration of how post-Chicago scholars have undermined 
Chicago thinking or otherwise altered how particular practices can be seen 
from an antitrust point of view. After this the main body of this chapter will 
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assess the substantial theoretical impact made by post-Chicago scholars on 
tying. 
2.4 Cartels 
Unlike the Chicago School, post-Chicago scholars have submitted that cartels 
are in fact more robust than expected. The large body of cartels that have 
been uncovered by the US Department of Justice has suggested that the 
‘chiselling’ tendencies of the market place are not as effective at undermining 
pricing fixing arrangements as Chicago scholars would have liked. 33 
Examples given include the US steel industry34 and car manufacturer price 
leadership.35 These markets took 75 years and 55 years respectively to be 
undermined. 
2.5 Predatory pricing 
It was originally claimed by the Chicago School scholar Professor John 
McGee that economic analysis proved that predatory pricing could never be 
used as a profitable business strategy. 36  However, through thorough 
observation and investigation, Malcolm Burns has shown quite clearly that 
predatory pricing has been used effectively to undermine competitors. In his 
study, he showed that a US firm (American Tobacco) had used predatory 
pricing to first lower the value of shares37 of its smaller competitors and then 
acquiring their competitors’ firms at a substantially lower cost.38 Surprisingly, 
in this instance, the exploitation was not even particularly complex, but rather 
predatory pricing was used to drive down the value of the target company 
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before it was bought up at a “bargain” price.39 It was shown therefore that an 
established Chicago School tenet40 was in fact incorrect.41 
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3.0 Tying theories 
The following section puts forward the post-Chicago theories on tying. Many 
of these theories are the latest and most contemporary theories explaining the 
effects of tying under specific market conditions. These theories are important 
because they demonstrate that contrary to what has been suggested by 
Chicago School theorists tying can be used anti-competitively. This is 
significant to this thesis as, in order to evaluate whether tying should be 
prohibited and how the law should treat the practice, it is must be established 
if and when tying can be used to hinder competition. 
3.1 Whinston’s model 1990 
In Whinston’s model put forward in 1990, a tying practice is compared with a 
practice of independent pricing of two separate items. Various courses of 
behaviour (including variations on how easily reversed the tie is) are 
compared in order to ascertain which could cause, in theory, greater loss to a 
producer of a single product over a tie. 
 
Whinston puts forward the following scenario to begin. There are two firms 
active in a market, one of them has a monopoly in product A and produces 
product B which is sold in a competitive market. The firm then commits itself 
to producing only a bundle of product A and B. In this situation the second firm 
(which only makes product B) would earn less than in an independent pricing 
game. 42  The reasoning for this however is not as straightforward as the 
leveraging of market power explanation relied upon by the Harvard School. 
Whinston posits that the reason that exclusion could take place here, is that in 
order to maintain sales of its monopolised good A, the firm must make sales 
of product B and to do this the company will cut the price of the bundle in 
order to take away the sales of the second firm. This causes the profits of the 
bundling firm to be lower. However if this reduces the profitability of the firm 
producing only product B to such an extent that it causes the firm to leave the 
market this could still be a profitable practice. This scenario essentially uses 
tying to drive the competitor out of the market. 
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The second scenario is where there are two products A and B that are usually 
used together but for which there are alternative uses for product B. First to 
understand this scenario a contrast must be understood. If product A and B 
were used in equal proportion then a monopolist in product A would not wish 
to tie A and B necessarily. This is because by allowing B to be sold 
competitively by other firms for as little as possible, the monopolist can 
increase sales of product A. This is because products A and B are used 
together in fixed proportions so an additional sale of B will result in an 
additional sale of A. However, if this is compared to a system where there are 
alternative uses for product B there is no guarantee that increased sales of B 
will lead to an increase in the sale of monopoly good A. A simple example can 
be put forward as illustrated by the case of Hilti.43 In this case, A would have 
been the cartridges used with the nail guns that Hilti produced. Product B 
would be the nails. There were other producers of nails and there were other 
uses for nails when Hilti sought to bundle both nails and cartridges together. 
However in this scenario by tying the products together the monopolist is 
seeking to deprive the competitor of sufficient business so that they can no 
longer profitably remain in the market for product B. 
3.2 Choi and Stefanadis model 2001 
In the Choi and Stefanadis44 model tying causes the cost of research and 
development to rise and as a consequence makes market entry more difficult. 
The model works on the basis that in many markets great amounts of capital 
are required to successfully develop a product due to the cost of research and 
development. In addition, there is often an inherent risk of failure for each 
product that is developed. Choi and Stephanadis point out that by tying two 
products together a company can increase the chance of an entrant failing to 
develop a successful combination of products to compete with a tie, working 
on the assumption that each product will only work when used in conjunction 
with the other. This is because each element of the product has to be a 
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success for there to be a marketable final product so by doubling the number 
of products required, the firm increases the chance that a failure of one of the 
products will prevent entry into the market by a new competitor.45 
3.3 Nalebuff model 2005 
In Nalebuff’s model, 46  once again product A is the monopolised product 
produced by the tying firm. The market for B is competitive. This model has 
the additional premise that product A and B are used together in a ratio, for 
the purposes of illustration 1 to 1. Therefore if someone needs to buy A they 
also need to buy B, and vice versa. In this illustration, Nalebuff shows that 
even without a ‘tie’ as such, the firm can actually tie the products in practice. 
All that is required is essentially cross subsidisation, so that the monopolised 
product’s price is increased by the same measure that the competitive product 
is discounted. That way there is no actual change in the profit made by the 
tying company, but it would be illogical for a consumer to buy A and then B 
from another company because it would be far cheaper to get them both from 
the tying firm.47  
 
A second scenario given by Nalebuff, which is similar to the first, is for the firm 
to offer A at a higher price than if it is bought with B. Once again such a 
scenario makes it more expensive to buy B elsewhere and thus makes it more 
logical for a customer/consumer to buy both from the tying firm. What is 
particularly noteworthy about Nalebuff’s model is that it does not cause the 
tying firm to lose any profit, unlike the models posed by Whinston. Further, 
although in practice the effect of this pricing strategy is a tie, it does not 
appear as a naked contractual tie at all on first glance. Its objective is 
obscured and it appears more benign that it actually is.48 
3.4 Carlton and Waldman model 2002 
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The Carton and Waldman49 model sets out two different scenarios. These are 
both based around two firms, two products and two separate periods of time. 
 
The first states that where there are high entry costs in a market it may be 
profitable to tie goods together. In this example, it is assumed that the 
monopolist is already producing two products that are complementary once 
again at a ratio of one to one. The model states that normally if a new entrant 
produces the complementary product in the first period of time, it will be 
profitable and then in the second period it will be able to enter the primary 
product market (that in which the dominant firm holds a monopoly). As a result 
the monopoly position will be jeopardised. However, if the incumbent decides 
to tie, this will mean that to enter the market, the entrant must enter both the 
primary and the complementary markets at the same time. If the entry costs 
were low, this would not matter.  If they were extremely high, then the entrant 
may not be able to enter the market regardless of tying. But if they were 
intermediate, the fact that the products are tied may make the cost of entry 
high enough together so that the entrant cannot profitably afford to enter the 
market, protecting the incumbent’s monopoly position. 50  This of course 
depends on whether access to capital can be considered a barrier to entry.51 
 
The second situation put forward is similar but rather than considering the cost 
of market entry it considers the effect when there are network externalities.52 
In this case the entrant enters the complementary product market in the first 
period and may or may not enter the primary market in the second period. 
Using this example it is possible to see, that by tying the products in the first 
period the monopolist can create greater network benefits associated with its 
products. These benefits will then produce an incentive in period two for 
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consumers to purchase the system of the monopolist even if the entrant then 
chooses to enter the primary and complementary markets.53 
  
                                            
53
 Dennis W. Carlton, Michael Waldman, ‘The Strategic use of tying to preserve and create 
market power in evolving industries’ (2002) 33 RAND.J.Econ 194, 207; this appears to be a 
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3.5 Evans and Salinger model 2005 
The Evans and Salinger model54 in contrast to the others is in fact a model 
demonstrating when tying is the logical choice for any competitive producer 
who wishes to maximise the benefit of their product to their customers. This 
occurs in circumstances where the fixed cost for making a product is very high 
and the marginal cost is comparatively very low.55 The result is that the cost of 
offering a greater selection of products is actually more expensive than 
offering all the products bundled together as one and allowing the customers 
to use what they wish. Where there is insufficient demand to warrant a 
product being made available individually, it is actually less expensive to 
bundle the products together thereby distributing the high fixed costs across 
all customers reducing the cost per unit. The determinant factors for this to 
apply are the marginal costs, the fixed costs and the number of customers 
that seek each variation. An ideal example could be two pieces of music, the 
production and deployment of which is very expensive, but once available, the 
marginal cost is virtually nothing. If a very high number of persons want both 
songs compared to those who may want just one, it is actually more 
expensive to make them available separately (incurring unnecessary 
distribution costs). In this case, there is no logical reason for making them 
available separately as it would be cheaper for consumers to just purchase 
the bundle and ignore the additional components that they do not want. This 
is highly important when considering markets such as software that, have very 
high fixed costs and very low marginal costs. 
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4.0 Criticism of Post-Chicago 
Post-Chicago has not been totally free from criticism. Here three areas of 
criticism that have been raised against post-Chicago thinking will be 
expressed including the most prevalent, namely the difficulty in transposing 
post-Chicago principles into legal rules which can be administered by the 
competition authorities and courts.  
4.1 Concerns about government intervention 
First of all there has been criticism from Chicago scholars that the real danger 
to the market is not so much corporations seeking to undermine the 
competitive market but rather the well-intended but ill-conceived behaviour 
and interference of government. Scherer provides some support for this 
argument. He notes that during his experience as a consultant56 in connection 
with two alleged cartels, in both cases the behaviour that was supposedly 
prohibited was strongly influenced by government intervention. In the first 
instance, potash producers importing their goods into the US market were 
going to have their goods levied with ‘anti-dumping’ tariffs due to the 
objections of inefficient US producers. As a consequence a settlement was 
negotiated whereby the importing companies agreed to raise their prices to 
non-dumping levels.57 In the second example, a competitor was pressured 
into joining a cartel by threats that if it did not participate it would be driven out 
of the market by anti-dumping complaints.58 This does support the Chicago 
School view that government intervention can be damaging to markets, 
possibly even more damaging than certain anti-competitive behaviour. But in 
these instances, it is surely not antitrust intervention that is in question but 
rather anti-dumping policy. Therefore it can be argued that these examples 
should not be used to undermine court intervention for the purposes of the 
protection of competition, rather these examples support the reform of a 
specific policy, in this case, anti-dumping laws. As such the facts given do not 
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represent a valid argument against antitrust or the use of post-Chicago 
analysis in court. 
4.2 Prevalence of harm and consistency of approach  
One criticism of post-Chicago analysis relates to the lack of predictability in its 
work. Pierce raises the point that post-Chicago scholars rarely try to show 
how frequently a particular behaviour is intended to have pro or anti-
competitive effects. 59  For example, does tying behaviour have anti-
competitive effects 1/10, 1/100 or 1/1000 times? Further he argues that post-
Chicago theory often requires those applying it to determine what firms know 
about each other’s actions and what firms will infer from each other’s 
actions.60 He says, “…there are always critical variables that I simply have no 
way of knowing, e.g. whether a firm can anticipate the reactions of its 
competitors with a high degree of accuracy at the time it takes a particular 
action”.61 He goes on to say that the proponents of post-Chicago analysis 
rarely appear to agree on which course of action should be taken. This is 
when they are working from the same models and applying them to the same 
markets.  
 
There are counter arguments to both those points. It is not necessary from a 
legal perspective to establish what proportion of instances of a particular 
behaviour is pro or anti-competitive. Courts do not deal with every single 
instance of, for example, tying, rather they investigate only those instances 
that are brought before it. As a consequence, the question a court is 
concerned with is “is there unlawful anti-competitive conduct in this case?” 
rather than trying to decide before a case begins “what is the statistical 
likelihood that anti-competitive conduct exists in this case?” 
 
The second argument he raises is not so much an issue that relates to the 
appropriate use of economic theory, rather it relates to the courts maintaining 
an appropriate standard of proof. If a court is required to determine what firms 
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infer from each other actions they can rely on a number of types of evidence. 
First there is the recorded communication between senior company directors, 
which will often encompass strategy and consideration of other market actors’ 
behaviour. Second there is direct observation where empirical evaluation 
shows that, for example, each time a dominant firm raises its prices the same 
competitors follow suit. Third and finally there is of course economic theory. It 
is strange that a school of thought that is so reliant on establishing the 
reasoning behind economic behaviour using economic principles like price 
theory and the concept of the rational business person would be so averse to 
the use of economic principles to establish the likely behaviour of competitors 
in response to the behaviour of other firms. Where there is no clear outcome 
on the basis of any of these methods and the court is convinced after 
appropriate investigation that there are critical variables that it cannot 
accurately determine, it is free to decide there is insufficient evidence of anti-
competitive conduct. This may mean that certain behaviour that is anti-
competitive may not be caught, but surely this is better than the alternative; 
choosing blanket legality that will fail to address anti-competitive conduct even 
when these “critical variables” can be established? 
4.3 The ability of the courts to administer post-Chicago principles 
One of the most consistent attacks levelled at post-Chicago analysis is that in 
practice, whether or not the economic theory behind it is accurate, it cannot be 
effectively applied by the courts and/or competition authorities. In fact Shipiro, 
62 Pierce63 and Hovenkamp64 all separately claim that post-Chicago should 
not be applicable, or is not yet capable of being applied within the court 
room.65 
These complaints can be broken down into two basic arguments: 
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1. Judges and the court system cannot effective apply post-Chicago 
economics due to their complexity; 66 
2. The judicial system is too slow, it cannot analyse anti-competitive 
behaviour in a time frame that would make it useful to the market.67 
Hovenkamp instead praises the Chicago School for producing a doctrine that 
has a “purity of vision that few legal disciplines ever attain”.68 This attachment 
to Chicago School principles just because it is pure and undemanding to apply, 
it is submitted, is misplaced. After all there are many areas of law that could 
be simplified by removing the complicated parts or ignoring evidential 
elements that are difficult to ascertain. Contract law for example could 
become far more pure by simply pursuing the goal of certainty rather than 
fairness or the intention of the parties, but whether or not that would lead to 
superior application of the law is highly debatable. 
 
In answer to the first argument it is argued that there are many complex 
issues that courts are required to consider. There are ways to help courts deal 
with these matters, not least the use of expert witnesses 69  and judicial 
seminars. Judicial seminars are particularly pertinent as the Chicago School 
itself chose to use judicial seminars to bring their theories to the attention of 
the judiciary.70 
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The second argument raised is that judicial governance takes too long to 
moderate dynamic markets, an example given being the IBM case.71 In IBM, 
the US Department of Justice started a case when IBM was the dominant firm 
in the computer market. The case was abandoned 13 years later by which 
time IBM was no longer dominant in that market and even the company’s 
viability in the market was starting to come into doubt. The suggestion is then 
that by the time a case has been decided by a court, the market has corrected 
the deficiency anyway or there has been such a change that the market in 
question is completely different. In response to this it should be noted that for 
each case that takes over a decade there are examples of cases that are 
swiftly and effectively determined and their remedies imposed within a 
comparatively slight time scale. Microsoft I 72  for example was completed 
relatively swiftly, with the Commission decision73 published in 2004 and the 
decision of the General Court74 (then CFI) in 2007, once it was completed 
further issues regarding the deployment and installation of web-browsers were 
resolved in less than a year, although admittedly this was through the use of 
commitments rather than court judgement. Also while cases such as IBM take 
place in dynamic technology markets, there are other cases which take place 
in relatively static markets. There is no logical reason to prohibit the use of 
post-Chicago models in all antitrust cases on the basis that some markets 
move too quickly to allow them to be applied effectively.  
 
There are also those who believe that post-Chicago economics can be 
converted into a workable legal policy. 75  Brodley believes that with 
simplification some of the more complex modern economic principles can be 
made into a workable form of law. 76  Further, there are two groups of 
commentators who have each put forward their own version of a test that 
could, and they believe should, be used to apply the latest thinking in 
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economic theory to tying cases coming before the courts. These tests will be 
explained in the following section. 
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5.0 How should tying be treated by the courts? 
There have been three legal approaches to tying advocated in light of the 
arguments made by post-Chicago analysts. Ahlborn et al77 summarise the 
post-Chicago tying models then come to the conclusion that tying should be 
given per se legality.78 This is because post-Chicago analysis, in their eyes, 
while providing examples of situations where these activities may be anti-
competitive, “…do not disturb the consensus view that tying and bundling are 
a constant feature of economic life”79 and that in reality most of the time firms 
are really seeking to obtain valuable efficiencies. Working on the assumption 
that the cost to society due to tying is low,80 that it is difficult to measure 
efficiencies, that tying itself is widespread and that economic theory and 
empirics are not able to distinguish pro-competitive from anti-competitive 
tying,81 Ahlborn et al state that the best approach is modified per se legality: 
Tying arrangements should be considered legal unless there is strong 
evidence that there are significant anti-competitive effects that outweigh the 
beneficial effects. This means tying arrangements would be given a rebuttable 
presumption of legality. 
 
Schmidt argues for a new regulatory model that is based upon the following 
five points: 
 Per se legality 
 An expanded consumer demand test to define products 
 A market share cap to assess dominance 
 As-efficient-competitor test and consumer harm test to assess anti-
competitive effects 
 Objective justification considerations based on Article 102(d)82 
Per se legality 
                                            
77
 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, A. Jorge Padilla, ‘The antitrust economics of tying: a 
farewell to per se illegality’ (2004) 49 Antitrust. Bull 287, 290 
78
 ibid 290 
79
 Ahlborn et al  (n 77) 330 
80
 Ibid 334 
81
 ibid 338 
82
 Hedvig Schmidt, Competition Law, Innovation and antitrust (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
2009) 
Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis 
91 
 
First Schmidt sets out that tying should be per se legal. What is meant by this 
is that undertakings are free to tie until they reach a particular market power 
threshold. After this point the tie will be subject to the following test to 
ascertain whether it is an illegal tie.83 This, so far, follows the present EU tying 
law, as tying is only prohibited where an undertaking is found to be dominant. 
 
An expanded consumer demand test to define products 
The first step of the test would be to ascertain whether or not there were two 
separate products. This would be done using an ‘expanded consumer 
demand test’.84 This would ask whether there was consumer demand for the 
tying product free of the tied product.85 If there is no demand for the tied 
product without the tying product there is no tie. But Schmidt also combines 
this with further considerations: It must also be shown that the tie produces 
new functionalities that cannot be obtained by simply ‘bolting’ the products 
together.86 The question is also asked whether there is evidence of the market 
developing in such a way that there will not be demand for a particular 
element of a product in future. Courts would also be able to distinguish 
between components and added features. If a product will not work without a 
particular element then the sale of these together should not be seen as tying 
separate products even if there is demand for it on its own.87 This, she argues, 
is to allow courts to distinguish between contractual tying and technological 
integration.88 
 
A market share cap to assess dominance 
A market share cap would be used to assess dominance. This would be 
arranged into three categories: 
 Ties by undertakings with less than 40% market share would be 
presumed harmless 
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 Ties by undertakings with between 40-60% in competitive markets 
would be permitted to tie 
 Ties by undertakings with more than 60% of the market or more than 
40% in an uncompetitive market would be subject to a full assessment 
weighing pro and anti-competitive effects.89 
As-efficient-competitor test and consumer harm test to assess anti-
competitive effects 
To assess anti-competitive effects two factors will be taken into account. First 
an as-efficient-as competitor test will be used to assess whether competitors 
may be equally efficient but are nevertheless unable to compete due to the 
advantage created by the tying arrangement. If such exclusion is found a full 
assessment of pro and anti-competitive effects should be made using 
consumer harm as the appropriate measure of damage. 90  Part of this 
assessment is included in the next stage (objective justification) because 
essentially that stage is just an assessment of the pro-competitive effects of 
the tie.91 If there is a net detriment to the consumer, taking into account all 
available information, the conduct will be prohibited.92 
 
Objective justification considerations based on Article 102(d) 
Under this test a tie would be justified under two circumstances. The first is 
where there are potential efficiencies that outweigh any anti-competitive harm 
(as established under the arm of the test immediately above). The second is 
where the nature of the products or market conditions dictates that tying is 
part of commercial usage.93 
 
In some respects Schmidt’s model is similar to the current Article 102(d) 
approach but with greater weight given to economic efficiencies when 
balancing them against foreclosure effects.94 However, this appears to be 
based on the mistaken belief that the EU courts are not taking efficiencies into 
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account effectively at present.95 What should also be taken into account is 
that although her approach recommends per se legality, ties deemed to cause 
harm are required to have a “strong defence” to be permitted.96 Consequently, 
although it may appear that Schmidt’s proposal conforms more to Ahlborn et 
al’s recommendation, it is actually more in line with the suggestions of Kühn et 
al below. 
 
Kühn et al97 use almost exactly the same theories as considered by Ahlborn 
et al to come to a rather different conclusion. They highlight that the 
conclusion reached by Ahlborn et al assumes that the cost of tying to society 
is low. Further the premise upon which so much of the article is based, that 
tying is ubiquitous, is vacuous when placed in context. The fact that shoes do 
not come without laces and that cars cannot be bought broken down into their 
constituent parts ignores the essential element in all tying tests, that the 
vendor has market power.98 This means that the innocuous examples of tying 
provided, such as shoes and laces, would, rightly, never be pursued as anti-
competitive behaviour because there are no dominant firms in shoes or laces. 
This requirement of market power is clearly appreciated by post-Chicago 
authors too, since, as can be seen by the models above, they usually involve 
two products, one of which is monopolised. Therefore this claim that tying is 
common, although technically accurate, is misleading. 
 
Kühn et al also note that the claims to efficiencies are often overstated with 
sweeping generalisations.99 There are efficiencies claimed that don’t actually 
require tying, a plethora of situations ignored where there aren’t efficiencies 
and theories misinterpreted so that efficiencies appear that don’t really exist. 
In addition while examples are provided where it is more effective for a 
                                            
95
 See ibid 96-97 and 212-213 for an example of Schmidt stating that a tie that produced an 
improvement in performance was rejected by the General Court (as an efficiency justification) 
due to it not reaching a high enough threshold when in fact the Court rejected it due to a lack 
of evidence to support the claim of improved performance; Case T-201/04 Microsoft v 
Commission [2007] ECR II – 3601, para 1160 
96
 ibid 240 
97
 Kai-Uwe Kühn, Robert Stillman, Cristina Caffarra, ‘Economic theories of bundling and their 
policy implications in abuse cases: an assessment in light of the Microsoft case’ (2005) 1 
Eur.Competition.J 85 
98
 ibid 109 
99
 ibid 107 
Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis 
94 
 
manufacturer to assemble products than consumers, examples where the 
reverse applied are notable only by their absence. In short, Kühn et al argue 
that where efficiencies are claimed to exist these claims need to be 
demonstrated on the basis of those particular circumstances, they should not 
just be able to rely on a general defence of efficiencies.100 They then turn their 
attention to the claim that economic theory and empirics are not capable of 
discerning between anti-competitive and pro-competitive tying.101 They state 
that while the models involved in post-Chicago thought depend on specific 
conditions being present in a market, these are often easily identifiable 
characteristics that have quite predicable effects. So that while, unlike 
Chicago School theories, it is not possible to make a single test that broadly 
applies to all situations, each model does have certain empirically notable 
features that allow the models to be confirmed as applicable or rejected as 
inapplicable in each situation. As such they put forward a test that they believe 
maximises the chance of the competition enforcement authorities preventing 
abusive tying while minimising the resources required to do so. The test has 
three stages: 
 
1. There would be safe haven rules that would put a tie onto a “white” or 
“permissible” list. This would happen if a tie did not conform to the 
following: market power in one of the bundled products, 
complementarity and asymmetry in product lines.102 
2. If these characteristics are present then the circumstances should be 
investigated into order to ascertain whether the tie appears to fit with 
one of the models previously mentioned (or any new models).103 
3. The firm should have the opportunity to put forward any efficiency 
defences it may consider relevant. The burden of proving efficiencies 
exist lies with the firm under investigation because unlike the 
government, courts and authorities they have access to private 
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corporate documentation that would give them the best opportunity to 
prove such efficiencies exist. It would then be for the authorities to 
decide whether or not they are the genuine reasons for the tie or 
whether they are nothing less than a pretext. 
This shows that there are not only those who support the idea of post-Chicago 
economics being used in the court room, but commentators have gone further 
and proposed a legal test that can be used to determine whether or not an 
anti-competitive tie exists. It must be acknowledged that the test provided by 
Kühn et al is more a framework than a precise test. The second step does not 
give an exhaustive list of empirical criteria to look for; neither does it explain 
how a tie would be deemed to fit any particular model, but nothing less is to 
be expected. If a test is to truly conform to post-Chicago economics it cannot 
be rigid or strictly defined, neither could it provide an exhaustive list of models 
or circumstances that are of concern. By the very nature of post-Chicago 
antitrust analysis, any legal test must be open to investigate the particular 
circumstances of the market concerned and then consider whether the 
strategy the defendant is accused of employing would have any genuine anti-
competitive effects. Under this approach a single test that explains each and 
every step of the test precisely cannot exist. The state of economic thought is 
constantly progressing providing new insights into determining where conduct 
damages the competitive process and markets are constantly changing 
providing new opportunities to seek to exploit imperfections in the market. 
Therefore the law is at a familiar junction of either choosing flexibility or 
predictability/legal certainty. As a result the test advocated by Kühn et al, 
although not as simple and quick to apply as previous Chicago School 
approaches, nonetheless provides the fairest result ensuring that anti-
competitive conduct is not ignored by the broad brush approach of the 
Chicago School. 
6.0 Application in EU competition law 
In the following chapters it will be demonstrated that both the style of analysis 
and the actual theories of harm produced by post-Chicago analysis have 
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influenced EU competition law. Chapter five will show that in Microsoft I104 the 
Commission started to adopt a style of analysis that is similar to post-Chicago 
methods. In Chapter Seven it will be demonstrated that these theories of 
competitive harm that are associated with post-Chicago analysis have already 
been incorporated into the EU approach to tying. This will be shown by 
reference to the Commission’s 2009 Guidance on the enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 102 to exclusionary conduct.105 It will be shown that, although 
the Guidance does not make direct reference to the authors of these theories 
or expressly use the term “post-Chicago”, the Commission is sensitive to the 
developments taking place within the sphere of economics and is 
incorporating post-Chicago theories into their method of analysis. It will also 
be seen that the Guidance appears to support the consumer welfare 
standard106 that is propounded by post-Chicago scholars.  
7.0 Conclusion 
It has been seen that the Chicago School, although increasingly dominant and 
influential in the US at one time, has been challenged since the 1980-90s by a 
new approach in antitrust economics which has been named post-Chicago 
antitrust analysis. Instead of using price theory, this style of analysis 
investigates each market’s idiosyncrasies before drawing conclusions. It 
analyses the market using not just price theory but other newer approaches 
such as game theory. This has led to new arguments being made that explain, 
for example, that predatory pricing can be used to monopolise a market. What 
is particularly relevant to this thesis however is the progress made in relation 
to tying. There are a number of models that have been demonstrated to be 
viable courses of conduct that can create anti-competitive effects. Post-
Chicago models have come under some criticism due to the difficulty in 
establishing the prevalence of the harm they exemplify and the challenges in 
application for competition enforcement authorities and courts. However, It 
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has been argued in this chapter that there is no reason why a broad 
framework of implementation that provides a logical approach to determining 
tying, while simultaneously providing sufficient flexibility to accommodate the 
recent and future developments in both economic thinking and market 
structures cannot be implemented by the competition enforcement authorities 
and courts. 
 
In relation to the thesis as a whole this chapter has set out the main 
arguments made by post-Chicago analysts that relate to tying. This provides a 
base of comparison for future chapters so that it will be possible to see the 
ways in which the EU Commission and courts have followed and incorporated 
post-Chicago principles and theories on tying. This is particularly relevant 
regarding the Commission’s Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 102 TFEU where, in Chapter 7, it will be shown that the Commission 
has deliberately incorporated the economic theories that have been 
expounded here, demonstrating an economics-oriented approach that is 
receptive to the latest post-Chicago analysis. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Having discussed the main schools of competition law analysis, the chapter 
turns now to the analysis of EU competition tying law. The period that this 
chapter covers is from the signing of the EEC Treaty in 1957 to 2004. This 
period has been selected because it represents what the author defines as 
the “mono-theoretical” period. That is the period where the Commission and 
courts of the EU appear to draw on only one economic/competition theory 
when deciding tying decisions: Ordoliberalism. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to make three main arguments. The first is that 
customer freedom, a concept highly regarded by Ordoliberal1 scholars, has 
been a fundamental concept used within EU tying law to analyse tying 
problems. Second, it is argued that customer freedom is one of several 
concepts within EU tying law, and EU competition law more broadly, that 
reflect a strong Ordoliberal influence. It will also be shown that there is 
evidence that the EU competition enforcement authorities tacitly reject 
arguments and concepts made by Chicago School scholars. Third and finally 
it will be argued that the EU approach to tying pursues justifiable economic 
aims. These are the maintenance of customer welfare and the long term 
maximisation of competition in markets and neighbouring markets that are 
subject to limited competition. 
 
This will be set out in the following way: First, the way tying law was viewed 
and understood during this period will be set out. Using sources that were 
published during the mono-theoretical period it will be shown that during this 
period there was relatively little knowledge regarding the law and theory 
underlying tying in terms of when a tie existed and what the harm was that 
tying law was seeking to prevent. It will also be shown that those who did try 
to ascertain what harm tying law intended to address posited that the concern 
                                            
1
 Eucken in: Peacock, A.T. and Willgerodt, H. (Eds), Germany’s Social Market Economy, 
(London, Macmillan 1989) p35; Walter Eucken, (1948/1982). The social question and Böhm, 
Forschungs-und Lehrgemeinschaft’, 162 and Nils Goldschmidt, Michael Wohlgemuth, ‘Social 
Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations’ CPE (2008) 19 269. 
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underlying tying law was based on “leverage theory”. It will be argued that this 
is not the case but rather this confusion was caused by a relative lack of EU 
case law at the time and an abundance of US case law that did explicitly 
express a concern regarding leverage theory. Establishing this is important as, 
by breaking down previous misconceptions regarding the aims and theories 
underlying EU tying law it is possible to begin to assess the genuine aims of 
EU tying law and understand how a tie was established. 
 
Second, the main element of this chapter will be set out. It will be argued that 
tying law was based on the concept of customer freedom. That is to say the 
true concern of the EU competition enforcement authorities was not leverage 
theory, but rather protecting the freedom of the customer to choose the 
combination of products that they considered most appropriate. After this is 
set out it will be supported by evidence from court judgements, Commission 
decisions and the opinions of advocate generals. This is significant 
contribution as it establishes what behaviour the EU competition enforcement 
authorities were really concerned with preventing and this greater 
understanding of the law provides the opportunity to compare the approach 
during this period with the approach used in later periods to determine 
whether customer freedom still is a major influence in determining tying. 
 
Next, the jurisprudence will be used again to demonstrate what the harms of 
tying were considered to be at this time and it will explain how the protection 
of customer freedom was considered to thwart these issues. The Treaty2 
provisions on tying give little guidance as to how tying will be precisely 
determined or what economic harm it is seeking to prevent. It states that 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position is prohibited 
and that such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
“(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
                                            
2
 Both the EEC Treaty and the Treaty TFEU 
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nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.”3 
 
However, by reference to the decisions of the Commission and courts it will 
be shown that interfering with customers’ freedom to choose the combination 
of products that suits them is considered unlawful because the customer is in 
the best position to assess what combination of products is best for them, not 
the dominant undertaking. The second harm related to tying, according to the 
jurisprudence of this period, is that such ties limit access to the market for 
other suppliers. As such this restricts competition in markets, or neighbouring 
markets, where there is already limited competition due to the presence of the 
dominant undertaking. 
 
After this several other concepts present in EU tying law will be highlighted to 
show how Ordoliberal ideas have influenced the application of competition law 
in the EU. In addition it will be shown that the EU tying law jurisprudence 
shows that arguments,  that Chicago School scholars have supported, have 
been rejected by the Commission and courts, demonstrating that this is not a 
school of thought that has had a significant influence of the EU competition 
enforcement authorities. This section is important as it establishes, in 
conjunction with the sections above on customer freedom, that Ordoliberal 
theory has been a very substantial source of inspiration for the law on tying in 
the EU. In contrast, the Chicago School has not. 
 
Finally, this approach to tying will be assessed from an economic point of view. 
In order to critique the EU approach, arguments raised by members of the 
                                            
3
 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or 
in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may 
affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
... 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the 
subject of such contracts. 
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Chicago School, 4 that suggest that tying ought not be prohibited will be used 
as a lens through which to critique the EU approach. Through this it will be 
argued that the law on tying during this period is consistent and pursues two 
valid economic aims. The first is to maximise the welfare of the customer, by 
allowing them to pick the best products that they desire, rather than the 
dominant undertaking creating a situation where the customer has to choose 
the best tie of products. This it will be argued maximises the utility of those 
products to the customer. The second reason why this approach pursues 
sound economic aims is because it seeks to protect efficient 
producers/suppliers of products so as to strengthen competition on markets 
that suffer limited competition due to the presence of a dominant undertaking, 
either on that market or on a related market. 
2.0 EU Tying Law 1957-2004 
During the period of 1957-2004 there was little discussion of the European 
competition law approach to tying in the EU competition law literature. 
Specifically, there was very little debate concerning how European 
competition law was likely to ascertain: 
 
1. How a tie was determined to have taken place; or, 
2. what the potential economic harm from tying was supposed to be. 
There were case comments published regarding IBM5 and Hilti,6 there was 
discussion of how dominance was determined in the Tetra Pak 7  case in 
relation to which of the two markets involved were relevant (tying and tied)8 
and even, immediately prior to the Microsoft I decision, a debate about why 
                                            
4
 In particular these criticisms will be based on the work of Richard Posner. 
5
  Case comment on EEC v IBM [1984] 3 CMLR 147 (CEC) (1986) 11(1) E. L Rev. 91 
6
 (no author given) Article 86 – tying obligations (1988) 9(1) E.C.L.R 19 
Peter Alexiadis, European Court of Justice: competition laws – tying agreements 1992 14(5) 
EIPR D102 
7
 The decisions of Hilti and Tetra Pak II will be discussed below. 
8
 Scott M. Kareff, ‘Tetra Pak international SA v Commission (Tetra Pak II): The European 
Approach to monopoly leveraging’ (1997) 28 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus 549 
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the software industry may be an exception to the rules prohibiting tying.9 But 
there was little on the strict legal definition of when a tie existed or the harm 
the prohibition was intended to prevent. 
 
An illustration of this can be seen by looking at the work of Goyder. In 1988, 
the first edition of his textbook10 contained hardly any reference to tying at 
all.11 However, under a subheading on abuses of intellectual property rights, it 
discusses tying in relation to the settlement between IBM and the 
Commission.12  In terms of ascertaining when a tie has occurred, Goyder 
writes that the Commission will place importance on activities of dominant 
undertakings which foreclose competitors from a market by insisting that two 
related products can only be purchased together.13 What is not explained is 
how this causes foreclosure, neither is a reference given to what foreclosure 
means in this context. This remained the same in the second edition of the 
same textbook released in 1993.14 What can be seen to be missing generally 
from the literature on tying then is an analysis of how tying is established and 
what the underlying theory of economic harm associated with tying is that the 
rules are trying to prevent. There is one exception to this; the work of 
Waelbroeck, which will be considered next. 
 
                                            
9
 David S. Evans, A Jorge Padilla and Michele Polo, ‘Tying in Platform Software: Reasons for 
a Rule of reason Standard in European Competition Law’ (2002) 25(4) World Competition L.& 
Econ.Rev. 509 
10
 D. G. Goyder, EEC Competition Law (1st edn, OUP, 1988) 
11
 In part this could be in part be attributed to the relatively small number of tying cases 
available at the time, however even those cases that did exist appear to have received little 
discussion at the time. 
12
 Goyder (n 10) page 314-316; The facts were that IBM were charged with including main 
memory in the price of a central processing unit and refusing to supply it separately and also 
(less relevant to tying) refusing to disclose important interface information about IBM 
computer systems until they had actually been marketed. The Commission suspended its 
proceedings in return for an undertaking by IBM to amend its practice relating to memory 
bundling and interface disclosure. 
13
 Goyder (n 10) page 316; Goyder also discusses interoperability issues related to the case, 
calling these issues ‘implicit tying’ however this seems to have little to do with tying as it is 
now understood and bears more to what is now seen as interoperability issues. As such it is 
outside the ambit of this thesis. 
14
 D. G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (2nd edn, OUP, 1993) 
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One commentator’s work that did seek to analyse the economic harm EU 
tying law was seeking to prevent is that of Denis Waelbroeck.15 Waelbroeck 
recognised that the then European Community had until the recent years 
preceding his writing in 1987 “hardly paid any attention” to tying16. Waelbroeck 
began his analysis with an appraisal of what he refers to as the traditional 
doctrine. By this it appears that he means ‘leveraging theory’, as discussed in 
Chapter Two. However, at this point it is possible to see that he contorts and 
confuses his appraisal of the European Approach. 
 
Waelbroeck begins by describing the US case of Standard Oil17 that suggests 
that the competition concern of enforcement authorities when dealing with 
tying is related to customer freedom. He then goes on to equate this concern 
with another separate concern, namely leveraging theory.18 It is argued by this 
author that these are two different issues that should not be conflated. 
He begins: 
 
“In the United States, the basic reason for considering that tying 
arrangements violate competition rules was expressed in Standard Oil 
Co 19   … by conditioning his sale of one item on the purchase of 
another, a seller insulates the tied product from free competition and 
tries to convince the buyer to select it over others even if it is 
intrinsically inferior to competing products. Assuming that the buyer 
would anyway purchase the tied product if it had sufficient merit. 
… 
This so-called ‘leverage theory’ was espoused by the Commission of 
the European Communities…”20 
                                            
15
 Denis Waelbroeck, ‘The Compatibility of Tying Agreements with Antitrust Rules: A 
comparative study of American and European Rules (1987) 7 Yearbook European Law 39 
16
 ibid 
17
 Standard Oil Co of California v United States (1949) 337 US 293, 305, 69 S Ct 1051, 1058, 
93 L Ed 1371 
18
 For leverage theory in US case law, see: See Carbice Corp. of America v American Patent 
Development Corp (1931) 283 U.S. 27, 30-32; Mercoid Corp. v Mid-Continent Investment Co.  
(1944) 320 U.S. 661, 667; Keith K. Wollenberg, 'An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-
examining the Leverage Theory' (1986-1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 737, 740. 
19
 Standard Oil Co of California v United States (1949) 337 US 293, 305, 69 S Ct 1051, 1058, 
93 L Ed 1371 
20
 Waelbroeck (n 15) 53 
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The difficulty here is that a concern for the restriction of consumer choice (that 
which was expressed in Standard Oil) and leverage theory are two completely 
separate concerns. 
 
While concern for consumer freedom was appropriately articulated by 
WaelBroeck by reference to the Standard Oil case, “leverage theory” is 
different. Leverage theory (offensive leveraging) is the concept that if an 
undertaking produces a product in a market where it possesses market power, 
market A, then by tying it with a product in competitive market B, it can extract 
double monopoly profits, that is, charge a monopoly price on both products, 
increasing its monopoly profits.21 But this is clearly a different concern to that 
expressed in Standard Oil. The concern expressed in Standard Oil is based 
on ensuring the customer has the freedom to choose the combination of 
products that is most suitable to them, it is about freedom of choice. In 
contrast leveraging theory relates to the level of profit made by the monopolist. 
They are two separate ideas related to two separate competitive issues: 
restriction of freedom and monopoly profits. This can be illustrated by 
considering a simple example, if a monopolist tied two products together 
(previously sold at X monopoly price and Y competitive price) and sold them 
at the price (X + Y), this would still be a problem under the Standard Oil case, 
but it would not be an example of offensive leveraging. This is because it 
would still affect consumer freedom even though the total price would be no 
greater than if the products were available separately. Therefore the concern 
for consumer freedom should not be equated with leveraging theory. As a 
consequence of this confusion, Waelbroeck then appears to treat the 
arguments that have been levelled against offensive leveraging theory as 
arguments against the approach that the Commission and courts have used 
to decide the tying cases that have come before them. This is not appropriate. 
It will be shown in this chapter (and in the following chapters) that the 
                                            
21
 Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law (4 edn, OUP, 2010), 456; it should also be noted 
that this simplistic form of leveraging theory has been successfully undermined, see the 
Chicago School view on leverage theory: Ward S. Bowman, ‘Tying arrangements and the 
leverage problem’ (1957-1958) 67 Yale L.J. 19, 20; Richard A. Posner, ‘The Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 929; Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 
(New York, The Free Press 1978) 372-373. 
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Commission and courts tying cases have been decided on the basis of 
customer freedom, that is, a similar concern as expressed in Standard Oil, but 
not the same problem as the leveraging of market power to gain additional 
monopoly profits. Therefore it is not appropriate to set up criticism of 
leveraging as criticism of the EU approach, they are not the same.  
 
It is possible that the reason for this confusion is due to the period in which 
Waelbroeck was writing. In 1987 there was very little case law from the EU on 
tying and consequentially little precedent on how it was applied and what 
harm it was seeking to prevent. Most of the major tying cases22 had not yet 
taken place. In contrast in the United States there had already been a great 
deal of judicial comment on tying.23 Further at that point leverage theory was 
strongly associated with the tying prohibition in US law.24 It is not surprising 
then that, in the absence of EU case law, and with the comparative 
abundance of US case law and the theories of harm underlying it that at this 
time commentators such as Waelbroeck may have taken EU law to be based 
upon the same theories of harm as in the US. But as explained above, this is 
not the case, leveraging is not mentioned in the EU case law as a concern of 
tying, neither is double monopoly profits. 
 
It appears that this misconception was also present in the work of another 
commentator. Goyder, for example in the third edition of his textbook 
published in 199825 finally gives a theoretical explanation as to how tying 
could harm competition. He also suggested that the potential damage that 
tying could cause was that the tied product could be sold above market price 
even though it could be bought elsewhere on better terms.26 Goyder then also 
links tying with leverage theory but he gives no reference linking this 
explanation of harm to any of the case law or decisions of the Commission 
and courts. Neither is any reference given to the source of this theory of harm 
                                            
22
 Discussed below 
23
 See above at note 18 and Keith K. Wollenberg, 'An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-
examining the Leverage Theory' (1986-1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 737, 740 
24
 ibid 
25
 D. G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (3rd edn, OUP, 1998) 
26
 D. G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (3rd edn, OUP, 1998) page 350 
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or any explanation of why he thinks that this is the underlying concern that the 
Commission and courts are seeking to address. 
 
It can be seen then that during this period, the law on tying had not drawn a 
lot of interest from EU competition law scholars. While there were 
Commission decisions and some case law, this was relatively limited and had 
not drawn great attention from commentators. Those who had taken the time 
to study the decisions of the Commission and courts appear to assume that 
the EU reason for pursuing tying was the same as that in the United States. It 
will be argued below that this is not the case. 
The next part of this chapter seeks to fill this gap in the literature and present 
the actual test used to determine tying and the economic concerns underlying 
it. This will then be supported by an analysis of the Commission decisions and 
case law of the EU courts, demonstrating that the concern of the EU 
competition enforcement authorities is the freedom of the customer to choose 
the products they prefer and the protection of market entry. It is not the 
prevention of increased monopoly profits due to the extension of monopoly 
from one market to another. 
3.0 Ordoliberalism in the Approach to Tying: 
Customer Freedom 
3.1. The significance of the mono-theoretical period 
One of the most important issues that is explained by the case law during the 
mono-theoretical period relates to how the Commission and the courts 
determined that a tie actually existed. During this time there was never any 
consideration given by the Commission or courts to a requirement of 
“separate products”. Likewise there was no discussion within EU Competition 
law articles on the difficulties associated with distinguishing between separate 
products and integrated systems. This was the case despite the fact that the 
argument that two tied products could be claimed to be a single system was 
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raised by both Hilti and Tetra Pak.27 This is significant because in the next 
period, discussed in Chapter Five, the requirement of “separate products” was 
explicitly stated in Microsoft I,28 this gave a new focus within the academic 
literature on what constituted separate products and whether it was really 
practical to have such a test.29 Due to the relatively little attention given to 
tying during the mono-theoretical period and the great attention given after it 
is very easy to assume that the Microsoft I’s test was merely a concise 
articulation of what had always been the EU competition approach to tying. It 
will be shown that this is not the case.30 
 
This section will shown that contrary to what may be implied later 
developments, during this period there was no requirement of separate 
products to find a tie. Rather what can be determined from the Commission 
decisions and case law from this period is that in order for there to be a tie 
that breaches Article 102 TFEU a restriction of customer freedom caused by 
the tying practice had to be established. The test applied to determine if a tie 
existed was not concerned with showing definitively what is to be classed as 
two products and what is to be classed as one. Rather the aim was to 
establish how customers themselves wished to purchase the products and 
whether there was any legitimate reason to restrict the freedom of customers 
to purchase the products in the manner they saw fit. This will be called simply 
the “choice test” or the “customer freedom test”. This test can be described as 
follows: 
 
                                            
27
 Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti (IV/30.787 and 31.488) Commission Decision 88/138/EEC [1988] OJ L 
65/19, para 57; Tetra Pak II (IV/31.043) Commission Decision 92/163/EEC [1992] OJ L72/1, 
para 118 
28
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision [2005] 4 CMLR 965 
29
 These questions will be addressed in the next chapter. Hedvig Schmidt, ‘Article 82: is 
technological integration checkmated?’ [2009] Journal of Business Law 354, 368-369; Jean-
Yves Art, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, ‘The European Commission's media player remedy in its 
Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or foreclosure’ 
[2004] European Competition Law Review 694, 698. 
30
 It can be noted that the concept of customer choice has been identified as an element of 
tying abuse after Microsoft I (see Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law (4 edn, OUP, 2010), 
517) however this appears only to be established by reference to the Microsoft I decision and 
as such sits uneasily aside the test established in Microsoft. This chapter and the following 
seek to show that not only was customer freedom always a priority for the Commission and 
courts, including prior to the Microsoft I decision, but further it was the primary point of 
reference for the Commission and courts in ascertaining when tying way taking place. 
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1) Are there consumers31 who wish to purchase the tying good free from the 
tied good? 
2) Is it practically possible to provide the two elements separately? 
3) Does the undertaking lack objective justification for the tie? 
 
If the answers to the questions above are “yes”, it can be deduced from the 
case law that the dominant undertaking is restricting the freedom of 
customers and this is the breach of EU competition law, namely Article 102(d) 
TFEU. When viewed in this manner the importance of dominance (a 
requirement for finding Article 102 abuse) because obvious. This is because if 
an undertaking does not have market power in one of the product markets 
then it cannot restrict the freedom of customers, they will simply purchase 
their combination of products elsewhere. It is only when an undertaking is 
dominant in one of the markets it is able to effectively constrain the freedom of 
customers to purchase their desired mix of products. 
 
By reference to the tying decisions and case law of the Commission and 
courts it will be shown below that the Commission and courts were concerned, 
not with establishing whether two products/services could be considered two 
products/services or a single system/service, but rather they sought to 
ascertain whether the elements of the alleged tie could be sold independently. 
At times this included the EU competition enforcement authorities considering 
the physical distinction of the products and the differing functions of products 
and services in order to show that they could be sold independently and that 
there was no reason why they had to be sold together. Once it was 
established that the elements could be provided independently, along with 
customer demand patterns demonstrating that customers wanted to purchase 
them independently, in the absence of objective justification there was a tie. 
                                            
31
 This is presumably subject to the number of consumers being ‘not insignificant’, although 
this was not articulated until Microsoft, see; Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 
CMLR 965 para 806 and T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 917, 
932 
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3.2. EU Tying Commission Decisions and Case Law: Evidence for 
the Customer Freedom Approach 
The way tying cases have been decided will be discussed here in 
chronological order. This provides the additional benefit of illustrating the way 
the terminology used in tying decisions has changed slightly over time32 while 
showing that the test itself has in fact remained the same throughout. 
 
3.2.1.  Case 311/84 Centre Belge d’Etudes de Marché–Télémarketing v. 
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion (CLT) and Information Publicité 
Benelux (IPB) [1985] ECR 3261 
 
The first tying case of relevance is Centre Belge. Here the defendants, a radio 
and television station based in Luxembourg with a legal monopoly granted by 
the state, refused to allow advertisers who wished to advertise on the station 
from using their own telephone number when advertising the sale of products, 
but rather required them to use the station’s  own telemarketers. This thereby 
tied the sale of advertising airtime to the TV station’s own telemarketing 
service. This limited commercial freedom of the advertisers and prevented 
other telemarketers from competing with the TV station’s own. The Court of 
Justice held that it was an abuse when a dominant undertaking decides to 
refuse to supply an undertaking on a neighbouring market which it is trying to 
penetrate if there is no good reason.33 That is to say that CLT refused to 
supply television advertising to undertakings such as Centre Belge that had 
their own telemarketers (the neighbouring market), a market that Centre 
Belge was trying to penetrate. If a company does refuse to supply in such a 
way, without “objective necessity” (commercial or technical necessity), but 
instead for the purpose of reserving an ancillary activity to itself with the 
possibility of eliminating all competition from another undertaking, this will be 
considered abusive.34 In determining what an ancillary activity is, the Court 
merely said that it was wrong to reserve an activity which might be carried out 
                                            
32
 “refusal to supply X without Y” being used in earlier cases while “tying” being used in later 
cases 
33
 Case 311/84 Centre belge d’etudes de marché – Télémarketing (CBEM v SA Compagnie 
luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB) [1985] ECR 
3261, para 23 
34
 ibid para 26 
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by another undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate 
market.35 This broad definition of what constituted two services had been put 
forward by the Advocate General Lenz who said: 
 
“Where such an undertaking reserves to itself or to a subsidiary under 
its control, to the exclusion of all other undertakings, an ancillary 
activity which could be carried out by another undertaking as part of its 
activities, its conduct amounts to an abuse of a dominant position.”36  
 
The main point to note in this case is that whether or not a contract for service 
could be characterised as a single service or two separate services is 
irrelevant. What is decisive before the Court is whether the reserved activity 
could be carried out by another undertaking. The test could be expressed as: 
is there any logical reason why the customer cannot be the one left to choose 
which combination of services they want? If the answer is “no” then the tie is 
an abuse. This is the cornerstone of the “choice test” relied upon by the Court. 
3.2.2. Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v. Commission [1990] ECR II-163. 
 
Hilti was the next tying case decided after Centre Belge. This case was the 
first that concerned products as opposed to services being tied. Hilti’s nail 
guns required three additional consumables to work. The first was the nail to 
be driven into the surface. There was no intellectual property protection for 
these nails.37 The second consumable was a cartridge strip. These are strips 
that hold the cartridges and they were patent protected to the extent that Hilti 
sold virtually all the cartridge strips for its own guns and, in the UK at least, 
any cartridge strip design that could function effectively in a Hilti nail gun 
would very likely breach Hilti’s patent. 38  The third item was the brass 
cartridges. These act like the cartridge element of a bullet, in the sense that 
they contain powder and when activated provide the momentum to force the 
                                            
35
 Case 311/84 Centre belge d’etudes de marché – Télémarketing (CBEM v SA Compagnie 
luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB) [1985] ECR 
3261, 27 
36
 Ibid Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, para C(2) 
37
 Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti (IV/30.787 and 31.488) Commission Decision 88/138/EEC [1988] OJ L 
65/19, para 67 
38
 ibid para 19, 66 
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nail into the surface desired. These were not patent protected and were 
already freely available.39 The nail guns themselves were also patented.40 Hilti 
claimed that there were not two markets but one for powder fastening 
systems, which encompassed nail guns, cartridge strips and nails. The 
Commission had to decide whether this was correct for the purpose of market 
definition.  Although it was expressed that it was an abuse of a dominant 
position for an undertaking to refuse to supply certain products separately in 
the case summary,41 there was nothing in the official text that mentioned 
separate products. Rather the Commission defined the appropriate market 
here through supply and demand. It said that, “although they are 
interdependent, guns, cartridge strips and nails are subject to different 
conditions of supply and demand”.42 Therefore cartridge strips, nail guns and 
nails were different markets. It is argued that supply and demand is very 
important in the choice test because it establishes how customers wish to 
purchase products when given free choice, whether they buy them separately 
or together. It will be argued later that this represents an Ordoliberal concern 
to preserve the economic freedom of market actors. 
 
  
                                            
39
 Hilti (n 37) para 12, 66 
40
 Ibid para 12 
41
 See paragraph 5 of the case summary. 
42
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3.2.3. Napier-Brown- British Sugar 
 
In Napier Brown – British Sugar, British Sugar “refused to supply” sugar to its 
customers unless they also accepted British Sugar supplied the service of 
delivery too. This was also condemned by the Commission as the reservation 
of an ancillary activity which “could” be undertaken by an individual contractor 
acting independently.43 The Commission went on to say that they were not 
aware of any objective necessity requiring the reservation of such an activity 
to British Sugar. 44  Using a similar phraseology as in Centre Belge the 
Commission said that: 
 
“The Commission considers that [British Sugar] has abused its 
dominant position on the sugar market by refusing to grant to its 
customers an option between purchasing sugar on an ex factory or 
delivered price basis, thereby reserving for itself the ancillary activity of 
the delivery of that sugar, thus eliminating all competition in relation to 
the delivery of the products.”45 
 
This again demonstrates that the concern of the Commission was the lack of 
an objective need for the tying of sugar with delivery. The Commission was 
not asking the question, “could sugar and delivery be considered a single 
product/service” rather it was asking is there any objective reason why British 
Sugar should be allowed to refuse customers the option to choose. This is the 
choice test. 
 
3.2.4. London European 
 
The next decision delivered by the Commission was that of London European 
in 1988.46 This case provides a good example of the quick function/physical 
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 Napier Brown – British Sugar (Case IV/30.178) Commission Decision 88/518/EEC [1988] 
OJ L 284/41, para 69 
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 Napier Brown – British Sugar (Case IV/30.178) Commission Decision 88/518/EEC [1988] 
OJ L 284/41, para 71 
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distinction style of evaluation of products/services that was taken by the 
Commission during this period. Here the two services that were tied were 1) 
access to a computer system that allowed travel agents to book flights online 
and 2) aircraft handling contracts. In distinguishing the two allegedly tied 
products the Commission said simply that the two contracts were not 
connected. One was a computer reservation system and the other was a 
contract for handling aircraft on the ground.47 In other words they had totally 
separate functions. The defendants were found to be making the conclusion 
of a contract subject to the conclusion of a separate unrelated contract as 
expressly prohibited by Article 102(d) TFEU. Little evaluation was given as to 
whether it was a single service beyond a description of their differing 
purposes, and their benefit to completely different elements of the transport 
process. Thereby showing that once again the test was not whether there 
were objective distinctions between the two services allowing them to be 
considered separate, rather the aim was to assess whether there was a 
reason why the services needed to be sold together. If there was no reason 
and customers want to purchase the services separately then there was a tie. 
 
3.2.5. Tetra Pak II 
 
The Tetra Pak case was the first case where the separate products issue 
appears to have been raised as a defence to tying, rather than in relation to 
market definition.48 Tetra Pak argued that they were not tying cartons to filling 
machines because what they sold was a “packaging system”, therefore they 
could not tie a single unit to itself. They also provided secondary arguments 
including that there were natural links between the products49 and suggested 
that only Tetra Pak cartons would work effectively with Tetra Pak machines. 
The Commission did not appear to give much specific reasoning on the point 
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 London European – Sabena (IV/32.318) Commission Decision 88/589/EEC [1988] OJ L 
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of combined products at all,50 but appeared to rebut both the natural links 
argument together with the “packaging system” argument on the basis of 
physically distinct characteristics.51 It is also important to note here that the 
Commission promptly dealt with the argument that only Tetra Pak’s cartons 
would work properly with Tetra Pak machines by explaining simply that if 
there was “genuinely no technical alternative, such an obligation is 
unnecessary”52  and therefore it would not need to be incorporated into a 
contract. This is relevant because it further develops the Centre Belge 
decision and Article 102(d) TFEU which states that two services could not be 
combined if there was not technical or commercial necessity. Reading this 
element of the Centre Belge decision together with the points raised by the 
Commission in Tetra Pak, it could be questioned whether or not technical 
necessity could ever realistically be used as a ground for incorporating a tying 
clause into a contract. Should the undertaking be genuinely concerned with 
technical standards, the court will declare (as in this case) that there are other 
technical solutions such as the publication of standards and specifications, 
and legal recourse through general liability should a third party produce 
inferior products. The Commission went on to say that “the proportionality rule 
excludes the use of restrictive practices where these are not indispensable”.53 
So this can be seen to demonstrate a narrow view from the Commission of 
what it considers an acceptable reason for using a tying clause in a contract 
and suggests that the Commission will not allow safety considerations to be 
used as a pretext for tying practices. 
 
The General Court supported the Commission’s decision. It considered 
whether or not the tying of Tetra Pak’s machines and cartons was in 
accordance with “commercial usage”. The Court suggested that it was not in 
accordance with commercial usage because there were several independent 
manufacturers who had no involvement in machine manufacturing but made 
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 Korah argues that generally there is a lack of economic analysis, particularly Tetra Pak II, 
see Valentine Korah, ‘The paucity of economic analysis in the EEC decisions on competition 
Tetra Pak II’ [1993] 46 Current Legal Problems 148 
51
 Tetra Pak II (IV/31.043) Commission Decision 92/163/EEC [1992] OJ L72/1, para 119, see 
above. 
52
 ibid 
53
 ibid 
The EU Approach to Tying: The mono-theoretical period 
 
116 
 
cartons for use in other manufacturers’ machines.54 It went on to say that 
even if it was normal, such usage would not be sufficient to “justify” recourse 
to a system of tied sales by a dominant company.55 This again shows that 
dominant undertakings may find it very difficult to use “commercial usage” as 
a justification for their tie, if the Court believes that supply and demand 
patterns indicate that customers would rather purchase the tied product 
separately. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Justice, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
went further again and stated that tying the sales of products which are “by 
nature separable” constitutes an abuse. In his view, the products were, “not 
by nature inseparable nor did commercial usage in the sector require tied 
sales”.56 To support this argument, he also raised the fact that there were 
undertakings which only produced cartons that were used in conjunction with 
other undertakings’ machines. The fact that Tetra Pak undertook to abandon 
its system of tied sales was also used as evidence of this. He agreed with the 
decision of the General Court that even if such a usage was normally 
acceptable it would not be acceptable on an uncompetitive market. 57  In 
summary the Advocate General argued that if it is possible to separate 
products and it was not required by commercial practice to tie the products, 
then to do so would constitute an abuse unless objectively justified. He said 
that only in “exceptional circumstances” a dominant undertaking may be 
justified by the nature of commercial usage of the products themselves.58 
 
The Court of Justice did not explicitly endorse Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer’s statement, but did rule that a tie that is in accordance with 
commercial usage or has a natural link between the two products may still be 
an abuse unless there is objective justification.59 
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The Tetra Pak judgments are very important. They demonstrate that seller 
supply patterns (which reflect customer demand) are part of the process of 
determining whether or not a system is to be considered to be a tie or not. 
This is because “commercial usage”, whether or not other undertakings in the 
market also tie all their sales is another way of analysing how customers wish 
to purchase their cartons. If all customers wanted to purchase their cartons 
from their machine manufacturers the only undertakings in that market would 
be machine manufacturers. The fact that there were independent 
manufacturers of cartons was a proxy measure to demonstrate that 
customers wanted to be able to source their cartons from undertakings other 
that their machine manufacturer since that was what they were choosing to do 
before the tie. Relating this to step 1 of the test above, the Commission and 
the General Court established that customers wanted to buy their cartons 
separately, and therefore in the absence of a reason why this ought not be the 
case, they should have the freedom to choose. If it is possible to sell the 
elements separately and there is sufficient customer demand for those 
elements to be sold separately then in the absence of objective justification 
the dominant undertaking should provide them separately. The dominant 
undertakings should not use their dominance to restrict the freedom of 
customers. Essentially, this principle plays an important role in giving effect to 
the desires of the customer and maintaining their economic freedom. 
3.3. The true test of a tie: can the products be sold separately? 
The competition enforcement authorities when determining whether or not a 
tying practice was unlawful, were not concerned with asking if the products 
could be classified as a single integrated system. They did consider, on 
occasion, whether or not the products were physically distinct. 60  This is 
because the question that the competition enforcement authorities were really 
concerned with was not, “are these two separate products?” but rather “could 
they be sold as two separate products?” If there was no reason why a “system” 
                                                                                                                             
said that there was no reason why a tie would contribute to the performance of the task 
assigned to La Poste, therefore this seemed to be an evaluation of potential objective 
justification. 
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could not be broken down into separate products or services then there was 
no reason to allow the dominant company to prevent this from happening. 
After all, if there was a genuine benefit to having the products supplied as a 
tie, then the consumers would see this benefit and would choose to purchase 
them both together of their own accord. If there wasn’t any benefit to the 
consumer, then the benefit must be for the dominant undertaking alone and 
as such it was not appropriate for the dominant undertaking to benefit at the 
cost of customer choice and potentially at the cost of other competitors that 
play an important role in constraining the dominant undertaking’s dominance.  
 
Therefore it is possible to see that the fact that two elements of a tie were 
physically distinct or served differing functions was not related to determining 
whether they were “separate products” but rather it was part of establishing 
whether the elements of the tie could be sold separately or whether they had 
to be sold together. There is no reason why a nail gun cartridge strip has to be 
sold alongside its nails just as there is no reason why sugar has to be 
delivered to the customer by the company that makes the sugar. There is no 
reason why a company that has an electronic system for booking flights must 
also service the aircraft making those flights while they are on the ground. 
There is no justification for this behaviour other than to benefit the dominant 
undertaking and so these ties were considered abusive. If there was some 
sort of benefit that would assist the customer in any way, then first, this would 
be an incentive for the customer to buy their product without the seller having 
to resort to contractual tying and second, this could be raised as an objective 
justification. The fact that there is no such incentive or justification is seen by 
the Commission and the courts as evidence that the only beneficiary is the 
dominant undertaking, to the detriment of customer choice. It will be argued in 
the section below that this, in the absence of any superior economic method 
of determining consumer harm, is an excellent way of determining anti-
competitive tying. 
 
It should be noted that there is a specific class of exception to rule that a tie 
that provides no incentive for the customer to purchase it and that has no 
The EU Approach to Tying: The mono-theoretical period 
 
119 
 
objective justification will be considered abusive. 61  The exception is that 
where there is a state granted legally monopoly, a tie may be prohibited even 
when there are possible objection justifications, such as increased efficiency. 
In the cases of Centre Belge and De Post/La Poste there could arguably be 
efficiency justifications for the ties that were occurring.62 To take the strongest 
argument that could be made for efficiency; De Post/ La Poste was interested 
in tying their business mail with their normal mail. It could be argued that there 
are great efficiencies to be obtained if the post delivery company that is 
already dealing with a client’s regular mail also deal with their business mail. 
For example, the postal company is likely to already be sending couriers to 
their premises to pick up their normal mail and therefore it would be a cost 
saving to also pick up their business mail while they are doing so, rather than 
having two separate companies sending two separate couriers to come and 
pick up the mail at different times in the day. However, the reason why De 
post/La Poste drew the ire of the Commission is related to the fact that they 
had a legal/statutory monopoly that they were seeking to extend through 
contract law.63 After all a legally conferred advantage is one that would be 
very difficult to challenge commercially. If a competing company cannot enter 
both the tying and the tied market and the dominant company refuses to 
supply the legally protected product without the competitive product, then all 
those who are dependent on the legally protected product are forced to switch 
to the legally protected provider. If this is a large number of customers this 
may have the effect of making the continued presence of the competitor in the 
competitive market unprofitable and force them out of the market, ipso facto 
extending the legal monopoly into a market that it was never intended to cover. 
This is highly likely to be seen as damaging to competition in the market and 
therefore not taken likely by the Commission and courts. Ergo, it is argued 
that cases involving tying a product or service that is legally protected from 
competition are exceptional cases and subject to greater scrutiny. As a result 
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it may be that such ties will be found to be abusive even when there is some 
sort of efficiency that could be argued as an objective justification. This 
demonstrates a desire to protect free markets from state monopolies that are 
seeking to extend their remit further than legally intended and in the process 
damage competition in those markets.64 
 
So in summary it can be seen that the requirement of the existence of a 
separate product was never actually established during this period. Instead 
the competition enforcement authorities were concerned with whether a 
product could be sold separately. The difficulty that arose later however was 
that while, for example, the delivery for sugar and sugar itself are clearly 
separate products/services that can be provided separately without difficulty, 
there are other potential “ties” that are not as clear cut.65 The first of which to 
come before the Commission was the Microsoft I case.66 As a consequence 
the Commission attempted to enunciate the rules on tying more “clearly” for 
the first time and it is argued that this led to “separate products” being 
erroneously declared a requirement for tying abuse and thus for the first time 
drew academic attention to the concept. 67 In reality, prior to Microsoft I, the 
EU competition enforcement authorities had actually been concerned with 
whether products could be sold separately. This was because by ensuring 
that products that could be sold separately were sold separately (when there 
was a pattern of demand) this maximised the customer’s freedom to choose 
the combination of products and suppliers that most suited them. This 
maintenance of freedom of choice was the actual test of the EU competition 
enforcement authorities. The reasoning behind this concern for customer 
freedom will be explored in the following section. 
                                            
64
 It is difficult to attribute this concern with a specific economic theory of competition as all of 
the major competition theories would be adverse to the extension of state control of markets. 
However it is possible that this is a manifestation of the “as if” standard endorsed by 
Ordoliberalism as discussed below. 
65
 This ‘grey’ area will be discussed in the following chapter in relation to Microsoft. 
66
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965 
67
 Hedvig Schmidt, ‘Article 82: is technological integration checkmated?’ [2009] Journal of 
Business Law 354, 368-369; Jean-Yves Art, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, ‘The European 
Commission's media player remedy in its Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal 
despite the absence of tying or foreclosure’ [2004] European Competition Law Review 694, 
698. These questions will be addressed in the next chapter. 
The EU Approach to Tying: The mono-theoretical period 
 
121 
 
4.0 Customer freedom: the real test for tying and 
its intended aim 
 
It is argued in this thesis that the EU Commission and courts have pursued a 
doctrine of protecting customer freedom. The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate that the competition enforcement authorities of the EU have 
applied a doctrine of law in relation to tying that is intended to protect the 
customer’s freedom and that by understanding this it is easier to understand 
how tying itself was determined. It is argued that during this period, the 
question posed by the enforcement authorities when seeking to establish a tie 
can be summarised in one single question: “Is there any reason why the 
customer should not be able to choose their own combination of products?” If 
there is no objective reason why they cannot, subject to the tying undertaking 
being dominant and there being customer demand, the tie is considered 
unlawful and in breach of Article 102 TFEU. 
The test can be phrased as follows: 
 
1) Are there consumers who wish to purchase the tying good free from 
the tied good?68 
2) Is there any reason why it is not possible to provide the two elements 
separately? 
3) Is there any objective justification as to why the two elements should 
not be provided separately? 
Essentially parts 2 and 3 could be combined into one step. However they are 
separate here in order to separate the basic question of whether the two 
elements can possibly be provided separately and the far more difficult 
question of whether there are sufficient efficiency benefits to justify the tie. In 
reality question 3 will almost always be answered “no” in practice.69 This is 
because if, assuming the elements were sold separately, sufficient customers 
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would buy the tying good alone, then the tie could not be more efficient to 
those customers than providing the product separately otherwise they would 
have bought the goods together. And if the combination was so efficient that 
customers would almost always choose to purchase the products together 
then there would be insufficient demand for the elements alone and part 1 
would not be made out. 
 
This appears to be based on the following principle, namely that the customer 
is in the best position to decide what fulfils their needs and therefore they 
should be in a position to decide what products they wish to purchase. If the 
combination suggested by the dominant undertaking truly is superior then 
customers will select this combination of their own accord, and if not, then this 
suggests that the customer favours sourcing their tied product from another 
supplier. If they do prefer sourcing the tied product from another supplier, this 
must be because it is superior in some way. Therefore there is no reason why 
the supplier of the superior product should be potentially removed from the 
market merely because of the dominant undertaking’s market power in the 
tying product market. 
 
In order to demonstrate that the customer choice/freedom test truly is the test 
that is used by the Commission and courts and the argument above 
underlines their reasoning the following four principles will be established by 
reference to Commission and court decisions: 
 
1) It is an abuse of dominance to remove a customer’s choice of supplier 
through tying; 
2) This is because the customer is in the best position to assess their 
needs; 
3) To objectively justify a tie there must be a benefit to the customer; 
4) Tying limits access to the market for other suppliers 
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4.1. It is an abuse of dominance to remove a customer’s choice of 
supplier through tying 
It is argued that this principle is the foundation of the Commission and courts’ 
test on tying. The concept is that primacy must be given to the customer’s 
choice and freedom to choose the combination of products that suits them. 
This is why undertakings have been condemned when their policies, “leave 
the consumer with no choice over the sources of his [tied product] and as 
such abusively exploit him”.70 Similarly, it has also been considered to be an 
abuse when the defendant’s behaviour, “restricts the consumers' ability to 
choose sources of supply.”71 In the Commission decision of Van den Bergh 
Foods, a dominant ice cream manufacturer tied the provision of free 
refrigerators with the requirement that it only be used to stock their own ice 
cream. This was challenged as unlawful because it had the effect of 
“eliminating the freedom of a very substantial number… of retailers to stock 
and offer for sale to the consumer [the tied product] of any competing 
suppliers”.72 Contrary to the retailers’ interests, the agreements prevented the 
retailers from exercising their “freedom of choice” in the products they wished 
to stock.73 This indirectly prevented consumers from exercising their freedom 
to purchase the products they wanted.74 Therefore interference with retailers’ 
freedom to choose the products and suppliers on the basis of the merits of the 
products themselves was considered abusive. Therefore the restriction of 
both customers and consumers, that is to say purchasers or indirect 
purchaser’s freedom of choice will be considered harmful by the Commission. 
 
This customer freedom test has been confirmed by the General Court in Tetra 
Pak75 when it has shown a concern for behaviour that “deprives the customer 
of the ability to choose his sources of supply and denies other producers 
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access to the market.”76 This demonstrates that the General Court, like the 
Commission, was primarily concerned with the exercise of freedom on behalf 
of the customer. In the same case, the aim of protecting freedom of choice 
was reiterated by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. He stated that:  
“an undertaking which is in a dominant position and ties purchasers 
directly or indirectly by an exclusive purchasing obligation77 abuses its 
position inasmuch as it deprives the purchaser of choice as to his 
possible sources of supply and limits access to the market by other 
producers.”78  
 
Once again, the aim of the EU courts, Commission and the Advocate General 
is to protect the freedom of the customer to choose their own sources of 
supply. 
4.2. The customer is in the best position to assess their needs 
The belief that the customer is in the best position to assess their product 
needs is demonstrated by the way in which the Commission has treated 
proposed tying justifications. When Tetra Pak defended its tie by asserting 
that it was necessary on technical grounds because only their products were 
effective together the Commission explained:  
 
“If there is genuinely no technical alternative, such an obligation is 
unnecessary. However, if such an alternative does exist, the choice 
should be left to the user.”79  
 
When the undertaking tried to defend their behaviour by saying that they sold 
a system that was superior when using their own consumables, 80  the 
Commission responded by stating that if that were true, such benefits would 
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be apparent to the user without it being necessary for the seller to resort to 
imposing a contractual obligation on the purchaser. It was made clear, that in 
the view of the Commission: 
 
“it is up to the user, and not the producer, to compare such advantages 
with those offered by open systems, and to make his choice freely.”81  
This clearly demonstrates that the Commission believes that the customer is 
in the best place to decide the best combination of products for them to 
purchase. If there is a benefit to using the dominant undertaking’s tied product, 
they will choose it of their own accord. It is the customer who knows their 
needs and not the supplier. 
4.3. An objective justification requires benefit for the customer 
Where it is established that there is a reduction in the customer’s freedom and 
there is no objective justification for the tie it will be considered to be an abuse. 
What is also true is that within the term objective justification is an implicit 
understanding that any benefit of the tie cannot be for the supplier’s benefit 
alone. If the only benefit is for the supplier the Commission will consider the 
tie unfair.82 An objective justification must include some sort of benefit likely to 
be received by the consumer/customer.83 This approach appears to imply that 
if there is no objective justification given by the dominant undertaking then it 
will be assumed that any benefit from the behaviour is for the benefit the 
dominant undertaking alone. This notably departs from a Chicago School view 
of welfare (aggregate welfare) and appears to be more similar to the post-
Chicago concept of consumer welfare. 
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4.4. Tying limits access to the market for other suppliers 
If a tie does not benefit the customer (and if it did presumably that would have 
been raised as an objective justification) either the tie has no purpose, which 
is unlikely, or the tie is exclusively for the benefit of the dominant undertaking. 
The sort of behaviour that would have no benefit for the customer but would 
benefit the dominant undertaking is likely to be that which hinders access to 
the dominant undertaking’s market. After all if there was a benefit, such as 
reduced costs for the undertaking, this could be argued to be passed on to the 
customer through lower prices. The type of benefit that cannot be passed on 
is a reduction in competition. This assumption is never stated expressly; 
instead the Commission and courts have repeatedly specified that the effect 
of various tie-in agreements has been to limit access to the market. For 
example, it has been stated in Van den Bergh Foods that the effect of the tie 
was to prevent market penetration and expansion on the basis of the merits of 
the product.84 In Tetra Pak, the General Court said that the danger of a tie 
was that it “denies other producers access to the market”85. This was also 
supported by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer who said that:  
 
“an undertaking which is in a dominant position and ties purchasers … 
limits access to the market by other producers.”86  
 
Therefore, while it is not stated as an absolute relationship,87 the competition 
enforcement authorities are often wary that where an undertaking cannot 
objectively justify a tie or induce customers to purchase the combination of 
their own accord, the benefits of that tie, are likely to be the restriction of 
competition not in the customers’ interest but rather for the benefit of the 
dominant undertaking. 
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To summarise, establishing a tie does not depend upon some sort of inherent 
quality that can be used to distinguish where there are one or two products. 
On the reasoning of the Commission and courts at this time, the label or tag 
that was attached to a product/s system/s or service/s was totally irrelevant. 
The fact that a consumer/customer/retailer wanted to purchase the products 
from separate suppliers, combined with the fact that those products could be 
sold separately and that there was no objective reason why the undertaking 
should refuse to sell them separately meant that the undertaking had 
restricted the freedom of choice exercised by customers and ultimately 
consumers. This is what was truly relevant when establishing a tie. This is 
because it is for the customer to choose what they wish to purchase and it is 
not for the supplier to choose for them. That which restricts their freedom for 
no objective reason, provides no benefit to the customer and therefore is not 
permitted. This is particularly so if the true benefit to the dominant undertaking 
is likely to be that potential competitors find market access more difficult in the 
tied product market. 
5.0 Customer freedom and the Ordoliberal 
influence 
 
In this section, it will be argued that while customer freedom is a fundamental 
concern articulated by members of the Ordoliberal School of thought it is not 
the only aspect of Ordoliberal thought that is evident in the tying case law. 
Rather the law on tying (and broader competition law principles involved with 
tying) provide evidence of a number of concepts that are linked with 
Ordoliberalism. 88  The analysis undertaken in this chapter reveals further 
aspects of Ordoliberal thought contained within the decisions of the 
Commission, judgments of the courts and opinions of the advocate generals. 
These include the following: the requirement to behave ‘as it’ subject to 
competition, the definition of monopoly and the special responsibility of 
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dominant firms. It is argued that this is significant evidence of Ordoliberal 
influence on EU tying law. 
5.1. Behaving “as if” subject to competition 
Beginning with the Centre Belge judgment, the Court said that in order for an 
abuse to exist the undertaking must use its dominance and the resulting lack 
of competition to: “obtain advantages which it could not obtain if there were 
effective competition”.89 This obviously bears a very strong resemblance to 
the requirement set out by the ordoliberal thinkers that, should there be 
circumstances where a monopoly exists or a “natural monopoly” exists, the 
dominant undertaking should be required to act “as if” it was subject to 
competition.90 Consequently if an undertaking makes use of a benefit that 
would not be available if competition did exist, it is not behaving “as if” it is 
subject to competition. In BPB, the opinion of Advocate General Léger 
highlighted how the appellants, when seeking to demonstrate that they had 
not exploited their dominant position sought to show that they had not used 
their position to: 
 
“obtain advantages which [they] would not have succeeded in obtaining 
if there had been effective competition”91  
 
It is argued that the Advocate General is referring to the standard set by 
Ordoliberal thinkers.92 
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5.2. Monopoly: the ability to act independently of competitors 
When Hilti was being decided before the General Court, it was restated that a 
dominant position was characterised by the ability of an undertaking to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and 
therefore ultimately of customers. 93  This follows the pattern of market 
characterisation expressed by the Ordoliberal Walter Eucken explaining his 
empirical test to ascertain whether a market is a monopoly, partial monopoly, 
oligopoly or whether it is a competitive market. 94  In one instance the 
Commission even seemed to establish whether or not a dominant undertaking 
was subject to market conditions through the apparent reasonableness of the 
contractual terms it was evaluating, concluding that it was “barely conceivable” 
that an undertaking that was subject to market conditions would be able to 
coerce their customers to agree to such restrictive clauses. 95  This again 
demonstrates that the Commission seeks to establish dominance by 
reference to the Ordoliberal standard which is whether an undertaking can act 
independently of their competitors and consequently consumers. This 
definition applies generally when determining dominance under Article 102, 
not just to tying, but nonetheless it is important to consider it here as it 
provides more evidence of the Ordoliberal influence on tying law. 
5.3. A special responsibility 
Finally in EU competition law it is an established doctrine that a dominant 
undertaking has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to distort 
competition.96 This is a tenet of Ordoliberalism97 suggesting again that this is 
a source of inspiration for the Commission. 
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5.4. Rejecting the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis 
The legal principles discussed above constitute evidence of an Ordoliberal 
influence on EU competition law. A second substantial finding of the analysis 
of the case law undertaken in this chapter is the implicit rejection of key 
aspects of the Chicago School of Antitrust. 
 
These include rejecting “systems” arguments made by defendants, 
suggesting that markets are less than durable, recognising a number of 
barriers to entry and appearing to reject the aggregate welfare standard. 
 
In Tetra Pak, the undertaking defended its actions on the basis that its 
machines and cartons constituted a single packaging system rather than two 
separate products; machines and cartons. Tetra Pak argued that it was 
sensible for it to pursue this policy and further it was entitled to do so because 
this allowed it to protect its reputation which is a legitimate interest.98 Such an 
argument would have been acceptable if the Court was following a Chicago 
School line of thought.99 The Commission rejected this explanation, arguing 
that it was actually trying to limit competition to the area most favourable to it, 
that being the market for machines where the technological barriers to entry 
were high.100 Barriers to entry are themselves a concept largely rejected by 
the Chicago School of thought.101 This suggests that this decision was not 
made on the basis of Chicago School principles. 
In the Commission’s decision in Hilti, the Commission stated that had it not 
acted and issued a statement of objections in the manner it did and caused 
Hilti to agree to an undertaking then a competitor would have been 
                                                                                                                             
Conference Agreement (Case IV/35.134) Commission Decision 1999/243/EC [1999] OJ L 
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925, 929; Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York, The Free Press 1978) 372-373 
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EC (2008) 4 European Comp Journal 221; 
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“irreversibly” removed from the market.102 While this does not indicate that the 
Commission is following a particular theory as such, it certainly suggests that 
the Commission does not share the Chicago School’s belief that markets are 
generally durable and resilient.103 In other decisions, the Commission has 
indicated that it considered a strong brand and wide product range a barrier to 
entry104 and it considered heavy demands on investment a barrier to entry,105 
again rejecting the Chicago School view that access to capital is not a 
prohibitive barrier to entry.106 Further the Commission rejected the Borkian 
measure of welfare that suggests that any net increase in welfare can be 
sufficient to justify a particular behaviour. 107  Instead the Commission 
considered it discouraging that there was no guarantee that the benefit to the 
dominant company would eventually be passed on to the consumer.108 All of 
these arguments suggest that during this period the Commission and courts 
have not followed a Chicago School line of thought when investigating tying. 
5.5. Possible influences from the Harvard School 
There are parts of the Commission’s decisions and Advocate General’s 
opinions that have made reference to interference with the structure of 
competition in that particular market.109 There has also been reference to the 
particular idiosyncrasies of the markets themselves.110 This could be said to 
be characteristic of the Harvard (Structure-Conduct-Performance) school of 
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thinking. 111  However, the references are in no way distinctive enough to 
characterise them as a hallmark of Harvard thinking as opposed to similar 
themes running through Ordoliberalism or in some respects post-Chicago 
analysis. 
 
To summarise, what can be seen from the case law between 1957 and 2004 
is that the courts’ and Commission’s decisions show a number of clear 
influences of Ordoliberal thinking. They make reference to a number of 
concepts that are either expounded, valued or associated with Ordoliberal 
scholars. Secondly, they demonstrate an implied rejection of the Chicago 
School of thought by accepting or making arguments based upon ideas or 
theories that would be rejected by Chicago School scholars.112  
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6.0 An Assessment of the EU position: is it 
justified? 
 
The manner in which the EU competition enforcement authorities have dealt 
with tying during the mono-theoretical period has now been explained. The 
purpose of this following section is to assess whether the EU tying approach 
is justifiable from an economic stand point. The way this will be done is by 
using the Chicago School of Antitrust113 as a lens with which to criticise the 
approach. Arguments against the prohibition of tying that have been raised by 
Chicago School adherents will be put forward. It will then be argued that the 
approach used by the EU competition enforcement authorities is valid 
because it maximises customer welfare in the short term and it seeks to 
maintain competition in the long run in markets that already suffer from limited 
competition. In relation to this thesis as a whole, the purpose of this section is 
to argue that EU tying law is economically well-founded and is designed to 
achieve legitimate economic goals. 
6.1. Economic analysis of EU tying law 
Following what has already been discussed in Chapter Two on the Chicago 
School of Antitrust, Chicago School proponents such as Posner 114  would 
argue that tying a system together makes no difference to economic efficiency 
and thus there is no reason to prevent this from occurring. To take an 
example provided by the facts of the Tetra Pak case, if cartons are tied to 
packaging machines, then the customer will consider the price of the whole 
system of machines and cartons. As a logical consequence if the customer 
finds that the system is less competitive than another system, for example an 
open system, then they will opt for that open system rather than that of Tetra 
Pak.115 Therefore if the consumer buys the Tetra Pak system it is because 
they have evaluated the value of the Tetra Pak system and they have 
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evaluated the benefit of an open system and they have found that the Tetra 
Pak system is better suited to their needs. If the open system was more 
efficient then they would have selected that. Therefore if the competitors of 
Tetra Pak cannot make a system that is more efficient than Tetra Pak’s 
overall, then they are the less efficient competitor and therefore should not be 
protected. 
 
It is argued by this author that this argument can be undermined for two 
interrelated reasons:116 
 
1) This does not maximise consumer welfare; 
2) It does not factor in the long term value of having individual competitors 
that are more efficient at producing one particular product. 
This will be considered below 
6.1.1. Combined benefit verses individual benefit to the consumer 
By preventing tied products being sold without objective justification the 
competition enforcement authorities are actually maximising the benefit to 
customers. It may appear to be protecting competitors, but it is only protecting 
them in so far as it prevents dominant undertakings from removing the 
freedom of customers to purchase the best combination of items on the merits 
of each product rather than allowing an undertaking to force customers to buy 
the best package of products because they have a particular product which 
the majority of customers need and is difficult to replicate due to complexity or 
intellectual property. This can be demonstrated using the following illustration: 
 
Where the numerical value indicates the subjective value to the customer: 
 
Dominant Company produces: Product A =11, Product B =4 
Smaller Company produces: (cannot yet produce product A) Product B =5117 
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It is better to allow customers to choose product A from the dominant 
company and product B from the competitor (producing a value to the 
customer of 16) than allowing the dominant company to tie the products into a 
system that will still satisfy the needs of the customer although not as well 
(overall value to the customer of 15) if there is no objective reason A and B 
should be sold together. 
 
The Chicago School would argue that there must be some reason why the 
undertaking has chosen to tie the products together in order to promote 
efficiency; otherwise they would not have done so. However if this was 
genuinely the case, such an argument would have been raised as an 
objective justification. Dominant undertakings have sought to raise arguments 
to justify their tying behaviour however their reasoning rarely stands up to 
judicial scrutiny.118 
6.1.2. The Gradual nature of development 
The Chicago School would also likely argue that if a dominant undertaking 
ties two products together then the answer is for its competitors to simply 
produce the other product in the system too. If it cannot do so, then it is less 
efficient and should not be protected. Taking the facts in Hilti for example, if 
Eurofix wants to sell nails, then they should just produce nail guns too, and if 
they cannot, then this is simply a demonstration that they are not as efficient 
as Hilti and therefore they are not being excluded by Hilti, but rather they are 
just less efficient and thus Hilti is able to out compete them. However, this is 
not true for reasons that will be discussed below. 
 
The Chicago school suggests that if a company cannot produce a whole 
system, then it is not as efficient as its competitor and therefore is not entitled 
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to protection. What this ignores however is that the development of products 
takes time. Generally the more complicated the product the more time and 
expense it is likely to take. With this in mind it can be seen that the purpose of 
a tying strategy is often to use the short term advantage that the dominant 
company has (having a successful efficient primary product already in 
production) in order to prevent the competitors in localised markets from 
developing their own in the long term. This is usually done by offering the 
dominant product (which is usually difficult to replicate119) on the condition that 
they also purchase the tied product in addition. In doing so this starves the 
competitor of funds because customers who need the tying product have to 
buy the tied system and as a consequence they will not purchase the tied 
product from the smaller competitor company. This deprives the competitor of 
funds and accordingly the time in the market place that it needs to develop the 
more challenging of the two products in order to compete successfully in both 
markets.  This strategy can succeed because even though customers may 
prefer to get their tied products from the smaller company or and would 
benefit from the presence of more competitors in the market, they cannot go 
without the tying product during the period that their preferred supplier (the 
smaller competitor) cannot manufacture an effective form of the tied product. 
 
It would be inappropriate to consider the smaller company inefficient just 
because it cannot produce both products at that moment in time. An 
undertaking may only be able to produce one element of a tied bundle at one 
particular stage, but that does not mean that given time the undertaking will 
not eventually be able to also efficiently supply the second product. This will 
be prevented from happening if the dominant undertaking is able to remove a 
competitor from the market simply because they are not yet at a stage where 
they can efficiently produce an entire system. 
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6.1.3. Gradual development and Defensive Leveraging 
The idea that an undertaking may seek to keep neighbouring markets clear of 
competitors in order to protect their own dominant product is sometimes 
referred to as “defensive leveraging”.120 This seems to implicitly recognise that 
undertakings are likely to enter markets and gradually expand into 
neighbouring markets. In Hilti the Commission noted when considering the 
defendant’s behaviour that “these policies all have the object or effect of 
excluding independent nail makers who may threaten the dominant position 
Hilti holds”.121 The Commission has also stated that “the only counterbalance 
to the dominant undertaking which is effective in the short term takes the form 
of smaller competing suppliers on the edge of the market.”122 
The concept of competitors expanding into adjacent markets is not just a vain 
hope of the EU competition enforcement authorities, but the commercial 
behaviour of the dominant undertakings themselves suggests that they too 
consider it to be a threat and seek to prevent it from happening. For example, 
in the Tetra Pak case it was noticed that Tetra Pak had taken over several 
competitors: 
 
“[T]he takeovers of Selfpak, Zupak and Liquipak formed part of the 
same strategy … All of them involved the elimination of competitors 
which, even if some were only modest in size, might in the long term 
have proved dangerous because they had developed or were seeking 
to develop packaging systems which might jeopardize Tetra Pak's 
monopoly in the aseptic sector.”123 
 
Therefore Tetra Pak exhibited a concern for any competitor in a local 
competitive market that appeared capable of entering the less competitive 
market for aseptic packaging machines at some point in the future. 
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Further for the purposes of this argument the circumstances of Tetra Pak 
actually provide a useful example of this “gradual competition development” in 
practice. The General Court noted that until 1987 Elopak (Tetra Pak’s 
competition in the non-aseptic sector, which was founded in 1957) only 
manufactured cartons and accessory equipment. 124  However since the 
decision protecting Elopak’s ability to sell cartons, the undertaking has started 
producing its own non-aseptic machinery and now even produces its own 
aseptic carton filling machinery thereby entering the market in which Tetra 
Pak itself was super dominant,125 the same market that Tetra Pak was using 
to give itself an advantage when expanding in the neighbouring non-aseptic 
market. If Tetra Pak had been able to prevent Elopak from successfully selling 
cartons to the users of its machines it appears unlikely that Elopak would 
have ever been in a position to develop the technology needed to enter the 
market for aseptic filling machines and challenge Tetra Pak’s dominance. This 
of course is anecdotal; however it does provide a clear example of 
competitors in simple consumables, in time, moving into the primary market 
for more complex products and challenging the dominant undertaking’s 
position. 
 
Hypothetically it is possible to argue that if competitors are removed from a 
market through tying and prices are raised by the potential monopolist then 
this will attract entry into the market from other competitors. However, it is 
argued that this ignores the realities of business life. It assumes that an 
undertaking can accurately assess when a price has been raised to a 
monopoly level. Generally this is will be true. Individuals, consumers and 
competing business are able to detect when a price has been raised to a 
monopoly level. But the more complicated the market, and the more 
complicated the product being produced in that market, the less able those 
un-associated with the market will be able to accurately assess the extraction 
of monopoly profits. After all when it is considered that even an established 
undertaking may not be able assess how much the development of a new 
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product/service is going to cost, if it is substantially innovative enough 
compared to its previous products/services, how can those totally unfamiliar 
with the market be expected to accurately assess these costs? Those outside 
of a particular market will have no familiarity with its trends, its peaks and 
troughs in demand, its main customers and clients, development time and 
intricacies etc. All these information costs put a competitor that is totally un-
associated with a sector at a serious disadvantage when gauging whether or 
not to enter a market. The fact that small competitors or competitors in 
neighbouring markets often already have access to this information, or at 
least have a better understanding of it, means that they are first; unlikely to 
suffer high costs obtaining this information and second; are more likely to 
recognise when an opportunity, in the form of monopoly profits exist. 
Therefore if the Commission allowed undertakings to be foreclosed from a 
market by tying, they are not only preventing them from selling a potentially 
superior individual product just because they cannot yet sell both elements of 
a tie, but further they are allowing the removal of those who are most likely to 
recognise an opportunity to undermine the dominant undertaking’s position 
if/when it arises. 
 
Therefore in summary it is argued that the EU protects customer freedom for 
good reason. First, it preserves the freedom of consumers to purchase the 
combination of products that they wish to, preventing dominant undertakings 
from creating a situation where customers are forced to buy the best tie 
(rather than the best combination of individual products) when this favours 
them. This maximises customer welfare as customers are free to purchase a 
combination of products (from difference suppliers) if this is of greatest utility 
to them and are free to buy the tie should this be preferable. Second, this 
approach to tying protects small undertakings that are more efficient at 
producing a particular product. By preventing dominant undertakings from 
excluding rivals that can only make a single product more efficiently at that 
point, it maintains competition in neighbouring markets, providing time for the 
competitors in those markets to enter the dominated market and increase 
competition within that market too. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has covered three primary issues: first, it has explained that the 
main guiding principle that directs the EU competition law approach between 
1957 and 2004 is “customer freedom”. Second, it has been shown that the 
case law and decisions related to tying reflect an Ordoliberal influence on EU 
tying law and third it has explained how the “customer freedom” principle on 
which tying law is based can be supported/defended on economic grounds. 
As a result it has been argued that there are good grounds for the 
Commission and courts rejecting the views of the Chicago School when 
applying tying law. 
 
7.1. The “customer freedom” approach 
It has been seen that the condition of “two separate products” was never 
expressly a requirement to find a tie during the mono-theoretical period. 
Instead tying was determined by reference to “customer freedom” as a 
fundamental principle guiding the application of tying decisions. The way the 
restriction of customers’ freedom was established is expressed by the 
following test: 
 
1) Are there consumers who wish to purchase the tying good free from 
the tied good; 
2) Is it practically and commercially possible to provide the two 
elements separately; 
3) Is there objective justification for the tie? 
 
This customer freedom test, although not expressly articulated in case law in 
the above fashion, is a fundamental guiding test in this period of EU tying law. 
In later chapters it will be possible to see that this concept continues to play 
an integral part in tying law. Further it has been explained that the 
Commission and courts have given their own justifications for protecting 
“customer freedom” on the basis that it places the power to decide what 
should be sold together and what should be sold separately with the customer. 
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Since the customer knows their own needs best it is logical that they should 
be the ones to decide what products they wish to buy together and which 
separately and not necessarily dominant undertakings who may conceivably 
have alternate aims other than benefiting customers. Further where genuine 
efficiencies exist and these efficiencies are appropriately passed on to the 
customer, the customer is best placed to decide whether these benefits are 
sufficient to induce them to buy the two products together. The Commission 
and courts have also expressed that they believe that tying limits access to 
the market for competitors. The law on tying is also used to prevent this from 
happening. 
 
This careful analysis of the case law demonstrates that key elements of 
Ordoliberalism implicitly underpin the decisions of the EU competition 
authorities in EU tying law. In addition, it is argued that there are also tacit 
rejections of tenets of the Chicago school that strongly suggest that this is not 
a key school of thought from which the Commission and courts derive 
inspiration. 
 
7.2. Theoretical economic analysis 
The validity of the customer choice approach has been assessed from a 
theoretical economic point of view. To do this the arguments of the Chicago 
School of thought126 have been used to critique the customer choice approach. 
The purpose of this element has been to assess whether the approach used 
by the EU competition enforcement authorities is justified or whether it is in 
need of reform. It has been argued that the approach pursues the legitimate 
economic aims of maximising the welfare of consumers and maintaining the 
best competitive environment. To fail to do so could, not only cause detriment 
to consumers by requiring them to purchase the best bundle over all, rather 
than allowing them to purchase the combination that provides the greatest 
utility in total, but it also has the potential to exclude from the market those 
best placed to undermine efforts by the dominant undertaking to extract 
monopoly profits. 
                                            
126
 In particular those criticisms based on the work of Richard Posner, see Richard A. Posner, 
‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925. 
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In reference to the thesis as a whole this chapter has demonstrated that 
customer freedom, a concept highly regarded by Ordoliberal scholars, has 
been a fundamental concept used to analyse tying problems. It has also 
explained that from an economic stand point there are arguments that support 
this customer freedom based approach and justify its use based on 
maximisation of customer welfare and maximising competition in markets 
where competition is already weakened by the presence of a dominant 
undertaking.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Impact of the Microsoft (I) Judgment on EU 
Tying Law 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court of First Instance (CFI, now 
General Court) in Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission on 17 September 
20071  has been described as “the judgement of the decade”2 and the most 
important competition case in European history3 bringing Article 102 TFEU 
towards the use of greater economic based analysis. Further the judgment 
confirmed the Commission’s earlier 2004 Microsoft decision4 with its record 
breaking fine totalling €497,196,304, it also saw EU tying law being applied to 
the rapidly changing and complex high technology industry. 5  The CFI 
judgment confirmed the Commission’s allegation that Microsoft had unlawfully 
tied its PC operating system (Windows) with its media player (Windows Media 
Player). Several years after the CFI judgment (which was not appealed to the 
then ECJ), the case remains the leading authority on EU tying law, but many 
aspects of the judgment have attracted controversy which is on-going.  
 
In relation to the thesis as a whole this chapter argues that the Commission 
and CFI’s approach to tying in Microsoft I is consistent on the one hand with 
its previous case law on tying, but also contains new and important 
innovations. The EU approach to tying has stayed the same in that the 
overarching principle is to protect the freedom of the customer to choose the 
products that they wish to obtain and prevent dominant undertakings from 
interfering with this freedom of choice.  Nevertheless, there are some 
interesting and significant changes in that both the Commission and the CFI 
have begun to make way for greater use of economic theory in applying the 
law to tying. The Commission made greater efforts to investigate the 
individual market in order to assess whether it was possible for the tie to effect 
                                            
1
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission: [2007] ECR II-3601, judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of the Court of First Instance of 17 September 2007 
2
 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft Judgement and its implications for 
Competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, 927 
3
 Robert Lane, 'EU Law: Competition' (2010) 59(2) I.C.L.Q. 489, 492 
4
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965, Article 3 of the decision  
5
 It should be noted that the fine applied to Microsoft for both infractions regarding tying and 
interoperability on its workgroup server software. The scope of this thesis is limited to the 
tying element and the interoperability element of the decision will not be discussed. 
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foreclosure of competitors from the market. It is argued by this author that this 
approach appears to follow post-Chicago thinking. As such this appears to be 
the beginning of the di-theoretical period, that is, the period in which both 
Ordoliberal aims and post-Chicago analysis start to be used concurrently by 
the Commission and courts in their application of tying law. Whether or not 
this new approach applies exclusively to the software market or to tying 
generally is difficult to establish because, as will be discussed in the following 
chapters, the only tying decisions that have taken place since Microsoft I 
relate to software. There is however one strong piece of evidence that this di-
theoretical approach may be applied to ‘classic’ non-software markets; that is 
the Guidance6 issued by the Commission on the application of Article 102. 
This Guidance, along with the Commission decisions since Microsoft I will be 
explored further in Chapter Seven, where it will be demonstrated that there is 
further evidence to show that the Commission and courts appear to be 
applying post-Chicago thinking in their post-Microsoft decision making 
process.  
 
This chapter will be structured in following manner: First, in order to 
understand how Microsoft’s behaviour is alleged to have affected the market, 
it is important to understand how that market works. Therefore the products 
involved, the way these products generate revenue and the way customer 
uptake affects their utility to customers/consumers will be set out. It is crucial 
to understand these idiosyncrasies of the market involved in order to 
understand how Microsoft’s behaviour could and was alleged to influence and 
affect its competitors.  
 
Second, the legal test that was applied in both the Commission decision and 
the CFI judgment will be discussed and the main arguments raised by 
Microsoft in the Court judgment will be set out. This will show that the 
Commission’s reasoning was strongly supported by the CFI demonstrating 
                                            
6
 Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (Communication) 
(2009) OJ C 45/02 
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that there is no noticeable division between the approach of the Commission 
and the Court. 
 
Third, the novel elements that have been added to the test for tying by the 
Commission and confirmed by the CFI will be set out. These new elements 
are the addition of “separate products” and “foreclosure”. In the case of 
“separate products” this will be criticised as an unnecessary semantic change, 
and in the case of “foreclosure” this will be endorsed as a useful explicit 
requirement, that appears to have been implicitly assumed to exist in the 
cases previous to Microsoft I. It will also be argued that it is this additional 
requirement in particular which is now being used to incorporated greater use 
of economic theory in a post-Chicago style of economic assessment of tying 
effects. 
 
Fourth, the chapter will explain that the broader theoretical basis underlying 
the Microsoft I decision is consistent with prior case law in that it also pursues 
the aim of maintaining ‘customer choice’. What has changed in essence is 
that post-Chicago economics is being used to help determine when a 
particular tie is likely to pose a risk, either directly or indirectly to customers’ 
freedom to choose a combination of products that they want. 
 
Fifth and finally, an amended test from that given in Microsoft I will be 
provided by the author. Although the change given is subtle it is necessary in 
order to refocus the test upon that which tying law is seeking to protect: 
customer freedom.  
 
1.1. The importance of the market in the Microsoft (I) case  
 
 
From the outset, it is considered important by this author to set out the 
complex product, market and profit structures of Microsoft and its competitors 
This information on how computer operating systems, media players, content 
producers, and consumers, interact is crucial in order to understand how the 
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Commission established Microsoft’s tying behaviour was likely to affect 
competition in the market and hence be ruled unlawful. 
 
1.1.1. Products 
The Commission, in its decision, defines the various elements of software it 
considers as “system software” and “application software”. System software it 
states “controls the hardware of the computer” sending instructions on behalf 
of applications that fulfil a precise need for the user. It goes on to say that 
operating systems (Microsoft Windows being an example) are an example of 
system software; software controlling the basic functions of a computer, 
allowing the user to run application software.7 Media players are “application 
software”.8 Media players are defined as software products that play back 
audio and video content. A media player is able to “translate” digital content 
into instructions that are channelled to speakers or a display through an 
operating system.9 
 
In order to distribute content such as audio and video over the internet 
software infrastructure is required. Different pieces of software enable media10 
to be encoded, transmitted and played back by the recipient.11 The media 
information can be encoded into different formats. The formats define how 
data are arranged in digital media files. As digital media involves voluminous 
amounts of information compression and decompression algorithms have 
been developed, in order to make it possible to reduce the storage space 
required by audio and video content. The piece of code in a media player that 
implements a compression/decompression algorithm is called a codec” 
(coder/decoder). In order to correctly interact with media content compressed 
in a given format, for example playing a video file, a media player needs to 
implement the corresponding codec.12 Different formats have different codecs. 
 
                                            
7
 Microsoft (n 4) para 37 
8
 ibid para 402 
9
 Microsoft (n 4) para 60 
10
 Such as video and audio 
11
 Microsoft (n 4) para 112 
12
 ibid para 61 
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Some of these formats are open, which means that they are free for any 
software company to use and incorporate into their products, and others are 
proprietary formats.13 Different pieces of software are used to (i) encode a 
digital product (content producer); (ii) decode it (content consumer). Windows 
Media Player (WMP) is the software used by the consumer to decode media 
data. Most software developers don’t produce a complete software set for the 
entire process from encoding to play back by the user. The exceptions to this 
at the time were Microsoft, RealNetworks and Apple. Other developers who 
wished to use their technology to encode or decode media data would pay for 
a licence14 from one of these three companies or they used open industry 
standards.15 
1.1.2. Profit and Market structure 
Microsoft’s client software, that is the media player in question, was installed 
on every computer with the Windows operating system as a non-removable 
component.16 It could not play either Realnetworks’ format, Apple’s Quicktime 
format or MPEG-4, an open source format. 17  Microsoft’s own encoding 
software was available through a free download. 18  Its server streaming 
software, which only runs on Windows servers, was freely available with any 
version of Windows Server 2003 or as a download from Microsoft’s website.19 
So ostensibly, Microsoft did not make direct profit from the provision of its 
streaming and encoding software when customers downloaded Microsoft’s 
own software. Although the Commission pointed out in its decision, more than 
once, that in reality the cost of Microsoft’s media player was hidden in the 
price of the operating system media player bundle.20 That is to say that the 
elements were technically tied through integration rather than being tied 
contractually. 
 
                                            
13
 ibid para 113 
14
 For example, for a software developer to incorporate Microsoft’s Windows Media Video 9 
formats into its software it would cost 10 US cent for a decoder and 20 cents per encoder or 
25 cents for both (as of January 2003) see Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 
CMLR 965, footnote 132. 
15
 Microsoft (n 4) para 117 
16
 Microsoft (n 4) para 310 
17
 ibid para 122 
18
 ibid para 124 
19
 ibid para 123 
20
 ibid footnote 945 and 971 
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In contrast to this RealNetworks, Microsoft’s competitor, made a substantial 
proportion of their revenue (39.8%) from licensing its software to consumers.21 
This was because unlike Microsoft, RealNetworks sold two versions of its 
media player; one that was free and another that was a premium ‘paid for’ 
version. 22  Further, while RealNetworks had a free version of its server 
software, its enterprise versions cost upwards from $4,199.23 RealNetworks 
had also recently developed a media player that could play Windows Media 
formats, but without using Microsoft’s codec, meaning that RealNetworks did 
not have to pay a licence fee to Microsoft.24 
 
Other media players exist beyond Microsoft, Apple and RealNetworks, but 
they do not use their own format for encoding and decoding data. 
“Musicmatch” and “Winamp” for example rely on Microsoft’s format. They 
provide only media players and do not provide software to create, manage or 
deliver digital content. 25  This means that any content provider seeking to 
target Musicmatch users, for example, would need to use Microsoft’s software. 
 
2.0 The Commission and CFI  decision 
 
2.1. The Commission’s 2004 Microsoft decision: Microsoft26  
 
One of the main areas of interest within the Microsoft I Decision was the 
express formulation of a tying test. The Commission applied a four pronged 
test to determine that tying had occurred:27 
 
(i) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; 
(ii) the undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product market;  
                                            
21
 RealNetworks’ revenue was generated as follows: 39.8% Software licences fees (client and 
server) Service revenue 56.6% (digital media subscription) 3.7% Advertising revenue. See 
Microsoft (n 4) para 125 
22
 ibid para 131 
23
 ibid para 133 (price correct on 4 September 2002) 
24
 ibid para 130 
25
 Microsoft (n 4) para 141 
26
 ibid 
27
 The test did not have any case law references given to indicate from where it was drawn. 
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(iii) the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product; and  
(iv) tying forecloses competition.28 
 
This test (“the Microsoft test”) was applied by the Commission without 
reference to any prior tying case law. 29  There were no references and the 
Commission did not explain how this test related to the leading cases on tying 
(discussed in Chapter 4) such as Hilti30 and Tetra Pak.31 (Although the CFI did 
cite these cases in support of the test in its judgment.32)  
 
The first three elements of the Microsoft test are not complicated, that is not to 
say they were uncontentious, but they do not need further elaboration at this 
point. In contrast, how Microsoft’s behaviour was alleged to foreclose the 
market requires greater explanation. The Commission identified the following 
“feedback loop” which was used in support of both the Commission and CFI 
decisions. In brief it can be described as follows: 
 
1. Content providers and software developers look to installation and 
usage shares of media players when deciding in which technology to 
develop their complementary content and software.33 
 
2. By tying Windows and WMP Microsoft ensures that content providers 
and software developers who use the Windows format can reach over 
90% of the market, so they primarily code for WMP.34 
 
                                            
28
 Microsoft (n 4) para 794 
29
 Pierre Larouche, 'The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy 
and Innocation: Comment on Ahlborn and Evans' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 933, 936 
30
 Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1991] ECR II – 1439 and Case C-53/92 P Hilti AG v 
Commission [1994] ECR I – 667 
31
 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission [1994] ECR II – 762 and Case C-333/94 P Tetra 
Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I – 5951 
32
 See Microsoft (n 1) para 859 
33
 Microsoft (n 4) para 879 
34
 ibid para 880; Note: once software or content is encoded in the proprietary Windows media 
format, it can only be played back on other media players if Microsoft licenses its technology 
(see paragraph 881). 
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3. This content drives up the popularity of the media player which, in turn, 
drives uptake of the underlying media technology.35 
 
4. This uptake of WMP feeds back to step one. 
 
Through tying WMP, Microsoft was alleged to have thus created a positive 
feedback loop reminiscent of the one that propelled Windows to its quasi-
monopoly position in the client PC operating system market.36 
2.2. The Court of First Instance Judgment (now General Court): T-
201/04 Microsoft v. Commission 17 September 2007 
 
The Commission Decision was appealed by Microsoft to the Court of First 
Instance which delivered it ruling on 17 September 2007.37 
 
2.2.1. The basis of Microsoft’s appeal  
 
Microsoft challenged the four part test applied by the Commission. It argued 
that the Commission had incorrectly applied EU law on tying,38 It argued that 
the test39 the Commission had applied departed from Article 102 (d) TFEU in 
two ways.40 First, it stated that Article 102 TFEU prohibits abusive behaviour41 
and that: 
 
“Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
                                            
35
 ibid para 881; Underlying media technology not only includes the supported codecs but 
also other formats such as DRM and Microsoft’s media server software 
36
 ibid para 882 
37
 The appeal procedure is dealt with by Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230). The consequence 
of this is that the Court’s jurisdiction allows it to checking rules of procedure, assessment of 
facts and checking for manifest errors of assessment of misuse of power. See: T-201/04, 
Microsoft v Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601, para 87 
38
 Microsoft (n 1) para 840, 794 
39
 ibid para 842 
40
 ibid para 844 
41
 “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so 
far as it may affect trade between Member States.” 
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Microsoft claimed that Commission had replaced this requirement that of 
supplementary obligations that are not related to the contract with the 
condition that the dominant undertaking does not give customers “a choice” to 
purchase the tying product independent of the tied product.42  
 
Second Microsoft claimed the Commission had added a foreclosure 
requirement not expressly provided for in Article 102 (d) (ex 82(d)). This 
requirement was not normally taken into account when assessing the 
existence of abusive tying43 (the addition of foreclosure is discussed in detail 
below, section 3.2).  
 
Both of these arguments were firmly rejected by the Court as “purely 
semantic”.44  The Court decided that the Commission’s analysis was correct 
and consistent both with Article 102 (2) (d) TFEU and with the established 
case-law.45 The Court stated that the elements set out in the Microsoft test46 
were the appropriate factors to consider when seeking to ascertain whether a 
particular behaviour constituted abusive tying. Although the Commission itself 
did not make reference to the case law when it expressed the test, the Court 
said that it was in line with case-law and referred to specific cases in 
support.47  
 
The Court added that the list of abusive practices set out in Article 102 (2) 
TFEU was not exhaustive but rather illustrative of examples of abuse. 48 
Therefore it was not necessary for the abuse to conform precisely to one of 
the examples (a) – (d) in order to be a violation of that Article 102(2) TFEU.49 
                                            
42
 Microsoft (n 1) para 845 
43
 It was argued that the Commission further based its conclusion on a new and highly 
speculative theory (see paragraph 846). Largely the same element was argued later in their 
plea. The Court rejected the argument for reasons that will be considered in full below as 
essentially Microsoft raised the same argument again in their first plea (see paragraph 868) 
44
 Microsoft (n 1) para 850 
45
 ibid para 859 
46
 See above and ibid para 794 
47
 ibid para 859; in particular Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, upheld in 
Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission 
[1994] ECR II-755, Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. 
48
 Microsft (n 1) para 860 
49
 ibid para 861 
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In any event the Court decided that the test applied in the Microsoft I Decision 
reflected the conditions laid down in Article 102 (2) (d) TFEU appropriately.50 
 
In relation to Microsoft’s first point, the CFI explained that when the 
Commission stated that the dominant undertaking did ‘not give customers a 
choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product,’ it was merely using 
different words to describe the concept that tying assumes the customers are 
compelled in one form or other to accept supplementary obligations.51 
 
In relation to the second argument put forward by Microsoft, the Court stated 
that while it was true that neither Article 102(d) nor Article 102 as a whole 
contained any reference to anticompetitive effect, the principle remained that 
conduct was only abusive if it was capable of restricting competition.52  
 
It can be seen that the Court rejected Microsoft’s arguments, and strongly 
endorsed the four point Microsoft I test that the Commission used.53 
2.2.2. Two further pleas 
 
Assuming the Commission had interpreted the test to be applied appropriately 
Microsoft relied on two further pleas in seeking to appeal the decision. The 
first plea, disputed any infringement of Article 102 (ex Article 82) and second 
plea claimed a breach of proportionality.54 
 
The Court dealt with the four parts of the first plea in the order in which they 
arise when applying the test: 
 
1. The existence of separate products; 
2. The existence of supplementary obligations; 
3. The existence of restrictions on competition; 
                                            
50
 ibid para 862 
51
 ibid para 864 
52
 T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601, para 867 ; See Case T-203/01 
Michelin v Commission [2003] ECR II-4071, para 237. 
53
 Microsoft (n 1) para 869 
54
 ibid para 814 
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4. The existence of objective justification of Microsoft’s behaviour.55 
 
The Court also dealt with the claim that the Commission failed to take into 
account the obligations imposed by the TRIPS Agreement. However this 
largely relates to international trade law and therefore will not be dealt with in 
detail here.56 
2.2.2.1. The existence of two separate products 
 
Microsoft argued as its main point, as it did at the hearing before the 
Commission Decision was issued, that the media functionality was not a 
separate product from the Windows operating system but rather formed an 
integral part of it. As a result, it argued that there was only a single product for 
sale to customers which is being constantly updated.57 
 
They then went on to argue three further points to support this: 
 
1. Microsoft had to tie WMP with Windows for technical reasons; 
2. WMP and Windows were linked by nature and commercial usage; 
3. That the commercial failure of the remedy58 (Windows without WMP) 
demonstrated that the Commission’s finding of separate products was 
incorrect. 
 
To begin, the Court clarified that the software concerned was that for WMP, 
and not software that was merely related to media functionality. It noted that 
even Microsoft itself differentiated in its technical documentation between files 
that constitute WMP and other media files, in particular those relating to basic 
media infrastructure.59 
 
                                            
55
 ibid para 870 (compare 839) 
56
 The Court considered Microsoft’s argument and rejected it on the basis that the TRIPS 
agreement allows for the Member States to prevent abusive behaviour that has an adverse 
effect on competition. See T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601, para 1188-
1193, rejection at para 1192. 
57
 Microsoft (n 1) para 885-912 
58
 The remedy, its failure and the consequences of that failure are discussed in Chapter Six. 
59
 Microsoft (n 1) para 916 
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The Court then noted that the Commission had correctly stated that the 
distinctness of a product was assessed by reference to customer demand.60 
Microsoft had argued that the test ought to have been whether there was 
demand for the tying product without the tied product. This was rejected.61 
 
First, the CFI held that this did not correspond to what was expressed in case 
law. 62   Second, Court said the argument amounted to saying that 
complementary products could not constitute separate products. For example, 
the Hilti case concerned nail magazines and nails. Since there would be no 
need for nail magazines without nails, these two products would then be 
categorised as a single product. But that was not the case.63 Third, regardless 
of the previous points there was demand for Windows without WMP, for 
example, from companies that do not want their staff using their computers for 
non-work-related purposes.64 Looking outside of the case-law to the practical 
facts that could support or undermine an argument for separate products, the 
Court also found that: 
 
 The function of Windows and WMP was different;65 
 There were independent producers who made only media players and 
did not produce operating systems;66 
 Microsoft designed versions of WMP that worked with competitors’ 
operating systems;67 
 WMP was available for download independently of Windows and 
released upgrades of WMP independent of Windows;68 
 Microsoft engaged in promotions specifically dedicated to WMP;69 
 Microsoft provided different licences depending on whether they 
related to Windows or WMP;70 
                                            
60
 ibid para 917 
61
 ibid para 919 
62
 ibid para 920 
63
 ibid para 921 
64
 Microsoft (n 1)  para 924 
65
 ibid para 926 
66
 ibid para 927 
67
 ibid para 928 
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 ibid para 929 
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 ibid para 930 
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 Despite the bundling, a number of customers continued to acquire 
media players from Microsoft’s competitors, separately from the their 
operating system.71 
2.2.2.2. Consumers are unable to choose to obtain the tying 
product without the tied product 
 
Microsoft argued that they had not prevented customers from obtaining the 
tying product without the tied product on three bases: 
 
1. customers paid nothing extra for receiving WMP with windows; 
2. customers were not obliged to use WMP; and, 
3. customers were not prevented from installing and using competitors’ 
media players.72 
 
The Court observed that, regardless of these arguments, it was not disputed 
that consumers were unable to acquire the Windows system without also 
acquiring WMP, which means the requirement of abusive tying, that the 
contracts were made subject to supplementary obligations, was satisfied.73 In 
addition, it was not possible to uninstall WMP.74 This alone appeared enough 
for the Court to reject the arguments.75 But nonetheless the Court addressed 
Microsoft’s points stating that: while there was no separate price for WMP that 
did not mean it was free of charge, rather the price was just incorporated into 
the total price of the Windows operating system. Also there was nothing to 
suggest from either Article 102 or the case-law on tying that required a certain 
price to be paid for the tied product.76 And with regard customers not being 
obliged to use WMP and not preventing users from installing other media 
players the Court said that neither argument was relevant since Article 102 
and tying case-law did not require that to be the case.77 
                                                                                                                             
70
 ibid para 931 
71
 ibid para 932 
72
 Microsoft (n 1) para 950-960 
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 ibid para 961 
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2.2.2.3. The Foreclosure of competition 
 
Microsoft claimed that the Commission had failed to prove that integrating 
WMP and Windows involved foreclosure of competition. 78  In particular 
Microsoft criticised the Commission for applying a “highly speculative theory” 
relying on prospective analysis of the possible reactions of third parties in 
order to find that the tie would foreclose competition.79 
 
The Court did not accept this. It found that the Commission had “clearly 
demonstrated” that the pre-installation of WMP on Windows systems had “the 
inevitable consequence of affecting relations on the market between Microsoft, 
OEMs and suppliers of third party media players” altering the balance of 
competition in Microsoft’s favour and to the detriment of other operators.80 
The fact that the Court considered the actual effects which the tie had already 
had and the way that the market was likely to evolve did not mean that it had 
adopted a new legal theory. On the contrary, normally the Commission would 
have just considered that tying by its nature had a foreclosure effect.81 The 
Court accepted that Commission’s analysis showed that Microsoft’s conduct 
was “liable” to foreclose competition.82 The Court then went on to assess the 
validity of the Commission’s foreclosure explanation, but this consists of little 
more than repeating the exact same points and coming to the exact same 
conclusion as the Commission did in its own analysis.83 
2.2.2.4. The absence of objective justification 
 
Within EU law it has been expressed that the dominant undertaking may 
provide objective justifications for their behaviour.84 Microsoft argued that the 
tie produced efficiency gains that outweigh any anti-competitive effects.85 
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Microsoft said that: 
 the Commission ignored the benefits to software developers and 
website creators who benefit from a stable and well defined Windows 
platform;86 and, 
 that removing WMP would result in degrading and fragmenting the 
Windows operating system.87 
 
In answer to this the Court recalled once again that Microsoft was not obliged 
to stop providing Windows with WMP altogether, but rather to provide a 
version of Windows without WMP.88 
 
Next the Court stated that the fact that software and website developers could 
rely on WMP being present on almost all PCs in the world was precisely a 
fundamental reason why the tie was considered to lead to market 
foreclosure. 89 While it was accepted that standardisation 90  did present 
advantages, it was not for Microsoft to impose that standard unilaterally 
through tying.91 Further it was not requiring a removal of functionality because 
OEMs could provide their own media software by installing third party media 
players.92 
 
                                                                                                                             
efficiencies which outweigh any anticompetitive effects on consumers.”; Commission, 
‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (Communication) (2009) OJ C 
45/02, para 28 
85
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It was also established that while Microsoft claimed integration lead to 
superior performance 93  and that certain software would not work 94  or 
Windows would have its functioning affected95 if WMP was removed these 
assertions were either unsupported or there was evidence to the contrary. 96 
2.2.2.5. US v Microsoft Corp. (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
 
Microsoft also submitted that since there had already been a case regarding 
Windows and WMP in the United States, and that there had been a 
settlement agreed, this was sufficient and it was not necessary to take the 
measures any further.97 This was rejected not only due to the timing of when 
the abuse took place in the US decision,98 but also the US settlement did not 
allow customers to acquire Windows free from WMP.99 
 
The United States pursued Microsoft for a similar tying offence prior to the EU 
litigation. The essence of this case was that Microsoft had attempted to use its 
power in the market for operating systems to increase take up of its Internet 
Explorer browser (IE).100 The District Court (District of Columbia) found that 
tying IE with Windows “prevented OEMs from preinstalling other browsers and 
deterred consumers from using them”.101 This was because IE software was 
irremovable from Windows and installing another browser would entail further 
costs and use more space on the computer’s hard drive.102  On appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, the court stated that on a matter of procedure the issue 
should be remanded back to the District Court.103 On remand the District 
Court Judge ordered settlement discussions,104 which resulted in the United 
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States (as a legal body) and nine of the States (as individual legal bodies) 
reaching a consent decree with Microsoft. 105  Nine states sought further 
remedies but ultimately were granted only the same remedies as had been 
agreed previously.106 
 
With respect to tying the main element of the consent decree that applied was 
as follows:107 
 
 Microsoft was required to allow end users and OEMs to remove access 
to Microsoft Middleware Products by removing icons, shortcuts, menu 
entries and disabling automatic invocations;108 and, 
 Microsoft was required to offer the end user the opportunity to alter 
default invocations.109 
 
However Microsoft retained the right to program Windows to invoke a 
Microsoft Middleware (such as IE) in any instance in which Non-Microsoft 
Middleware (such as a third party browser) failed to implement a reasonable 
technical requirement. So if there was some sort of information that the user 
was trying to access that would not function properly on non-Microsoft 
Middleware for some technical reason (e.g., a requirement to be able to host 
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 66 Fed. Reg. 59452 (Nov. 28, 2001) and after amendment: 67 Fed. Reg. 23654 (May 3, 
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a particular ActiveX control) then the equivalent Microsoft software would be 
activated by the computer.110 
 
Therefore after the US case111 against Microsoft, Microsoft still installed its 
media player on every computer with its operating system as a non-
removable component. As a result, the Commission considered that Microsoft 
was required only to ‘hide’ the presence of the programme from users. All of 
the code was still present112 on every installation and started if a user tried to 
open media encoded in Microsoft’s format. 113  Therefore, despite the US 
remedy, Microsoft’s behaviour was still considered an infringement of Article 
102 (d) TFEU.114 
2.2.2.6. The second Plea 
 
Microsoft claimed that the Commission’s remedy was disproportionate. In the 
next chapter the merits of the remedy implemented in Microsoft I will be 
discussed, what is relevant here is that the Court rejected Microsoft’s claim. 
Microsoft challenged the decision the basis of three grounds. But all were 
grounds that had been dealt with previously under the first plea but relisted 
under the heading of proportionality. 115  Therefore the Court held that the 
arguments were unfounded on the same grounds as had been described 
earlier in the decision.116 And that contrary to Microsoft’s assertion the remedy 
prescribed brought the abuse to an end with the minimum possible 
inconvenience to Microsoft.117  
 
As a consequence of the above, the claims relating to the annulment of the 
contested decision were rejected so far as they concerned the tying of 
Windows and WMP.118 
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In summary, in almost every aspect the CFI confirmed the Commission’s 
decision.119 This means two new requirements have been added to the law on 
tying: 
 
1. It has established a requirement of separate products; 
2. It has established a requirement of foreclosure. 
 
These two elements of test have had a substantial impact on the law, which 
will be considered below. 
3.0 The new elements of the tying test 
 
3.1. The first element of the test: the need for “separate products” 
 
The concept of “separate products” as a requirement to find tying constitutes 
an abuse was a new element in tying case law. Both the Commission and 
Court decisions in Microsoft I state that a prerequisite for finding a tie was that 
there are two separate products. This development has been particularly 
controversial.120 At first glance, this requirement may be axiomatic, after all 
Article 102 prohibits any abuse of a dominant position which may, in particular, 
consist in: 
 
“(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts.” 
 
                                            
119
 The only aspect of the Commission’s decision that was successfully repealed related to an 
element of the remedy that required the placement of a monitoring trustee to supervise the 
implementation and compliance of the other remedies: Case T-201/04 Microsoft v 
Commission [2007] ECR II – 3601, para 1278- 1279 
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The acceptance of supplementary obligations suggests that there must be a 
supplementary and thus additional service or product that is being added to 
the original. But the Treaty never uses the term “separate products” or 
“separate services”. Prior to Microsoft I, although dominant undertakings had 
tried to defend their ties on the basis that they were a “system” rather than two 
products, the requirement of separate products was never articulated. It is 
argued that the use of these words in Microsoft I, words that notably had not 
been used prior to Microsoft I,121 was a poor decision. This is purely because 
it suggests that there is an objective distinction that makes single/tied 
product/s identifiable. Since this is not the case it causes confusion. This 
confusion has been exploited by those who disagree with the Microsoft I 
decision as a whole. If the original term “separate consumer demand” had 
been retained this would still explain when a tie exists (or to use the 
Commission’s phrase when there are “separate products”) but it would also 
highlight that there is no objective definition of what constitutes one or two 
products, but rather it is the customer’s desire to purchase the products 
independently that defines when a tie exists. Using the term “separate 
consumer demand” instead of “separate products” highlights, rather than 
hides this and therefore makes the law clearer and easier to understand. This 
argument is set out in greater detail below: 
 
It should be recalled from Chapter Four, that no case from the mono-
theoretical period articulated a specific step by step test for tying in the 
manner that was attempted in Microsoft I itself. If a test could be deduced 
from the case law of the mono-theoretical period it would conform to the 
following pattern:122 
 
4) Are there consumers who wish to purchase the tying good free from 
the tied good? 
5) Is there any reason (e.g. practical or commercial) why it is not possible 
to provide the two elements separately? 
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6) Is there any objective justification as to why the two elements should 
not be provided separately? 
 
Notably no reference to separate products is needed. Prior to Microsoft I there 
was never a substantial debate based on whether or not a tie consisted of 
separate products. This was because prior to Microsoft I any discussion on a 
particular tie before the Commission and courts was dealt with on the basis of 
the following simple determinants: 
 
1) Is there customer demand for the elements separately? 
2) Are the elements physically distinct? 123 
3) Are their functions different?124 
 
If the answer to these questions was in the affirmative then there was a tie.  
 
The reason why there was no substantial legal discussion regarding what 
constituted separate products prior to Microsoft I, was because the 
Commission and Courts had only dealt with cases where the factors above 
were relatively uncontentious. This was because the elements of the tie were 
always physically distinct, with clearly differing functions and differing 
customer demand. This made the presence of a tie appear obvious. To take 
the example of Hilti,125 nail guns, nails and cartridges are all clearly physically 
separate items. They also all serve different purposes. As a result little time 
and consideration was needed or given to the idea of whether there were 
separate products.  
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 The simplicity of considering physically distinct products has not been ignored by 
commentators. See: Jorge Padilla, David S. Evans, 'Tying Under Article 82 EC and the 
Microsoft Decision: A Comment on Dolmans and Graf' (2004) 27 World Competition 4 503, 
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remedy in its Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or 
foreclosure' (2004) 25(11) E.C.L.R. 694, in this particular article the authors use the phrase 
“physically distinct” or “physical characteristics” no less than 5 times at 694, 697, 697, 699 
and 706 giving an indication of how fundamental he believed it to be that the tied products be 
physically distinct. 
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However in the Microsoft I decision, the factual context was different.  The 
Commission and CFI were presented with a tie involving physically integrated 
elements, with no obvious visual distinction whatsoever. No additional CD 
was required to obtain WMP, no additional equipment needed to be bought. 
The question of whether a media player has a separate function to, or is part 
of an operating system is far more complicated when the very 
general/multipurpose nature of a computer’s function is considered. Again 
comparing Hilti a nail and nail gun are for binding materials for the purpose of 
construction, the functions of a personal computer are as numerous as its 
potential users. 
3.1.1. The Commission decision 
The Commission stated that products that were not distinct could not be tied 
in a way that was contrary to Article 102.126 Microsoft had argued that WMP 
was an integral part of Windows and as such was not distinct from Windows. 
The Commission did not believe that such an approach corresponded with the 
“realities of the market place”.127 The Commission went on to note that in both 
Hilti and Tetra Pak the dominant companies had tried to claim that their 
products were not distinct (even if in Hilti this was for the purpose of market 
definition).128 It was further noted that in each of these cases the argument 
was rejected. This was because independent manufacturers who produced 
the tied product alone existed.129 This was taken to indicate that there was 
separate consumer demand and as such distinct markets for the tied 
product.130 It can be seen then that independent consumer demand was the 
essential requirement needed to prove the existence of a tie or 
“supplementary obligations”. 
3.1.2. The CFI judgment 
The Court supported the Commission noting a number of facts that supported 
the Commission’s finding of separate products, not least: The function of 
Windows and WMP was different;131 The existence of independent producers 
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who made only media players and did not produce operating systems; 132 
Microsoft designed versions of WMP that worked with competitors’ operating 
systems;133 WMP was available for download independently of Windows and 
released upgrades of WMP independent of Windows; 134  Microsoft had 
promotions specifically dedicated to WMP; 135  different licences existed for 
Windows and WMP;136 and customers continued to acquire media players 
from Microsoft’s competitors, separately from the their operating system.137 
Again, most if not all of these elements demonstrate independent consumer 
demand, but instead were used to show separate products existed. 
3.1.3. How “separate products” opened up the Microsoft I decision to 
criticism 
The use of the term “separate products” has resulted in three criticisms of the 
law: 
1. Separate products are sold together all the time, therefore it is not anti-
competitive; 
2. How products are viewed (two separate or one combined) changes 
between the producer, the customer and the competition authorities; 
and, 
3. Preventing separate products from being combined in technology 
markets may result in the stagnation of technological development to 
the detriment of consumers. 
 
It is argued below that these are not valid criticisms. 
 
Separate products are sold together all the time and therefore such a practice 
is not anti-competitive. Commentators such Schmidt, and Art and McCurdy 
have used the prevalence of separate products being sold together in ordinary 
commercial life to undermine the Commission’s restriction of tying separate 
products. To that end, examples were given such as shoes with laces, mobile 
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phones with cameras and music players,138 cars with air conditioning and 
stereos and operating systems with browsers.139 The difficulty with this first 
criticism is that it ignores the other requirements of the test. These 
combinations are unlikely to come under the scrutiny of the competition 
authorities because the undertakings offering them are unlikely to be 
dominant in the market and will often provide, for example, phones without 
cameras as well as phones with cameras. Therefore, the presence of 
“separate products” being sold together in ordinary commercial life is 
irrelevant, as the competition authorities are not interested in preventing all 
products from being sold together, but rather only those where the other 
essential conditions are present so that there exists a risk of negatively 
affecting competition. 
 
The second criticism is summarised by Schmidt: 
 
“Cases like Hilti and EC Microsoft illustrate that there can be a 
significant difference in how a product is perceived by the company 
producing the product, the consumers and the competition authorities. 
However, the competition rules and their case law offer limited 
guidance in defining a product.”140 
 
It is no doubt true that dominant undertakings may argue that their products 
are in fact a single system when the competition authorities believe there are 
two separate products being tied. This poses the question how can the law 
truly establish there is a tie when there are differing opinions on whether there 
are two products in the first place. The strength of this argument comes from 
the fact that the term ‘separate products’ implies that there is some objective 
difference between products that allows competition authorities to identify 
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when there are two products being sold together, when of course this is not 
the case. But this issue is resolved by looking at how the competition 
authorities actually establish that there are two separate products. 
 
In both Microsoft I and Tetra Pak141  the issue of whether there was one 
product or two was resolved by using patterns of supply and demand 
immediately prior to the tie to ascertain customer demand. This is the main 
determinative factor because customer demand demonstrates how customers 
want to purchase the product/products when given the freedom to choose. If 
there are undertakings offering products separately or if there are 
undertakings that offer only the tied product this shows there is customer 
demand for buying them separately. If there was no customer demand such 
undertakings would not be able to sustain a market presence. Therefore 
customer demand is the factor that determines142  that there are separate 
products and therefore it is not the dominant undertaking or the competition 
enforcement authorities who define what constitutes one product and what 
constitutes two, but the customer, as set out in Chapter Four, this is because 
the customer knows their needs better than the dominant undertaking and the 
competition enforcement authorities.  
 
The difficulty created by using the term “separate products” instead of 
“independent/separate customer demand” is that the underlying reasoning, as 
set out above, becomes less clear. It obscures from the true value that the 
Commission and Court protects, that is customer freedom.143 While both the 
Commission and Court used the term “separate consumer demand” at times 
in their decisions they used it infrequently and only in the context of seeking to 
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find “separate products”.144 This is an error. By not making it absolutely clear 
that it is the customer (through customer demand) that defines separate 
products the Commission opened itself up to misguided criticism about how 
difficult it is to determine what are separate products. The criticism is almost 
entirely semantic, 145  whether it is easier to say “independent customer 
demand” or “separate products”, which is established by independent demand 
is a matter of opinion. Nonetheless, this change in wording caused the 
decision to appear weaker than it actually was. This criticism could have been 
averted simply by making the test clearer by using the term 
“independent/separate customer demand” instead. 
 
It is likely that the reason why the term “separate products” was used instead 
of independent customer demand is because the Commission used more 
than just customer demand to demonstrate that Windows and WMP were 
separate products.146 “Separate products” may have been a term that was 
given to encompass both customer demand and other factors that were 
considered such as Microsoft providing different licences depending on 
whether they related to Windows or WMP. Nonetheless, the use of this term 
still allowed commentators to criticise the test used in Microsoft I. It is argued 
the use of the term independent customer demand instead of separate 
products would have made the test clearer in its application and aim of 
protecting the customers’ freedom to select the products most efficient for 
them. 
 
The third and final criticism revolving around the separate products definition 
is based on the idea that preventing separate products being combined in 
technology markets may result in the stagnation of technological development 
to the detriment of consumers. If two products are increasingly being sold as a 
package, at what point do those two products become accepted as one 
product? This argument, unlike those above, may appear particularly 
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convincing when considering rapidly changing software markets, although it 
could equally be applied to other less dynamic markets. The Commission was 
criticised, again by Schmidt, for applying an overly restrictive test that does 
not take into account the continuous product development and integration in 
“high technology” markets like operating systems.147 Schmidt criticised the 
test saying that it may find products are tied during a transition period 
between when customers want products separately and the point where they 
expect the two elements together.148 
 
Once again this issue disappears by looking at separate products as a 
question of customer demand. By looking at customer demand to ascertain 
which products the customer wants to purchase independently it is not the 
Commission or Court that decides when two products are no longer separate, 
nor dominant undertakings, but rather it is the customers who decide when 
they wish or wish not to obtain elements of a tie separately. This is particularly 
important when the undertaking involved is dominant and therefore may be 
using the tie for motives other than purely reflecting consumer demand. For 
example, even though it was argued that customers did not want to buy an 
OS without a media player at the time Microsoft started tying, the fact was that 
after four years of tying by Microsoft, consumer demand for independent 
media players was still present.149 Customers therefore did not consider the 
media player as part of the operating system. Therefore, either Microsoft had 
misread the market or their behaviour was not based on the genuine belief 
that there would not be demand for independent media players in future.150 
 
As a consequence of all this it can be seen that the use of the term “separate 
products”, distracts attention away from the genuine concern of tying law;151 
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that is the primacy of the consumers’ freedom to choose the combination of 
products/services they want, and instead opens up discussion on when the 
dominant undertaking considers there to be two products or one. It is also 
argued that consumer demand is important in terms of continuous product 
development because it ensures that the dominant undertakings have to 
follow the behaviour of customers (the undertaking only stops making 
products available separately when customers stop buying them separately) 
rather than dominant undertakings trying to anticipate customer trends before 
they happen or using such anticipation as a pretext for restricting customer 
choice. 
 
It is worth noting at this point that the issue of separate products has also 
arisen in the context of tying under US antitrust law. Unlike EU law however 
the issue of separate products has been subject to debate for a number of 
decades, both in terms of discussion within the courts and academic 
debate.152 The first case where issues arose regarding “separate products” 
concerned advertising space sold in morning and evening local newspapers. 
Whether they were separate or not was dealt with on the basis of whether 
there were separate markets and whether the buyers perceived the two 
groups of readers as anything other than “fungible customer potential”.153  On 
this basis there was no tie. In Crawford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp.154 
contractual provisions allowing Chrysler to choose the carriers that shipped its 
vehicles to its dealers was challenged. This challenge was rejected on the 
basis that it was “vital” for Chrysler to have vehicles delivered properly and 
that to say it was enforcing an illegal right seemed contrary to “universal 
business practice”. In Jerrold Electronics Corp. the court considered the 
mandatory purchase of an entire system and service contract was not tying 
separate products if there were “legitimate reasons” for selling normally 
                                                                                                                             
the almost total absence of observable physical distinction between integrated software 
programmes and software where integration has not taken place. In spite of this it is still 
maintained that the law is clearer, even in non-software markets, if the term “separate 
consumer demand” is used in place of “separate products”. 
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separate elements combined.155 So until this point it is possible to see that the 
issue of separate products was dealt with on an inconsistent basis. However, 
since then the law has been settled through the decision in Jefferson Parish 
Hospital.156 In this case it was set out that services were separate when they 
could be offered separately and if offered separately some customers would 
purchase an alternative service. This of course is similar to the current EU test 
as it uses customer demand to ascertain what the customer would choose to 
do given the freedom to do so. Weinstein has argued that the US approach in 
technology cases could be improved by taking into account more factors.157 
These factors include the customer’s point of view, the manufacturers’ point of 
view and functionality. 158  However, these three issues he respectively 
identifies using customer demand, patterns of manufacturer supply and 
evidence of a substantial technological advance. With regards to these 
matters however EU tying law already takes into account supply and demand 
patterns, and technological advances, if they exist, can be raised as objective 
justifications. So these factors are already taken into account in EU 
Commission and court decisions. 
 
3.2. The fourth step of the test: Foreclosure 
 
The fourth condition of the test in Microsoft I requires that the tie causes 
foreclosure.159 Prior to the Microsoft I decision, foreclosure was an implied 
requirement.160  It is argued by this author that its express inclusion in the test 
is a significant development as it paves the way for greater use of economic 
theories of exclusion and foreclosure to be taken into account.  
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3.2.1. Foreclosure prior to Microsoft I 
As discussed in Chapter 4, prior to the Microsoft I case there had been little 
express economic analysis included in Commission and Court decisions 
leading some to criticise the Commission for a lack of economic rigor.161 This 
changed with Microsoft I because foreclosure of the market was expressly 
required. As noted in the previous chapter, the Court and Commission had 
demonstrated a concern for “foreclosure” prior to Microsoft I, albeit under the 
heading of “market access”. In the Hilti decision, behaviour that allowed the 
undertaking to prevent the entry of competitors into the market through the 
misuse of dominance was seen unfavourably by the EU competition 
authorities. The Commission stated that Hilti had abused the market by 
attempting to “limit the entry of independent producers”162 into the market. It 
was also said that aspects of Hilti’s commercial behaviour were “designed” for 
that purpose 163  stating that their policy was to “hinder new entrants” by 
obstructing access to the tying product needed to make use of the tied 
product.164 In addition, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer noted in his 
opinion in Tetra Pak that the Court had held one of the reasons for the 
behaviour being considered abusive was because it limited access to the 
market by other producers.165 Other Commission decisions also emphasised 
the need to protect small competitors from behaviour designed to: exclude 
competitors from the market;166protecting “equality of opportunity” particularly 
for “new market entrants”;167 and other similar concepts.168 This suggests that 
while there was no express requirement of foreclosure prior to Microsoft I 
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there was still a concern whether or not the actions of the dominant firm would 
have the effect of excluding competitors unfairly. 
 
The strongest example of the Commission and courts considering potential 
effects similar to ‘foreclosure’ before Microsoft I are found in Tetra Pak. In the 
Commission decision, Tetra Pak was described as limiting “competition to the 
area most favourable to it”.169 There was in Tetra Pak a requirement that all 
maintenance and repair of its machines be carried out by Tetra Pak. The 
Commission said that this “closes the door to any competitor on the 
maintenance and repair services market”.170 This appears to correspond to 
stating that there is foreclosure of the maintenance and repair market. Tetra 
Pak also contained a provision whereby all cartons used by a purchaser of 
Tetra Pak machines must be supplied by Tetra Pak. The Commission stated 
that: 
 
“Such a system of tied sales…makes the carton market completely 
dependent on the equipment market and favours the charging of 
discriminatory prices or indeed loss-making operations on the latter 
market. … They place competitors, and chiefly those which market only 
one or other of the products which are tied by Tetra Pak, and who 
cannot therefore, unlike Tetra Pak itself, subsidize possible losses on a 
given product through profits made on another product, in an extremely 
uncomfortable position.”171 
 
Further analysis continued: 
 
“[By tying carton sales to machine sales] Tetra Pak thereby limits 
competition to the area which is most favourable to it, i.e. that of 
machines, where the technological entry barriers are very high, 
especially on the aseptic market, where it enjoys a virtual monopoly. By 
the same token, these same contractual clauses prevent the 
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emergence of any competition in the cartons sector, where the 
technological barriers are much lower.”172 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that the Commission has previously considered 
foreclosure pre-Microsoft I and to a very limited extent there was even some 
discussion regarding the economic impact of their tying obligations. But these 
are quite limited in their scope and are not considered in detail.  
3.2.2. Foreclosure in Microsoft I 
The express inclusion of a requirement of foreclosure should be seen 
positively. As discussed above foreclosure was considered occasionally in the 
pre-Microsoft I case law, but it was not analysed in detail.173 Jones and Sufrin 
state that the Commission found abuse after “very little analysis of the 
market”. 174  As a consequence, the Commission was considered to lack 
economic consideration and analysis in its approach to abuse cases175 and 
castigated it as being “largely … immune to influence from economics”176. As 
a result some suggested that a more economic approach should be taken.177 
The express requirement of foreclosure appears then to be a very welcome 
addition. 
 
The Commission appears make a real effort to demonstrate that it did not 
assume foreclosure, expressly stating that since users could obtain third party 
media players from the internet free that there were “indeed good reasons not 
to assume without further analysis that tying WMP constitutes conduct which 
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by its very nature is liable to foreclose competition.178 Elements of this change 
opened up the Commission to criticism too. In this instance, it was not the 
poor wording of the test that opened the opportunity for criticism but rather Art 
and McCurdy 179  and Petit and Neyrinck 180  appear to take the economic 
arguments of the Commission out of context. They even go so far as to argue 
that the Microsoft I decision was not a real tying case at all; instead it was a 
case that ought to have been dealt with on the basis of essential facilities or 
refusal to deal. 181  Further they also suggested that if the case was 
appropriately dealt with under refusal to supply then the case would have 
failed because the standard required would have been much higher than for 
tying.182 It is submitted that this view is incorrect. It is accepted that if one 
were to be directed to particular paragraphs of the Microsoft I Commission 
decision in isolation, for example, paragraphs 861, 866 and 878, it would 
appear that the Microsoft I decision was about access to “essential facilities”, 
but this is not the case. The paragraphs mentioned continually compare 
Microsoft’s distribution model with that of its competitors and find that their 
competitors’ are not equal. Art and McCurdy cited this discussion as evidence 
that the Commission was concerned with access to Microsoft’s operating 
system as a method of distribution. 183  But these paragraphs in the 
Commission decision are not discussing an independent issue it is merely 
part of the process of proving foreclosure. It is one of a number of steps taken 
by the Commission to ascertain whether or not Microsoft’s competitors would 
be able to overcome the foreclosure effect of Microsoft’s tie by making their 
media players just as prevalent as WMP. It is not about access to essential 
facilities, rather just a single step in a discussion that is seeking to establish 
whether Microsoft’s behaviour would foreclose the market. 
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In seeking to comprehensively demonstrate that there was an economic 
theory underpinning the case, the Commission sought to demonstrate that by 
tying WMP to Windows, Microsoft could credibly start a feedback loop184 that 
would eventually result in Microsoft’s dominance in the media player market 
almost independent of the quality of its media player. 185  As such the 
Commission set out that: 
 
1) Microsoft’s behaviour would result in WMP being present on almost 
every personal computer;186 
2) That this ubiquitous presence would act as an incentive for content 
producers to code their audio and film only in Microsoft’s proprietary 
format;187 
3) That this move towards content producers coding their content in one 
single format would then result in consumers moving to WMP;188 
4) That the move towards customers using WMP instead of other media 
players would damage competition from the market;189 and, 
5) Consequently control over Windows proprietary format would act as a 
serious barrier to entry to any new entrants to the media player market 
even if their media player was technologically superior.190 
 
Therefore, the reason why the ability of Microsoft’s competitors to distribute 
their Media Players as effectively as Microsoft was relevant was because if 
Microsoft’s competitors could successfully make their Media Players equally 
as prevalent as Microsoft’s then this would undermine the process of 
foreclosure. This is because there would be no greater incentive for content 
producers to code their content in WMP than there would be to code it for any 
other media player, despite Microsoft’s decision to tie.  
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This discussion was important for the Commission to consider because 
Microsoft had suggested that although they were able to secure the presence 
of WMP on every computer that was using Windows there were other matters 
to take into account that showed that there may be no negative effect on 
competition. One of these matters was that there were other ways for users to 
get media players on their computers.191 As such, to calculate whether these 
other methods of getting media players to consumers were sufficient to 
prevent Microsoft’s tie from foreclosing competition the Commission 
investigated whether or not they could achieve a comparable level of 
presence in the market place, thereby preventing Microsoft’s WMP becoming 
the automatic choice for content providers. This required the Commission to 
ascertain whether internet downloading was a roughly equally efficient 
method of reaching customers as Microsoft’s tie.192 
 
The evaluation of distribution methods appears to have led Art and McCurdy 
to mistakenly believe the Commission considered access to Microsoft’s 
operating system distribution network to be the hindrance to competition.193 
This is not supported by the wording of the decision however: 
 
“[841] There are indeed circumstances relating to the tying of WMP 
which warrant a closer examination … in the case at issue, users can 
and do to a certain extent obtain third party media players through the 
Internet, sometimes for free. There are therefore indeed good reasons 
not to assume without further analysis that tying WMP constitutes 
conduct which by its very nature is liable to foreclose competition.” 
 
“[842] In the following sections, it will be explained why tying in this 
specific case has the potential to foreclose competition so that the 
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maintenance of an effective competition structure is put at risk.” 194 
(Note that the discussion of distribution methods followed). 
 
So, once the discussion is placed in context, it is clear that the discussion of 
distribution mechanisms is there simply to evaluate whether Microsoft’s 
competitors were able to gain equal distribution through internet downloads or 
other distribution methods which would allow them to nullify any foreclosing 
effect of Microsoft’s tie. The Commission was not seeking to punish Microsoft 
for its ability to distribute its media player more effectively than anyone else, 
or excluding others from accessing its distribution system. Rather the 
evaluation of the possible avenues of distribution available to Microsoft’s 
competitors was just one step in the process of demonstrating the potential for 
foreclosure. 
 
When the Commission’s evidence of foreclosure was evaluated by the Court 
its analysis was concise. The Court stated that Microsoft had merely asserted 
that the finding of foreclosure was based on conjecture and had not 
succeeded in showing that was the case. While this does not add much to the 
discussion of foreclosure specifically in Microsoft I, it is very important more 
generally. The Court’s response suggests that it would be willing to consider 
economic arguments that undermine or empirically demonstrate that the 
Commission’s arguments on foreclosure are conceptually or empirically 
flawed.195 This again opens the way for far greater use of economic theory 
and the use of empirical economic evidence in the analysis of tying. That said, 
how far the court will be willing to go to analyse large volumes of complicated 
economic data is yet to be seen. 
3.2.3. Foreclosure and the Post Chicago Approach 
It is argued in this thesis that the Microsoft I case not only contained an 
express requirement of foreclosure of the market, but further contained 
greater economic evaluation of the effect of the tying behaviour. The 
Commission specifically analysed whether or not Microsoft’s behaviour 
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foreclosed or “harmed” competition.196 It noted that while in previous cases, 
the Commission and courts considered the foreclosure effect to be 
demonstrated by the tying of one product to another dominant product, in this 
instance there were “good reasons not to assume without further analysis that 
tying … foreclose[s] competition”.197 It then went on to describe the feedback 
loop that has already been described in this chapter.  
 
This approach appears to conform to a post-Chicago approach. The Chicago 
School tends to look at cases through price theory and come to general 
conclusions.198 Post-Chicago analysis tends to analyse competition problems 
by considering the individual circumstances of the case, the facts that 
surround that case and the differing elements of that specific market that 
affect the actions of the market actors.199 The analysis of Microsoft I included 
looking at the way in which “network effects”200 affected the decision making 
process of content and application producers. The foreclosure loop itself is 
based upon the reactions of market actors, such as content producers, to the 
actions of other market actors. So, for example, the Commission anticipated 
that with the tie in place media content producers would not code their content 
on the basis of the most superior media software available, but rather they 
would chose WMP on the basis that the vast majority of consumers were 
likely to purchase Microsoft’s operating system and therefore they would have 
WMP present on their computers. It is argued that this consideration of the 
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particular characteristics of the market combined with the analysis of the likely 
decisions of market actors in light of other market actors’ behaviour reflects a 
post-Chicago approach to assessing the impact Microsoft’s tie was going to 
have on the development of the media player market. This argument will be 
further supported and developed in Chapter Seven where it will be shown that 
the Commission, in particular, has continued to take on post-Chicago analysis 
in its assessment of the foreclosure caused by tying. 
4.0 Customer freedom 
 
4.1. Customer freedom in Microsoft I 
It has been argued above that the approach to foreclosure in Microsoft I 
appears to follow a post-Chicago style of analysis. What will be established 
here is that whilst the approach to foreclosure changed, following a more 
post-Chicago style of analysis the overarching Ordoliberal aim of protecting 
customer freedom remained the same. 
 
The Ordoliberal concern for customers’ freedom of choice can be seen in both 
the Commission decision and the CFI judgment. To demonstrate this, the 
emphasis placed on customer freedom in the Commission decision and the 
Court decision will be analysed: 
 
4.2. The Commission Decision (2004) 
Beginning with the Commission decision, one of the main elements they 
sought to prove to establish tying had taken place was that “the undertaking 
concerned [did] not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product 
without the tied product”201 Also when the Commission considered whether 
the fact that Microsoft’s competitors also sold their operating systems with 
media players constituted potential tying, it  found that this was not the case 
for a number of reasons, one of which was that Microsoft’s competitor’s gave 
users a “choice to remove the media player code” from the computers.202 
Again the fundamental concern with choice arose when the Commission 
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considered whether or not the US judgment was satisfactory in addressing 
their concerns. The Commission said that the US settlement was insufficient 
because it did “not restore the choice of Microsoft’s customers as to whether 
to acquire Windows without WMP”203  making it clear that the customers’ 
freedom of choice is the pre-eminent concern of the Commission. It even 
appears at one point that the Commission entered into a very brief analysis of 
the importance of efficiency gains versus consumer choice. This occurred 
when Microsoft suggests that tying WMP with Windows was efficient because 
it saved having to distribute two products. The Commission responded by 
saying that such efficiency gains could not outweigh the negative effective of 
the tie because:  
 
“distribution costs in software licensing are insignificant; a copy of a 
software programme can be duplicated and distributed at no 
substantial effort. In contrast, the importance of consumer choice and 
innovation regarding applications such as media players is high”204 
 
This shows once again the weight of importance the Commission attaches to 
customer choice. Finally, the Commission’s choice of wording to describe 
their remedy also demonstrated where its concern lay: After ensuring that 
Microsoft would offer a version of Windows without WMP it also required that 
“Microsoft must not … remove or restrict OEMs’ or users’ freedom to choose 
the version of Windows without WMP”205 
 
4.3. The Court decision 
First the Court notes that the phrase used by the Commission; “'does not give 
customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product” is 
merely another way of saying that “consumers are compelled, directly or 
indirectly, to accept supplementary obligations”. This suggests that the Court 
equates the wording of Article 102(d) with a restriction of customers’ freedom 
to obtain elements of a tie separately. 206  Further when the Court was 
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explaining that the contested decision did not require users to accept 
operating systems without Media players, the Court observed that OEMs and 
users would install media players themselves (in the absence of Microsoft 
doing so) “the difference being that that player would not necessarily be 
Windows Media Player”.207 This once again shows that the aim of the Court 
decision was not to decide how customers should buy or use Windows or 
enter into some sort of product redesign, but rather, to simply allow users the 
choice of which media player they wished to have pre-installed.208 In addition, 
the Court stated categorically that the price of the tied item was not 
determinative of whether a tie existed. Rather “[c]oercion exists when a 
dominant undertaking deprives its customers of the realistic choice of buying 
the tying product without the tied product”209 again noting that it is the erosion 
of the customer’s choice, not the way in which the tie is priced that matters. 
 
Further, the Court made clear its concern, not just for the freedom of 
consumers, but the freedom of third parties, such as content providers. The 
Court noted that “it is beyond dispute that Microsoft does not give customers 
the choice to acquire Windows without [WMP]” and that “the tying at issue has 
a direct influence on third parties and therefore interferes with their free 
choice”.210 This is because: 
 
“Microsoft recognises that content providers take [the wide spread 
distribution of a media player] into consideration when choosing the 
encoding format of their products and therefore implicitly accepts that 
the 'unmatched ubiquity achieved through [its] tie distorts that 
[choice]'”211 
 
This demonstrates that the Court is also concerned about dominant market 
actors using their market power in order to distort the choice of third parties, 
who in this case are content producers of streamed media. Finally, the Court 
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also defended the remedy imposed by the Commission on the basis that it 
“allows consumers to exercise their choice on the basis of the merits of the 
products”. 212  This demonstrates that the consistent concern of both the 
Commission and the Court throughout the Microsoft I case was to ensure that 
customers were able to exercise their economic freedom to choose the 
combination of products they wanted on the merits of those products rather 
than some other quality related to Microsoft’s dominance in the market. This is 
in accordance with prior tying case law and Ordoliberal principles. 
5.0 Improving the Microsoft I test 
The discussion above shows that the Commission and CFI have applied the 
law regarding tying in a manner which is in principle consistent with previous 
case law. Those changes that were made were either semantic changes 
(changing the test from separate consumer demand to separate products) 
that were unnecessary or were changes that brought in the greater 
opportunity to use economic analysis when considering the impact of the tie 
(foreclosure). As such the test, whilst changing the approach by making 
greater use of economics to find when a tie exists, does not change in 
substance, the aim of tying law; seeking to maintain customer freedom. 
 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that an amendment should be made to improve 
the legal test for tying further in terms of legal certainty and semantic clarity. 
The first stage of the test should be amended so that the tying test reads: 
 
(i) the tied good is subject to independent consumer demand; 
(ii) the undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product market;  
(iii) the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product; and  
(iv) the tie forecloses competition. 
 
This would retain the beneficial fourth stage of the test while altering the first 
stage so that it expressly requires independent customer demand and thereby 
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highlights the aim that the law is actually seeking to achieve: protecting the 
customer’s freedom to purchase the products they desire. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established that the Microsoft test changed the law on tying 
in two ways. The first was the exchange of “independent customer demand” 
with the phrase “separate products”. While the latter term allows the 
Commission to take a greater number of factors into account, it has been 
argued that it is a poor phrase to use because it suggests that there are 
objectively observable characteristics that make products separate, when 
what is actually key is to establish whether there are customers213 who want 
to purchase the products separately. Establishing customer demand is 
important because if it exists, then in the absence of practical reasons why it 
is not possible, or objective justification why they should not be offered 
independently, the dominant undertaking should provide the products 
separately, rather than seek to restrict the freedom of its customers. 
 
The second way in which the law on tying was changed was that it has now 
added the express requirement of establishing foreclosure. This is significant 
as it allows the Commission and courts to introduce greater economic 
analysis into their assessment of tying. It means that the competition 
enforcement authorities can, instead of assuming that tying will foreclose a 
market, set out the specific way in which they believe that the dominant 
undertaking’s tie will damage competition in the market place or why they 
believe this is not the case. In support of this they can rely upon economic 
models and market specific assessment in a manner that reflects a post-
Chicago style of analysis. 
 
This chapter has established that Microsoft I was a major change in the way 
the Commission and courts approach tying. While previously tying law was 
determined by reference only to Ordoliberal principles (thus the mono-
theoretical period) Microsoft I marks the beginning of the di-theoretical period. 
That is the period in which the Commission and courts pursue the Ordoliberal 
aim of customer freedom, but use an economic style of assessment that 
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follows post-Chicago analysis. This development means that cases from this 
point on wards are likely to contain far greater use of economic models and 
far greater use of empirical economic data in order to establish what precise 
effect a tie is going to have on a market. This will include looking not just at 
the direct effects, but the effect that a tie may have on other market actors 
whose products or services are used in conjunction with the dominant 
undertaking’s product. 
 
Finally a normative proposal has been put forward subtly altering the wording 
of the test proposed in Microsoft I. The purpose of this is to maintain the 
positive changes brought about by the Microsoft test, such as a greater 
opportunity to use economic analysis to establish foreclosure, but alter the 
phrasing of the first arm of the test to bring greater clarity and provide greater 
emphasis on customer demand. The consequence of this alteration is that the 
test reflects the purpose of tying law more accurately, that is; to preserve the 
freedom of the customer to choose the combination of products that is most 
efficient and provides greatest utility to them. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the Microsoft I 
decision provides a watershed in the development of EU tying law. Microsoft I 
represents the beginning of the di-theoretical period. During this period the 
Ordoliberal aim of preserving customer freedom of choice remains consistent 
as in the mono-theoretical period, but in addition to this a post-Chicago style 
of analysis begins to be incorporated into the EU approach. From this point on 
economic empirical evidence and economic models of competitive harm begin 
to take an increasingly important place in establishing if and how a tie causes 
anti-competitive effects. The purpose of this chapter has also been to argue 
that the law was applied appropriately in Microsoft I and the criticisms laid 
against its assessment of separate products and foreclosure stem from taking 
certain parts of the decision out of context. However, use of the term 
“separate products” was problematic and only obfuscated the aim of the law 
and the test. To resolve this, a reformed test has been proposed that alters 
the wording of the law to make clear its meaning and purpose. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter will contribute to the thesis by explaining that the failure of the 
Microsoft I1 remedy was not a result of faulty application of the test for tying 
per se, but rather an ill-considered remedy that did not take into account the 
particular characteristics of the market it was set in (unlike the assessment of 
tying itself). It will also demonstrate that there are superior, innovative 
remedies that could have been used to bring about the end of Microsoft’s tie. 
These matters are important to the thesis for two reasons. First, it is important 
to establish that the failure of the remedy was not due to a flawed application 
of the law2 by the Commission but due to flaws within the remedy itself. It is 
important to establish what caused the failure of the remedy to show whether 
it is the application of the law or type of remedies employed that needed to be 
amended. Second, once it is established that the failure of the remedy rests 
on flaws of the remedy itself, it is necessary to present normatively superior 
remedies so that in future decisions there are models that can be used or 
adapted in order to produce appropriate remedies that lead to greater 
effective competition. 
 
The remedy in Microsoft I required Microsoft to release a version of Windows 
without Windows Media Player (WMP). Microsoft complied with this remedy 
and released “Windows N”, a version of Windows without WMP. This version 
of Windows however did not attract any real customer demand.3 There are 
two main categories of academic opinion on why this happened. One group4 
believes the case should not have been brought against Microsoft in the first 
                                            
1
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 1043;T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission  
[2007] ECR II-3601 
2
 As has been argued by some, see: Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft 
Judgement and its implications for Competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe' 
(2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, 919, 922; T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601, 
para 943 
3
 < http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-24-06windowsxpnsalesfs.mspx> 
published April 2006 (accessed 29 May 2013) 
4
 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft Judgement and its implications for 
Competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, 920; Jean-
Yves Art, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, 'The European Commission's media player remedy in its 
Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or foreclosure' 
(2004) 25(11) E.C.L.R. 694, 697; Hedvig Schmidt, 'Article 82: is technological integration 
checkmated?' [2009] 4 J.B.L. 354, 370 
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place because integrating Windows and WMP was not really a tie. Some in 
this first group have used the lack of demand for Windows without WMP to 
suggest the decision in Microsoft I itself was flawed.5 Others6 have argued 
that the remedy itself lacked merit and failed as a consequence. Most in this 
second category recognise that the issue revolves around the fact that media 
players are usually priced at £0.00.7 The result of this is the rare situation 
where the price of a product is 0 and the cost of its implementation is likely to 
be >£0.00 due to search and implementation costs. It will be argued in this 
chapter that the failure of the remedy was a failure in its own right based on 
the circumstances of the market, specifically the price of media players, and 
the way the remedy was implemented, which did not take account of the cost 
of market actors integrating new media players. 
 
Even amongst those who recognise that the flaw that led to the failure of 
Windows N lies in the Microsoft I remedy, what is missing from the debate are 
proposals for an effective substitute remedy. There is little discussion, 
including amongst those who recognise the deficiency of the original remedy, 
as to what would have been an appropriate remedy or what remedy should 
have been ordered. Out of those that do discuss alternatives, 8  their 
consideration is brief, only considering one or two alternative remedies, and 
they do not fully consider the positive and negative effects that those 
alternative solutions could have. 
                                            
5
 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft Judgement and its implications for 
Competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, 920; see 
also Microsoft’s own arguments: T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601, para 
943 
6
 Renato Nazzini, 'The Microsoft Case and the future of Article 82' (2008) 22 Antitrust 59, 62; 
Pierre Larouche, 'The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and 
Innovation: Comment on Ahlborn and Evans' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 933, 955, 956-957; F 
Enrique Gonz Alez Diaz, Antòn Leis Garcia, 'Tying and bundling under EU competition law: 
future prospects' (2007) 3 Competition L. Int'l 13, 15 
7
 Roberto Pardolesi, Andrea Renda, 'The European Commission’s Case Against Microsoft: 
Kill Bill?' (2004) 27(4) World Competition 513; Maurits Dolmans, Thomas Graf, 'Analysis of 
Tying Under Article 82 EC: The European Commission's Microsoft Decision in Perspective' 
(2004) 27(2) World Competition 225, 243; Renato Nazzini, 'The Microsoft Case and the future 
of Article 82' (2008) 22 Antitrust 59, 62; Pierre Larouche, 'The European Microsoft Case at the 
Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation: Comment on Ahlborn and Evans' (2008) 75 
Antitrust L.J. 933, 957; F Enrique Gonz Alez Diaz, Antòn Leis Garcia, 'Tying and bundling 
under EU competition law: future prospects' (2007) 3 Competition L. Int'l 13, 15 
8
 Alan Riley, 'Microsoft break-up inevitable?' (2004) 39 Euro. Law. 10; Ian Ayres, Barry 
Nalebuff, 'Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU's Antitrust Case and Remedy' (2005) 2(2) The 
Economists' Voice 6 (article 4) 
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This chapter will consider a number of alternative remedies in order to 
establish which would be the most effective and would not be subject to the 
same weaknesses that undermined the original decision. This will be 
assessed primarily from an economic point of view; assessing the likely 
impact of each potential remedy on consumers, Microsoft and Microsoft’s 
competitors. It is argued that a number of these alternatives would have had a 
far better effect than the remedy imposed by the Commission, while still 
maintaining fairness towards Microsoft. 
 
This will be set out in the following way: First, the remedy itself will be 
explained and why it is generally considered to have failed. Second, it will be 
argued that the reason why the remedy failed was because it did not take into 
account the way in which Windows Media Player’s development was funded 
and the additional cost involved to customers, particularly OEMs,9 in adding 
other media players. As a consequence of these two factors, it will be seen 
that the Commission’s remedy did not offer an effective choice. Either the 
customer could pay for a product (WMP) and get it or pay for it and not get it. 
In short, it offered no choice at all. Third and finally, seven different remedies 
that were not implemented, but that could have brought Microsoft’s tie to an 
end will be proposed, and their advantages and disadvantages explained. All 
but two of these proposals are the author’s own work. The final remedy 
suggested is particularly novel and innovative. It is based on ordoliberal 
principles, and it is argued that it would not be subject to the flaws that have 
beset the original remedy and would provide greater competition in the market 
without causing an unnecessary burden to Microsoft, its competitors or 
consumers. 
  
                                            
9
 Original Equipment Manufacturers: in this case companies that manufacture computers and 
pre-install software on those computers before they reach the consumer. 
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2.0 The Remedy and Sanction 
During the mono-theoretical period the Commission’s use of sanctions were 
usually relatively simple. Under Regulation 17/62 Article 310 the Commission 
had the power to require infringements to be brought to an end. The 
Commission did this by requiring the tie to be broken, allowing users to 
purchase the products/services independently. So for example, in Hilti11 the 
order was given to bring their infringements to an end.12 How this was to be 
done was not specified but one of the infringements was the tying of nails to 
the sale of cartridge strips.13 In Tetra Pak14 the Commission ordered Tetra 
Pak to amend or where appropriate delete from its contracts the clauses that 
were abusive, which included the clause tying their machines to their 
cartons.15 In other decisions such as London European/Sabena and Napier 
Brown/British Sugar the infringements had been brought to an end when the 
Commission began to intervene.16 Therefore no order needed to be made to 
terminate the infringements. As a consequence, during the mono-theoretical 
period, the Commission had not faced a situation where the remedy required 
was complicated. An order to simply end the infringement sufficed. In 
Microsoft I the products had been integrated together and given a single price, 
while the price of the tied product alone was nominally zero. This meant that 
for the first time the Commission faced trying to forge a remedy for a market 
that had much more complicated characteristics than the markets in previous 
decisions.17 
 
The remedy that the Commission implemented to resolve Microsoft’s tying 
behaviour was to require them to offer a version of Windows for client PCs 
                                            
10
 Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62 of 6 February 1962 First regulation implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962] OJ L13/204 Now Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 (now 101 and 102) of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1, Article 7 
11
 Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti (IV/30.787 and 31.488) Commission Decision 88/138/EEC [1988] OJ L 
65/19 
12
 ibid Article 3 
13
 ibid Article 1 
14
 Tetra Pak II (IV/31.043) Commission Decision 92/163/EEC [1992] OJ L72/1 
15
 ibid Article 3(1) 
16
 London European – Sabena (IV/32.318) Commission Decision 88/589/EEC [1988] OJ L 
317/47, para 35 and Napier Brown – British Sugar (Case IV/30.178) Commission Decision 
88/518/EEC [1988] OJ L 284/41, para 82 
17
 The relevant complicating factors will be established and analysed below. 
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which did not include WMP. Microsoft retained the ability to offer users a 
bundle of Windows and WMP in addition to the version without WMP.18 This 
remedy was upheld on appeal by the Court of First Instance.19 It is important 
to note when considering the discussion below that the remedy imposed by 
the Commission, although legally successful in the sense that it was put into 
effect by Microsoft, it was commercially  unsuccessful in terms of sales 
volume. In the time Windows with WMP had sold 35.5 million copies, 
Windows without WMP sold 1,787 copies. 20  The reasons for this will be 
considered later in the chapter. 
 
It was also ordered that a monitoring trustee be appointed to ensure that the 
Commission was in a position to efficiently oversee Microsoft’s compliance 
with the Decision.21 This was repealed by the CFI.22 
 
As a consequence of Microsoft’s breaches of EU competition law (not only 
tying but also for failing to provide interoperability information for Microsoft’s 
workgroup server systems 23 ) the fine imposed on Microsoft was 
€497,196,304.24 This was also upheld by the General Court.25 This was a 
record breaking fine at the time and no doubt a fine of great magnitude. But 
the size of the fine is put in perspective when it is considered that it amounts 
to less than six days’ sales for Microsoft.26 The monitoring trustee, provision of 
interoperability information and the fine are not the subject of this chapter, but 
they are noted here for context. 
  
                                            
18
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 1011 
19
 T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission  [2007] ECR II-3601, para 1229. The substance of the 
decision has been explored in detail in Chapter Four. 
20
 < http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-24-06windowsxpnsalesfs.mspx> 
published April 2006 (accessed 29 May 2013) 
21
 Microsoft (n 18) 1043-1044 
22
 Microsoft (n 19) para 1278-1279: this was on the basis that the Commission had “no legal 
basis” for imposing such a requirement and “therefore exceed[ed] the Commission’s powers 
of investigation and enforcement”. 
23
 It should be noted that the discussion of interoperability information and the offences 
associated with it are beyond the scope of this thesis as they do not pertain to tying. 
24
 Microsoft (n 18) 
25
 Microsoft (n 19) para 1366-1367 
26
 Alan Riley, ‘Microsoft break-up inevitable?’ [2004] European lawyer 10 
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2.1. The Remedy Failure 
It is widely accepted that the Microsoft I remedy was a “commercial failure”.27 
It could therefore be assumed that the Commission’s reasoning/rationale for 
the decision was flawed. The Commission had based its decision on the fact 
that two products were being sold by Microsoft as one, namely operating 
systems and media players. To determine whether the products were being 
tied the Commission found that media players and operating systems were 
subject to independent customer demand. The Commission was of the view 
that there was customer demand for media players on their own, without 
operating systems. If this conclusion was correct then it would be expected 
that, given the option (that had previously been denied to them by Microsoft), 
a substantial number of customers would purchase Windows N (Windows 
without WMP), and choose to source their media player elsewhere. The fact 
that this did not happen in considerable numbers, implies that the 
Commission had erred in its decision. 
 
Microsoft used the commercial failure of the remedy as a foundation to attack 
the test used in the decision on appeal before the Court of First Instance.28 
Microsoft argued that the commercial failure of Windows N showed that the 
Commission failed to appropriately assess whether or not WMP was a 
separate product. The Court rejected this argument, but only on the 
procedural ground that the Court was only to analyse the lawfulness of 
Community measures by reference to matters of fact and law existing at the 
time when the measure was adopted. Therefore since the Commission could 
not have considered the inference of the failure of the remedy because the 
remedy had not been ordered at that point, neither could the Court. The Court 
also stated that such facts did not in themselves prove that the finding of 
separate products was incorrect.29 But it is noteworthy that the Court did not 
or could not address in its judgment why Windows N failed to draw customer 
demand or what part of the test/remedy was at fault. 
                                            
27
 Pierre Larouche, 'The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy 
and Innovation: Comment on Ahlborn and Evans' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 933, 955 
28
 Microsoft (n 19) para 943 
29
 Although it did not say why this might be the case; ibid para 943 
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The commercial failure of Windows N also paved the way for commentators to 
criticise the Commission’s decision. Rather than criticise the remedy itself (as 
will be discussed below), Ahlborn and Evans supported the remedy30 and 
instead suggested that the failure of Windows N was proof that there was no 
demand for an operating system without a media player and that the result 
suggested that the competition enforcement authorities had applied the 
demand test incorrectly.31 Microsoft’s press centre32 even took the opportunity 
to highlight the lack of demand and the views of OEM manufacturers who did 
not see the benefit of sourcing operating systems without media players.33 
Therefore it can be seen generally that the lack of demand for Windows N has 
allowed the decision’s critics to point to the remedy failure and suggest that it 
is a symptom of a flaw in the substantive test for tying (discussed in Chapters 
Four and Five) rather than addressing the remedy, which, it is argued, is the 
real weakness in the decision. 
 
As such, it is very important to understand why the remedy failed. If it failed on 
its own merit, then the remedy must be altered, if it failed due to a flawed 
application of the substantive test, then the Commission (and Court) must 
concede that a mistake was made and correct future application of the tying 
test. 
 
2.2. The remedy’s flaw 
 
The fact that customers continued to purchase Windows with WMP and not 
purchase Windows N and source their own media player suggests one of the 
following: 
 
                                            
30
 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft Judgement and its implications for 
Competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, 919, 922 
31
 ibid 923 
32
 Microsoft’s department that publishes news on government regulations, legal news, 
corporate affairs, public policy etc. 
33
 < http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-24-06windowsxpnsalesfs.mspx> 
published April 2006 (accessed 29 May 2013) 
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1. the Commission was wrong in its factual assessment and there was no 
independent demand for media players; 
2. there was demand for standalone media players, but customers only 
wanted these in addition to WMP not instead of it; 
3. the opportunity to purchase Windows free from WMP was ordered by 
the Commission in a flawed way. 
 
 It is submitted, that the third explanation is the most important. 
 
Windows with WMP and Windows without WMP were priced exactly the same. 
This provided no incentive and a strong disincentive for OEM manufacturers 
and consumers to buy Windows N. This is because, first the price of WMP 
was part of the price of Windows, and second, there was an additional cost to 
customers, particularly OEM manufacturers, in installing additional media 
players. These two points are discussed below: 
2.2.1. The true cost of Windows Media Player 
The EU competition authorities accepted that WMP was not distributed to 
customers without cost being incurred by Microsoft. 34  The cost of its 
development by the software developer was never a work of charity. Rather 
the cost of the time and effort that the programmers took to write WMP would 
be recouped in the price charged for Windows itself. Everyone who paid for 
Windows was at the same time paying for the development of WMP. It is not 
surprising therefore that when Microsoft offered Windows N for the same price 
as Windows with WMP there was little up take. After all, it would have made 
little sense in any of the previous tying cases if the undertaking at fault was 
able to continue to offer (taking the example of Hilti) cartridges alone for price 
‘X’ or cartridges and nails for the same price. Essentially that would not 
eradicate the tie. It would just change it from a contractual tie to an economic 
tie, as many commentators have noted.35 Therefore to offer Windows N at the 
                                            
34
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965 see foot notes 945, 971; Case T-
201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II – 3601, para 948 
35
 Maurits Dolmans, Thomas Graf, 'Analysis of  tying under  Article  82 EC: the European 
Commission's Microsoft decision in perspective' (2004) 27(2) W. Comp. 225, 243; Renato 
Nazzini, 'The Microsoft Case and the future of Article 82' (2008) 22 Antitrust 59, 62; Pierre 
Larouche, 'The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and 
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same price as Windows with WMP was equivalent to offering users the option 
to have WMP or leave it, but be required to pay for it either way. 
 
A significant problem then is that unlike Microsoft’s competitors such as 
RealPlayer, WMP is essentially cross subsidised through the sale of Windows. 
So when a customer pays for Windows, they pay for WMP whether they want 
to or not. This explains how Microsoft is able to offer downloads of WMP free 
of charge, while RealPlayer’s free version used advertising to generate 
revenue. Unless the remedy took account of this factor it would not give 
customers a genuine choice to obtain Windows, not only free of WMP, but 
free from the cost of developing WMP. 
2.2.2. The cost of adding additional media players 
When assessing the foreclosure effect that Microsoft’s tie was likely to have 
on competitors, the Commission recognised that OEM manufacturers would 
be unlikely to bundle an additional media player alongside WMP because it 
would require them to “expend additional effort obtaining and loading separate 
multimedia playback software”.36 But they appear not to have recognised that 
this disincentive would remain if Microsoft was allowed to offer both Windows 
and Windows N at the same price. It poses the question to the OEM 
manufacturer: would they like a product that they have implicitly paid for 
(WMP), or would they prefer to implicitly pay for it, not receive it and have to 
spend further resources seeking to obtain, test and install an alternative 
media player? It is difficult to believe the rational customer or OEM 
manufacturer would elect the second option. When the remedy is viewed in 
this manner there is no surprise that customers eschewed Windows N, there 
was no rational incentive to select it. 
 
                                                                                                                             
Innovation: Comment on Ahlborn and Evans' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 933, 957; F Enrique 
Gonz Alez Diaz, Antòn Leis Garcia, 'Tying and bundling under EU competition law: future 
prospects' (2007) 3 Competition L. Int'l 13, 15 
36
 Microsoft (n 18) para 851 
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3.0 Alternative remedies 
 
It is clear from the above that the remedy imposed on Microsoft was 
ineffective. It is argued that in future, if competition law is to be applied 
effectively, it is essential that the remedies given by the Commission and 
courts are economically sound. On occasion, this will mean that the remedies’ 
economic impact will require the same careful consideration as the 
assessment of the effect of the tie itself. It is argued that the aim of the 
remedies must be to preserve the freedom of choice of the customer, while 
being carefully formulated to cause as little disruption to the market as 
possible, and where possible use the market to work with the remedy rather 
than against it. This is because the purpose of the law on tying is to preserve 
the freedom of customer to choose the combination of products they find of 
greatest benefit, 37  and because, due the dynamic nature of the pricing 
mechanism, courts are ill-situated to make decisions about price.  
 
With this in mind, it is important to consider what alternative remedies could 
have been implemented in the Microsoft I decision. Three alternative 
remedies have been put forward by Riley and Ayres and Nalebuff.  These are: 
 
 The break-up of Microsoft;38 and, 
 Unbundling and a ‘must carry’ clause39 
 
These represent only a small number of the possible remedies however. It is 
argued that a plethora of potential remedies exist, each with strengths and 
weaknesses to be evaluated. These are particularly important to consider in 
                                            
37
 As demonstrated in Chapter Four 
38
 Alan Riley, ‘Microsoft break-up inevitable?’ [2004] European lawyer 10, 11 
39
 Ian Ayres, Barry Nalebuff, 'Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU's Antitrust Case and Remedy' 
(2005) 2(2) The Economists' Voice (article 4) page 6; It should be noted that Stucke analyses 
the failure of the Microsoft I remedy using the lens of behavioural economics. Stucke 
postulates that customers perceived Windows N as an inferior product due to their reference 
point being Windows with an integrated media player. However the alternative remedy that is 
suggested is one version of Windows with WMP and one version of Windows with a choice of 
three media players. This is a variation of the must carry remedy, see; Maurice E. 
Stucke, ’Behavioural antitrust and monopolization’ (2012) 8(3) Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 545, 570 
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light of the failure of the remedy ordered by the Commission. What follows is 
consideration of a number of such remedies with the merits and drawbacks of 
each noted individually. Two are remedies that have already been suggested 
by Ayres and Nalebuff, (1 and 4 below) the following five are all models that 
the author has developed. The object of this analysis is to establish which 
remedies would maximise competition in the market,40 while interfering as 
little as possible with normal market forces and establish which remedies 
would fail and why they would be likely to be ineffective. This is a normative 
analysis, the purpose of which is to establish how innovative remedies can, 
and need to be used in complex markets to help restore competition in the 
market. 
 
The remedies that will be considered are as follows: 
 
1. Must not carry Windows Media Player; 
2. Must not integrate Windows Media Player; 
3. Must only carry a basic version of Windows Media Player; 
4. Must carry a/multiple competitors’ media players; 
5. Must not cross subsidise Windows Media Player; 
6. Must offer screen choice; 
7. Must behave ‘as if’ subject to competition. 
 
3.1. Must not carry Windows Media Player 
 
Concept 
A ‘must not carry’ remedy would require Microsoft to provide all of its versions 
of Windows without WMP integrated. OEMs would also only be able to 
acquire Windows without WMP. WMP could still be obtained from other 
sources, for example downloads, but the customer would not be able to buy 
Windows and WMP together “out of the box”, directly from Microsoft. 
                                            
40
 See on the purpose of competition law remedies: Douglas Melamed ‘Afterword: The 
purposes of antitrust remedies’ (2009) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 359. Compensation, 
punishment and deterrence, terminating and preventing unlawful conduct and restoring 
competitive conductions to the market. 
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Advantages 
If Microsoft was required to provide Windows without any media player then 
this would require the consumer or OEM to actively search out a media player 
and as a result they will be more likely to pick one that is genuinely the most 
suitable for their needs. The need for a media player may well prompt the 
consumer to check consumer information websites or the OEM to choose the 
most efficient media player, bringing back a real element of innovation 
competition to the market rather than consumers merely using WMP due to 
the fact that it is already installed. Anyone who really wants WMP due to its 
merits would be able to download it straight from Microsoft. 
 
Disadvantages 
Forcing Microsoft to provide Windows without any sort of media player could 
give validity to Microsoft’s (previously erroneous) argument that it is being 
forced to provide consumers with a degraded piece of software. Also while 
most consumers are probably perfectly capable of downloading their own 
media player, a reasonable proportion of the computer buying population may 
find the process difficult and as a result they may make mistakes or be taken 
advantage of by websites providing malware. In addition, it could set Microsoft 
at a disadvantage compared to undertakings like Apple who would still be 
able to provide their operating systems with their own media players, since 
they are not likely to be considered dominant undertakings on the operating 
system market. 
 
3.2. Must not integrate Windows Media Player 
 
Concept 
Must not integrate is a similar remedy to “must not carry”. Microsoft would not 
be able to provide any versions of Windows that automatically install WMP 
with Windows. However unlike the ‘must not carry’ remedy the end user, if 
they wish to use WMP, can instead simply re-insert the Windows CD and 
install WMP as an additional optional component. This is how WMP’s 
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predecessor “NetShow” was installed. If the customer wanted to install WMP 
then this could be done simply by inserting the Windows CD and running an 
‘add program’ feature which would then add WMP to the configuration.41 
 
Advantages 
This remedy would undermine any argument that Microsoft is being forced to 
provide a degraded product and anyone who wishes to install WMP could do 
so by following simple instructions that Microsoft could include with computers 
sold with Windows. If the consumer attempts to open any content that is 
coded in Microsoft’s format, a prompt could explain how to install WMP from 
the Windows CD. 
 
Disadvantages 
Consumers who do not understand the importance of a media player may 
neglect to install any media player at all. This could mean that they may not 
access as much content as they may not want go through a set up process 
they feel they do not understand, although this is made all the less likely by 
the CD being Microsoft’s own product. Those who try to access non-Microsoft 
media formats may also be at a loss as to how to access other media players 
if not given appropriate guidance, placing other media players at a 
disadvantage. 
 
3.3. Must only carry a basic version of Windows Media Player 
 
Concept 
It was noted in the Microsoft Commission decision that WMP tended to 
incorporate many of the functions of a premium media player into its free 
version. As a result it was more difficult for other media players to compete 
when consumers had access to what was in essence a premium product 
equally as good as their own without any cost.42 Under this remedy Microsoft 
would be required to only provide a basic version of WMP with each version 
                                            
41
 Microsoft (n 18), para 988 explains that this is how WMP predecessor ‘NetShow’ functioned. 
42
 ibid para 847 
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of Windows, and any upgrades that enabled access to a full version would be 
paid for by the customer. 
 
Advantages 
If Microsoft was required to offer only a basic version of WMP on their 
systems, this would allow users to take advantage of a pre-installed media 
player, which would be an advantage for those who were not familiar with 
technology, while still providing another market in which Microsoft and other 
media player providers could compete; a competitive premium market. 
 
Disadvantages 
This solution would be forcing Microsoft to provide a less capable version of 
their product to consumers. While this would maintain a competitive premium 
market it would be interpreted by many as protecting competitors at the cost 
of consumer welfare. After all, it would be restricting consumers’ access to 
high quality media players in order to enable competitors to continue to 
compete in the market. It would not save consumers money as a high grade 
version of WMP would still be produced and may be offered without charge 
(i.e. the production cost would be subsidised through the sale of Windows). 
So once again this remedy would be requiring consumers to pay for Microsoft 
to make a full version of WMP then forcing Microsoft to give them an inferior 
version. This would not maximise consumer welfare. Therefore, for this 
reason, this remedy is not ideal, assuming that the Commission and courts 
are pursuing the goal of consumer welfare in accordance with post-Chicago 
principles.43 
 
3.4. Must carry competitors’ media player(s) 
 
Concept 
                                            
43
 In relation to the post-Chicago arguments for consumer welfare being the correct standard 
see: Steven C. Salop, ‘Question: What is the real and proper antitrust welfare standard?’ 
[2010] 22 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 336, 338. The Commission’s use of post-Chicago analysis 
will be considered further in Chapter Seven. 
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A ‘must carry’ remedy would require Microsoft to provide Windows with 
competing third party media players pre-installed. For example, Microsoft may 
be required not only to provide Windows with WMP, but also perhaps 50% of 
their sales with RealPlayer and 50% with Apple’s Quicktime. In the alternative 
Microsoft could be required to provide 100% of its Windows sales with a 
particular third party media player in order to it give equal distribution. 
 
Advantages 
If Microsoft was required to provide Windows with at least one other media 
player then this would help ensure that there was a similar reach to those 
media players that were included with Windows as well as WMP. This could 
help stimulate content production in other formats because whichever format 
the content producer codes in there is going to be a similar reach to WMP. 
This would then make the decision less about reach and more about the 
technical superiority of each media player. This in turn would stimulate 
innovation and ensure that there is a healthy level of investment in media 
player technologies as each player would rise and fall on its technical merits, 
rather than on the merits of other programmes (such as operating systems) 
that the undertaking may also produce. 
 
Disadvantages 
There are a number of disadvantages to this remedy. First, it seems difficult to 
decide how media players would qualify for being carried by Microsoft. Too 
many players and this would slow the computer down and could create 
confusion for the consumer. Too few and this could exclude media players 
that are technically very effective and could provide use to consumers. In the 
Microsoft case itself Microsoft raised objections to any ‘must carry’ remedy.44 
Art and McCurdy have also made great efforts to explain how Microsoft would 
have “numerous objectively justified reasons for declining” to carry their 
competitors’ media players. 45  These include the argument that by forcing 
Microsoft to incorporate competitors’ code, this would effectively make 
                                            
44
 Microsoft (n 18) para 976 
45
 Jean-Yves Art, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, 'The European Commission's media player remedy 
in its Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or 
foreclosure' (2004) 25(11) E.C.L.R. 694, 704 
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Microsoft a guarantor of the quality and security of the competitor’s code and 
its ability to interoperate successfully with Windows. They also argue that 
such a requirement could impose significant testing requirements and costs 
on Microsoft. They say it could create “unknown direct and contributory” third 
party IP exposure relating to competitor’s code. Or it could make Microsoft 
liable for access language and other regulatory compliance and language 
issues. For these reasons they considered that any attempt at a must carry 
remedy would not be successful.46 In addition Ayres and Nalebuff have noted 
that even if Microsoft had to carry their competitors’ media players this would 
not be sufficient. This is because the issue would remain that a content 
provider may decide only to code in WMP format because it would be 
sufficient to reach almost all computers, 47  particularly if the remedy only 
applied within the EU.  Therefore in order for the remedy to be effective 
Microsoft would need to be required to licence a substantially number of 
computers with only their competitors’ media players installed. This 
combination of factors places an unfair burden upon Microsoft. 
 
3.5. Must not cross-subsidise Windows Media Player 
 
Concept 
If Microsoft was required to ensure WMP was not cross subsidised by 
Windows this would mean that Microsoft would be required to hold separate 
accounts for its WMP business and its other software business. As a 
consequence Microsoft would have to find revenue streams that would 
support the promotion, production and maintenance of WMP that would be 
independent of Windows sales. Through this mechanism, Microsoft could be 
required to charge differing prices for Windows and Windows N. Microsoft 
would still be able to provide versions of WMP free of charge, however they 
would potentially have to support the provision of these free versions through 
advertising or other revenue streams. 
                                            
46
 Jean-Yves Art, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, 'The European Commission's media player remedy 
in its Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or 
foreclosure' (2004) 25(11) E.C.L.R. 694, 703-704 
47
 Ian Ayres, Barry Nalebuff, 'Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU's Antitrust Case and Remedy' 
(2005) 2(2) The Economists' Voice (article 4) page 6 
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Advantages 
Theoretically, this remedy would provide a genuinely level playing field 
between Microsoft and any media player producers that do not have an 
operating system with which they can tie their media player. Microsoft would 
either have to charge for WMP or in the alternative WMP would have to use 
advertising or some other revenue stream in order to support its media player. 
The result of this would be that Windows with WMP would include an 
additional charge that would reflect the cost of developing WMP and 
customers would be able to choose whether or not they consider WMP worth 
that additional cost. It would allow customers to compare the cost of WMP 
with the value of purchasing other media players. They would also have the 
opportunity to purchase Windows genuinely free from WMP, not just of the 
software itself, but also free from the additional costs that are incurred in its 
development, promotion and sale. 
 
Disadvantages 
To begin, the difficulty in ensuring a separate account for WMP would be 
significant. A totally separate team would have to be established for coding 
WMP and they would need to account for their profits essentially like a 
separate company. This is unlikely to be efficient particularly when software is 
produced on a global scale. In addition, this would still fail to place Microsoft 
on a genuinely level playing field with its competitors since Microsoft’s 
competitors are presumably seeking to make a profit through the sale of their 
media players, whereas Microsoft could choose to rely on the profits it 
receives through the sale of Windows and run its WMP operation so that it is 
either loss making, or only just covering its costs. This would allow Microsoft 
to sell WMP for a much lower price than their competitors. Further, even 
assuming WMP could be run like a separate company it can be assumed that 
Microsoft would pay to licence WMP with Windows. Microsoft sells such a 
high volume of Windows operating systems that with only Windows as its 
main client, WMP would be able to charge virtually zero for the use of WMP 
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with each unit of Windows sold. This would put Microsoft back into the 
position of being able to sell Windows and Windows N at virtually the same 
price. This would mean that this remedy would have the same result as the 
original Commission decision. 
 
If, in the alternative, the Commission not only required WMP to hold separate 
accounts but also prevented Microsoft from paying for WMP to be licensed 
with Windows, then this would incur all the disadvantages associated with a 
‘must not carry’ remedy. As such this remedy is unlikely to be effective. 
 
3.6. Must offer choice screen 
 
Concept 
Microsoft would not include a pre-installed media player but rather provide a 
choice screen on first start up with the most popular media players in a 
random order. Each popular media player would have a roughly equal chance 
of being picked and each undertaking would be free to promote their media 
player through advertising in order to make it more likely that consumers 
would pick theirs. If customers do not like the media player they pick first they 
could download another and uninstall the media player they picked initially. 
 
Advantages 
This remedy would incur virtually no extra cost for either Microsoft or their 
competitors. It would also spur competition, since consumers would be more 
likely to consider a number of options before making their decision. The 
process could also be very simple providing little inconvenience for those 
unfamiliar with complicated software processes. It would also mean that 
customers still have access to a media player very soon after they take the 
computer out of the box. 
 
Disadvantages 
First the few computers that are not linked up to the internet may never get a 
chance to download a media player. While this is not a serious problem in 
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practice (those without an internet connection are unlikely to get a lot of use 
from a “streaming” media player) some aspects of functionality maybe lost 
such as audio play back or video viewing. In order to combat these issues this 
remedy may need to be accompanied by one of the previous remedies 
mentioned, such as providing a media player on CD or providing a basic, 
scaled down media player with the operating system. 
 
Second although those undertakings that provide media players that are 
already successful would benefit from such a system, it may provide a lesser 
benefit to those undertakings that are not yet established in the market as 
they would be unlikely to make it onto the list of the most popular media 
players.48 To compensate for this they would probably have to invest a large 
amount of capital into software promotion which is likely to be difficult for 
undertakings without substantial resources. Nonetheless, it would be unlikely 
that they would find it any harder to increase their market share than they 
would under the current system. As such this remedy has relatively minor 
draw backs and is viable.49 
 
3.7. Must behave ‘as if’ subject to competition 
 
Concept 
The final and most innovative remedy is based on the idea of requiring a 
dominant undertaking to behave as if it is subject to competition. This option is 
not the most invasive, but could be nonetheless controversial. Under this 
scheme Microsoft would be able to provide WMP integrated into only a certain 
percentage of the copies of Windows it sells. It is envisaged that the 
percentage would be between 20-33% of copies sold. The other copies would 
be sold without WMP. The underlying idea for this is that if the operating 
system market was competitive, it would in likelihood have at least 3-5 main 
                                            
48
 There are also figures to suggest that if the browser choice screen is to be taken as an 
example, ‘choice screens’ may not have much impact overall, see: Hein Hobbelen, Joelle 
Jablan, 'Presentational issues in the Microsoft II case: fair chance for all browsers or a 
European Commission imposed advantage for existing market players?' (2011) 32(4) E.C.L.R. 
206, 211 
49
 As will be seen in Chapter Seven, the approach of using a choice screen was taken up by 
the Commission in the later “Microsoft II” commitments decision. 
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competitors with the market distributed between them. If this was the case 
then even if Microsoft did tie their media player with their operating system 
they would only be able to reach between 20-33% of the market (assuming 
roughly equal distribution of market share). This would prevent any 
foreclosure effects because 20-33% of the market would not be enough to 
allow content producers to code in only one format. In terms of enforceability 
Microsoft could be required to account for sales at the end of each financial 
year and for every unit sold with WMP over the pre-determined level it would 
be fined a small amount. This would provide an incentive to ensure Microsoft 
conformed with the order. 
 
Advantages 
The fact Microsoft would not be required to carry any other media player 
would prevent Microsoft from being required to guarantee the interoperability 
of competitors’ code or any of the other issues associated with the ‘must carry’ 
remedy. Another benefit of this remedy is that it could lead to a natural 
change in price between Windows and Windows N. Under normal 
circumstances it would be very difficult for the Commission or court to 
accurately determine what the value of WMP is. Due to the high fixed costs 
and the virtually non-existent marginal costs of producing software it would 
make any evaluation of what the difference in price should be extremely 
difficult. This remedy would allow the market to decide what the extra value is 
of having Windows with WMP included. This is because, subject to supply 
and demand customers will be willing to pay more in order to get one of the 
versions of Windows with WMP integrated, if that is what they want. Or they 
will be happy to pay a little bit less for a version of Windows N. So the market 
will decide the value of buying Windows with WMP, not the Commission or 
courts. 
 
Further since media players are usually distributed free, and there would be 
nothing to prevent Microsoft continuing to offer WMP free to download, the 
change in price between Windows and Windows N would represent the value 
to the customer, not of WMP, but rather the value of having WMP integrated. 
This differentiation in price would be desirable as the cost of acquiring WMP 
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on the market is £0, but to some users, particularly those who are unfamiliar 
with computers there would be some value in buying Windows with WMP 
already installed and integrated. 
 
The change in value can be demonstrated as follows: 
 
If 
 
the value of Windows is X 
the value of a media player is 0 
the cost of (a consumer or OEM) installing a media player is Y 
 
Then: 
 
If the cost of Windows with WMP > X + Y then the customer will purchase 
Windows N and install a media player themselves (if they are an OEM they 
can incorporate the installation as part of their production process). 
 
Therefore under this remedy the true value of integration will be dictated by 
the market. Those customers (whether OEMs or retail customers) who value 
WMP being pre-installed will continue to purchase Windows. They will be 
willing to pay a higher amount for the pre-installation. Once the price reaches 
a stage where it is cheaper for the customer to install a media player 
themselves (be it WMP or Real or QuickTime or any other media player) they 
will switch to purchasing Windows N and install the media player themselves. 
Of course, this would not prevent OEMs from installing WMP on all their 
computers if that is what they wanted. But if they considered another media 
player superior they would equally be able to choose that instead. 
 
Disadvantages 
The primary disadvantage with this remedy is that there is the potential for a 
decrease in consumer welfare. It would depend on how the market responded. 
For example, assuming the cost of installation of a media player to an OEM 
was €0.20, if Microsoft previously sold Windows at €120 per unit, after this 
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remedy was implemented the price of Windows could perhaps rise to €120.20 
while the price of Windows N would remain at €120.00. Equally the price of 
Windows could remain at €120 and the price of Windows N could drop to 
€119.80. Either way the difference in price is likely to be very small per unit. It 
would make virtually no difference at all to the retail purchaser. However, for 
large companies that sell thousands of computers per week, the figure would 
not be insignificant. An increase in the price of Windows caused by the action 
of competition authorities would be at best an inconvenience and at worst a 
reduction in welfare for those whom competition law is supposed to protect.  
 
It is argued that this would not happen in practice for two reasons: 
3.7.1. Payments from third parties 
It is argued that there would be no real change in cost whatsoever to the end 
user as a result of this remedy. Even if the price of Windows increases and 
the price of Windows N stays the same, third party software producers often 
pay OEMs a small amount to have their software pre-installed on computers 
before they are sold. This sum would more than cover the cost of installation 
of a non-Windows media player.50 So there would be no price difference at 
the retail level, but there would be an increase in choice. 
3.7.2. Payments from Microsoft 
Once the remedy was instituted, Microsoft would be very likely to start losing 
market share in the short term. To counter this Microsoft would probably start 
to employ the same payments to OEMs to install their media player usually 
associated with third party software manufacturers. These payments would at 
least compensate the OEMs for the cost of having to install WMP on their 
systems. These payments would ensure that the price of Windows with media 
player would never really depart too far in either direction from the price of 
Windows N. 
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 If these payments were not sufficient to cover the cost of installing a piece of software then 
no rational OEM would ever agree to them. 
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3.7.3. Further effects 
The remedy would also drive an increase in demand for third party media 
players since around 75%-66% of Windows systems would be sold without a 
media player. This increase in demand would have the impact of decreasing 
the amount of capital third party media player producers have to pay to 
ensure their products are placed on OEM computers. This would provide 
them with more capital to invest in product development. OEMs on the other 
hand may not have any less capital as Microsoft would be in a position where 
it would also need to make payments to ensure the deployment of their own 
media player. As a result the cost to the consumer and the effect on prices 
would be neutral. The situation would be virtually the same as before the 
remedy was imposed, except for three vital differences: first, the cost of 
promoting and disseminating media player software would be divided 
between Microsoft and its competitors more evenly. Second, a large 
proportion of OEMs and retail customers would actively choose their media 
player forcing Microsoft and its competitors to compete on the merits of their 
media players rather than any other software they produce. Third, with no 
foreclosure effect consumers would be able to choose which way the market 
tips rather than a dominant undertaking. 
 
The result in this scenario would be that Microsoft would have to compete with 
other media players on level terms. Costs would be unlikely to change for 
OEMs and as a result unlikely to change for consumers. Profits would 
increase for third party developers leading to better products, more innovation 
and potentially lower prices. Microsoft would be required to pay to receive 
greater distribution just like its competitors, however it would still be able to tie 
a certain amount of its sales so that it would not be at any greater 
disadvantage than one of its smaller competitors that also tie their operating 
systems with their media players (e.g. Apple + Quick time). Perhaps most 
importantly competition would remain in the media player market so Microsoft 
would not be able to “switch off” innovation once it had driven its competitors 
out of the market (assuming it was able to do so). All this happens by taking a 
very small amount of the power held by Microsoft and returning it to the other 
competitors on the market. This puts the value back into the media player 
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software itself, rather than its technical value being dwarfed by the importance 
of (and the prevalence of) the operating system to which it is tied. Microsoft 
could of course still win the race for format dominance, if it did so under this 
remedy however, it would have done so due to the superiority of its product, 
not out of the dominance of its operating system. 
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4.0 Conclusion 
 
It has been shown that the remedy imposed by the Commission in Microsoft I 
was flawed because it did not take into account two important factors: first, 
that the price of WMP was essentially cross subsidised by the purchase of 
Windows. The consequence of this is that customers who bought Windows 
would always be required to pay for WMP, but if they chose to purchase 
Windows N they would indirectly pay for WMP and not receive it. Second, 
although OEMs may have wanted to integrate third party media players, this 
carries with it an inherent cost. These costs include search costs, testing 
costs, installation and support costs. Due to these costs OEMs would not 
want to purchase Windows without WMP as they would not only be paying the 
price of WMP without receiving it, they would also then be exposing 
themselves to the greater costs of installing another. 
 
What can be seen then is the ideal remedy would take into account the cost 
that OEMs would incur in installing third party media players in order to 
remove the fiscal disincentive of doing so. 
 
It has also been explained that while there has not been much discussion on 
alternative remedies, there are a number that could be employed. Some of 
these, such as the “must carry” remedy would be overly oppressive to 
Microsoft. Others, such as the “must not cross subsidise” remedy would not 
be practical to implement. Other remedies would decrease consumer welfare 
for the sake of protecting competitors, such as the “must only carry a basic 
version of WMP” remedy. But most importantly there are at two remedies that 
have very little, if any, negative impact on the market, Microsoft or consumers, 
while strengthening competition and giving users’ greater choice. It is argued 
that both these remedies do not cause harm to the consumer51 while 
maintaining the freedom of the customer to choose the combination of 
products that provides them with greatest utility.52 These remedies include the 
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 Consumer harm here is given the meaning understood in post-Chicago analysis 
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 As dictated by the Ordoliberal School of thought 
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“choice screen” and the “must behave ‘as if’ subject to competition” remedy. 
The former remedy by-passes the need for any media player to be installed, 
while the latter uses supply and demand conditions to dictate a change in 
price that compensates OEMs (or retail consumers) for the extra time and 
effort that is required to search for and install a media player of their choice. 
This prevents the Commission and courts being required to try to guess the 
value of WMP and its integration into Windows but still provides an incentive 
for customers to purchase Windows N and source their media player from the 
best provider on the market. 
 
This chapter explained that the failure of Microsoft I remedy was due to the 
poorly constructed remedy, not faulty application of the law. The Commission 
failed to take into account the particular characteristics of the market and as a 
consequence provided a remedy that turned a technical tie into an economic 
one. It has shown that the Commission, which took account of the 
disincentives of sourcing third party media players in their assessment of the 
foreclosure of the market caused by the tie, ignored those same disincentives 
when crafting the remedy. Finally this chapter has shown that there are other, 
innovative remedies that could have been implemented to help restore 
competition and innovation to the market. As a whole this is relevant as it 
demonstrates that the major changes that need to be made to the approach 
taken in Microsoft I regard the remedy not the application of the law.  
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1.0 Introduction 
This chapter considers the period since the Microsoft I decision until the 
present1 (“post-Microsoft I”). The purpose of the chapter, within the thesis, is 
to show that during this period the Commission’s aim has continued to be the 
preservation of customer freedom in accordance with Ordoliberal2 thinking. 
This chapter will also show that post-Microsoft I the Commission has made 
deliberate attempts to incorporate post-Chicago theory into its analysis. This 
means that Microsoft I is a watershed in the Commission’s decision making. 
Prior to Microsoft I was the mono-theoretical period when only Ordoliberal 
principles informed the Commission and courts’ approach. From Microsoft I 
and post-Microsoft I the Commission and courts’ enter the di-theoretical 
period,3 where Ordoliberal principles remain fundamental, but are pursued 
using post-Chicago4 analysis. Establishing this is important as it allows the 
law to be understood more fully. It explains that the aims that were pursued 
during the mono-theoretical period are still important but demonstrates that 
these aims are now informed by the latest post-Chicago models. This helps to 
explain how decisions are likely to be made in future and what factors are 
likely to be important in making the decision. 
 
The second substantial contribution this chapter will make will be through a 
novel analysis of the Commission’s approach to tying in software markets. It 
will be argued that the Commission has a particular approach to software 
markets that departs from that which it uses in conventional markets. It will be 
shown that the software markets have unique qualities that explain why the 
Commission takes a different approach. It is these qualities that allow a 
dominant undertaking to take advantage of “choice evasion”. This is a novel 
concept developed by the author to describe the concerns of the Commission 
                                            
1
 2014 
2
 See Peacock, A.T. and Willgerodt, H. (Eds), Germany’s Social Market Economy, (London, 
Macmillan 1989) p35; Walter Eucken, (1948/1982). The social question and Böhm, 
Forschungs-und Lehrgemeinschaft’, 162; Nils Goldschmidt, Michael Wohlgemuth, ‘Social 
Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations’ CPE (2008) 19 269 
3
 This period could also be called the poly-theoretical period, as the Commission has also 
taken on concepts from the Chicago School (discussed below). However, these are few in 
number and as a whole the style of investigation adopted by the Commission reflects post-
Chicago analysis to a much greater extent. 
4
 See Chapter 3 
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in the software market. It will be explained what choice evasion is, how it 
works and why it is a concern for the Commission. This will then allow the 
author to provide guidance and direction for dominant software undertakings 
so that they are able to demonstrate they are not exploiting choice evasion 
and consequently; comply with the law and avoid litigation. 
 
These arguments will be set out as follows: First, the impact of the 
Commission’s Guidance5 will be assessed. Post-Microsoft I,6 the European 
Commission published its long-awaited Guidance on its enforcement priorities 
in applying Article 102. 7  It will be seen that the Guidance incorporates 
principles and models that are post-Chicago in nature. This is the first formal 
recognition that the Commission is deliberately taking an increasingly 
economics focused approach, an approach that incorporates the most recent 
economic theory and seeks to ascertain whether anti-competitive effects are 
possible or likely as a consequence of the alleged tying behaviour in that 
specific instance. This is likely to be in response to criticism8 that the EU 
approach to tying is not economically focused. At the same time it will be 
shown that the Guidance continues to demonstrate that the Commission’s aim 
is to preserve the ability of customers to exercise their freedom of choice. 
 
Second, the Commission’s commitments decision with Microsoft 9  will be 
considered. This decision will be referred to as Microsoft II decision for ease 
of understanding. In Microsoft II the Commission objected to a second alleged 
                                            
5
 Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (Communication) 
(2009) OJ C 45/02 
6
 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965; Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. 
Commission: [2007] ECR II-3601 
7
 Commission Guidance (n 5) 
8
 See: Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, Why the European Commission's enforcement priorities on 
article 82 EC should be withdrawn (2010) 31(2) E.C.L.R. 45, 45; J. Kallaugher and B. Sher, 
“Rebates Revisited: Anticompetitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse Under Article 82” [2004] 
E.C.L.R. 263, 268; Waelbroeck, “Michelin II: A Per Se Rule against Rebates by Dominant 
Companies?” (2005) 1(1) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 149; Massimo Motta, 
“Michelin II--The treatment of rebates” in Bruce Lyons (ed), Cases in European Competition 
Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2009), p.29; Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins, 
'Reform of Article 82: where the link between dominance and effects breaks down' (2005) 
26(11) E.C.L.R. 605 
9
 Microsoft I: Microsoft (tying) (Case COMP/C-3/39.530); Microsoft II: Microsoft (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792) [2005] 4 CMLR 965 and Microsoft (tying) (Case COMP/C-3/39.530) 
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tying infringement against Microsoft. This allegation once again focused upon 
the tying of Microsoft’s Windows operating system with what was allegedly 
another piece of software. In this instance, it was Microsoft Internet Explorer 
(IE); browser software used for browsing (or “surfing”) the internet. In many 
ways the allegation was very similar to Microsoft I, yet there are two 
distinguishing factors which are particularly noteworthy. First, the tie 
concerned Windows and Internet Explorer rather than Windows Media Player. 
Second, instead of protracted (costly) court proceedings, the issue was 
resolved through commitments10 being offered by Microsoft and accepted by 
the Commission. It will be argued that the differences between media players 
such as Windows Media Player (WMP) and browsers like Internet Explorer 
mean that although there may well have been a foreclosure effect in Microsoft 
I there was so such foreclosure in Microsoft II. As a result while the 
Commission put forward a theory of foreclosure that was similar to Microsoft I, 
this theory of foreclosure did not apply on the facts of Microsoft II. However, 
while Microsoft I can be described as a good decision accompanied by a poor 
remedy, Microsoft II will be argued to be the reverse, a poor decision, but 
accompanied by innovative commitments that place little burden upon the 
dominant undertaking while still providing a beneficial effect on competition in 
the market. This is important as it shows that the Commission has learned 
from the mistakes that were made in crafting an appropriate remedy in 
Microsoft I. 
 
Third, it will be shown once again, that the freedom of the consumer to 
choose the combination of products that most suits them is the driving force 
behind EU tying law, even in Microsoft II. 
 
Fourth it will be argued that separate to the Commission’s formal assessment 
of foreclosure, there is another form of foreclosure that is present in the 
decision. This author believes that while this is not articulated as a theory of 
foreclosure expressly, when the commitments decision is carefully analysed it 
is possible to see that the Commission is concerned with another subtle type 
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 The concept of commitments is discussed below. 
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of foreclosure. This, the author has called “choice evasion”. This is a type of 
foreclosure only likely to be found in the software industry, where software 
undertakings are able to take advantage of unique characteristics present in 
the software market to undermine the consumers’ ability to perceive the 
alternative software options available to them and therefore make them less 
likely to exercise that choice. 
 
Finally, it will be explained what undertakings can do to avoid tying litigation. 
First, by providing general guidance to those firms outside of the software 
market, then giving specific advice to dominant undertakings on software 
markets. This will explain that if dominant firms wish to avoid being 
investigated by the Commission they will need to ensure that they give 
consumers the option not to install their tied software, should highlight the 
differing functions of their integrated software and should require positive 
action from the consumer for the software to be activated/installed. 
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2.0 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings 
 
Since the Microsoft I decision, the Commission has released a communication 
giving guidance on its enforcement priorities when applying Article 102 of the 
TFEU to exclusionary conduct.11 Since tying is an exclusionary conduct this 
has important implications for EU tying law. 
 
It appears that part of the purpose behind issuing the guidance was to defend 
the Commission against accusations that its decisions lacked economic 
reasoning,12  that it has pursued a formalistic approach, placing too much 
emphasis on the form of the conduct rather than the effect of the conduct13 
and sought to protect competitors rather than competition.14 This can be seen 
where the Guidance discusses the purpose of the document: 
 
“the Commission is mindful that what really matters is protecting an 
effective competitive process and not simply competitors. This may 
well mean that competitors who deliver less to consumers in terms of 
price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the market.” 
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 Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft Judgement and its implications for 
Competition policy towards dominant firms in Europe' (2008) 75 Antitrust L.J. 887, 904-905; J. 
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Position? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006); D. Waelbroeck, “Michelin II: A Per Se Rule against 
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151. 
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 Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, Why the European Commission's enforcement priorities on article 
82 EC should be withdrawn (2010) 31(2) E.C.L.R. 45, 45; J. Kallaugher and B. Sher, 
“Rebates Revisited: Anticompetitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse Under Article 82” [2004] 
E.C.L.R. 263, 268; Waelbroeck, “Michelin II: A Per Se Rule against Rebates by Dominant 
Companies?” (2005) 1(1) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 149; Massimo Motta, 
“Michelin II--The treatment of rebates” in Bruce Lyons (ed), Cases in European Competition 
Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2009), p.29; Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins, 
'Reform of Article 82: where the link between dominance and effects breaks down' (2005) 
26(11) E.C.L.R. 605 
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 Jurgita Malinauskaite, 'The development of "consumer welfare" and its application in the 
competition law of the European Community and Lithuania' (2007) 18(10) I.C.C.L.R. 354, 359 
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The Guidance is particularly useful as, in defending its position, the 
Commission has been forced to give details regarding the theoretical 
foundation of its approach to tying in a comparatively clear manner. Analysis 
of the Guidance yields four points of particular note in relation to tying and its 
theoretical basis: 
 
1. confirmation that the restriction of customer choice determines the 
presence of a tie; 
2. acknowledgement that tying is a common market phenomenon; 
3. confirmation of the importance of economic theory in the Commission’s 
assessments; 
4. acknowledgement that protecting customer welfare is a primary aim. 
 
2.1. Confirmation that customer choice determines the presence of 
a tie 
 
First, it is important to state that the Commission guidance continues to hold 
the customers’ freedom of choice as a defining characteristic of tying law. The 
Commission iterated that the customers’ choice is a determining factor in 
assessing tying. It states that: “[e]vidence that two products are distinct” 
includes evidence that, “when given a choice, customers purchase the tying 
and the tied products separately from different sources of supply”.15 It has 
been argued throughout the previous three chapters that the customers’ 
freedom to choose the combination of products that suits them best is the 
driving force behind the law on tying and as such the restriction of this 
freedom is an essential element in determining the existence of a tie. This 
shows that the Commission still considers the preservation of customer 
freedom paramount in its approach to tying. 
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2.2. Acknowledgement that tying is a common market 
phenomenon 
 
Second, the Commission accepts that tying and bundling are, not only 
common, but also intended to provide customers with better products in more 
cost effective ways. 16  This appears to be an acknowledgement of the 
presence of tying in many markets, including competitive markets. It 
acknowledges that tying isn’t inherently anti-competitive and that it can be 
used to bring benefits to consumers. This point seems to be in response to 
the criticism that was levelled at the European competition law enforcement 
authorities in relation to Microsoft I’s “separate product” test.17 As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the wording of the test suggests that there are 
characteristics that make products objectively separate. This is not the case, 
and as a consequence the test was criticised, for apparently ignoring the fact 
that there were many markets where combinations of what could be 
considered “separate products” were sold together as a normal practice. 
Therefore the Commission appears to be distancing itself from the implication 
that all ties are anti-competitive.18 This is particularly useful development in 
light of the work of Evans and Salinger19 that demonstrated that in markets 
with very high fixed costs and very low marginal costs, such as software 
markets, it can lower firms’ costs by providing software together and allowing 
the user to ignore the elements that they do not wish to use. 
 
2.3. Confirmation of the importance of economic theory in the 
Commission’s assessments 
 
Third and most importantly, the Commission’s Guidance demonstrates a 
deliberate attempt to incorporate economic theory into its policy and decision-
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 Commission Guidance (n 5) para 49 
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 See Chapter Five and Jean-Yves Art, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, ‘The European Commission's 
media player remedy in its Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence 
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making. In conformity with previous decisions, there are references to 
Ordolberial doctrine, for example: market power being the ability of a 
competitor to act appreciably independent of its competitors and customers; a 
concept established in case law and fundamentally Ordoliberal,20 but there is 
another theory present which is of great interest. The Guidance contains a 
number of descriptions of Commission policy that strongly reflect the work of 
post-Chicago authors. In terms of general principles, the Commission states 
that it will take into account the specific facts and circumstances of each 
case.21 This alone does not prove a strong post-Chicago link, but it shows that 
the Commission will consider how the specific characteristics of each market 
affect each case. This is a further move away from assuming abuse exists per 
se as soon as a tie and dominance is established, continuing the trend 
iterated in Microsoft I.22 Further, the guidance appears to taking into account 
game theory based corporate behaviour. That is where undertakings make 
decisions based upon the likely behaviour and reactions of other market 
actors. The Guidance states that when predicting expansion or entry of a 
market it will take into account factors such as barriers to entry and expansion, 
risks and costs of failure and “the likely reactions of the allegedly dominant 
undertaking and other competitors”. 23  Again, while not conclusive, this 
consideration of market actors’ reactions to certain behaviour is characteristic 
of the post-Chicago school of thought.24 These aspects of the Guidance are of 
a general post-Chicago character. Of even greater significance however are 
the following references that are far more identifiably post-Chicago in 
character: The Guidance states in reference to tying that the risk of anti-
competitive foreclosure is expected to be greater where the dominant 
undertaking makes its tying strategy a lasting one, for example by tying in a 
manner that is costly to reverse.25 Although there is no citation, this is based 
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upon the work of the post-Chicago theorist M. Whinston.26 Also the guidance 
explains that when two products can be used in variable proportions to a 
production process, increases in the price of one element may be avoided by 
customers if they can increase their use of the other product. In such a 
scenario, tying the two products together can allow the dominant undertaking 
to avoid this risk and raise prices.27 This reflects the economic theory of harm 
established by Burnstein.28 The Guidance also states that if there is a tie, and 
the tied product of that tie is an important complementary product for the 
customers of the tying product reducing the number of suppliers of that tied 
product through tying may make entry into that market more difficult.29 It is 
argued that this concept mirrors the arguments made by Carlton and 
Waldman.30 These specific references show that the Commission is listening 
to legal economic theorists, demonstrating that it is not “immune from the 
effects of economics”. 31  Further, it also shows that the Commission is 
deliberately incorporating ideas from the post-Chicago school, using them to 
guide its hand and focus its attention on tying situations that are most likely to 
have anti-competitive effects. This confirms that the Commission intends to 
continue its di-theoretical approach, that is to say that the Commission 
continues to pursue Ordoliberal aims (customer freedom and market access) 
while using post-Chicago analysis to establish, for example, when market 
access is being hindered. This suggests that in future the Commission will 
attach much greater importance to economic analysis. The Commission will 
be looking to establish whether the tie in question corresponds to a known or 
new paradigm of market foreclosure. The post-Chicago references present in 
the Guidance are also important for another reason: Each tying decision that 
has been handed down by the Commission since Microsoft I relates to 
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 Michael D. Whinston, ‘Tying Foreclosure, and Exclusion’ (1990) 80 Am.Econ.Rev. 4 837 
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software. Consequently, if considering only Commission and court decisions, 
it is difficult to establish whether the new di-theoretical approach applies only 
to the software market or more broadly to other more traditional markets as 
well. After all there are commentators that suggest that the software market 
and technically integrated products should be treated differently.32 The fact 
that the Commission’s Guidance establishes and sets out no such distinction 
suggests that the di-theoretical approach is quite likely to apply to both 
software and non-software markets. Although it is perhaps likely that in 
traditional non-software markets in depth post-Chicago style analysis will be 
seen as less important. But the extent of this will remain unknown until further 
tying cases are pursued by the Commission and courts. 
 
One final reason why the Guidance is of great importance is because it shows 
that this new di-theoretical approach is not limited to tying law alone. It is clear 
from the title of the Guidance33 as well as the topics covered in its contents 
that it is intended to apply to Article 102 abuses generally. This shows that the 
di-theoretical approach is being applied to a wide range of anti-competitive 
behaviour and not just tying. However detailed consideration of how this is 
and may continue to occur is outside the ambit of this research.  
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 David S. Evans, A Jorge Padilla and Michele Polo, ‘Tying in Platform Software: Reasons for 
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2.4. Acknowledgement that customer welfare is still a primary aim 
 
Fourth, the Guidance reinforces the point that protecting consumer welfare is 
a key aim.34 The argument for measuring welfare by reference to consumer 
welfare rather than total aggregate welfare (the welfare of consumers and 
producers) was articulated by Salop, a post-Chicago theorist.35 This further 
demonstrates that the Commission’s approach is being informed and guided 
by post-Chicago economic thinking. This suggests that the Commission also 
favours post-Chicago analysis over the Chicago School’s paradigms.36 
 
2.5. Impact of the Guidance 
 
It is argued that the Guidance shows that the concerns of the Commission 
have remained the same: the Commission is still concerned with dominant 
undertakings interfering with customers’ freedom and foreclosing the market 
to competitors. But what is new is the manner in which foreclosure is now 
being assessed. As seen in previous chapters 37  the Commission has 
previously avoided entering into detailed explanations of how a tie may hinder 
market entry or exclude competitors from the market, this can be expected to 
change. The Commission can now be expected to assess ties to find whether 
a credible theory of economic harm exists, before necessarily taking the 
matter further. What appears unclear at this stage is whether a credible theory 
of economic harm will be required before tying is established. Although a 
theory of economic harm was given in Microsoft I neither the Commission nor 
the Court stated that they were legally obliged to provide a theory of harm in 
order for the allegation to be made out.38 It is uncertain whether the Guidance 
has changed this. 
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3.0 Commission decision Case COMP/C-3/39.530 
– Microsoft tying 16/12/2009 
 
The commitments decision39 between Microsoft and the Commission is the 
first to be reached by the Commission since the publication of its Guidance. 
As a consequence it provides the first opportunity to assess how the 
Commission’s approach to tying has changed and/or stayed the same in light 
of the Guidance. It will be shown here that the Commission continues to make 
greater use of economic theories of foreclosure and does not assume 
foreclosure is present simply because a dominant undertaking ties two 
elements together. It will also be explained that the Commission’s formal 
theory of foreclosure in this decision does not take into account consumers’ 
expectations of web page functionality. 
 
3.1. Background 
 
In December 2007 the Commission received a complaint from Opera 
Software ASA (‘Opera’), a company based in Norway, which develops web 
browsers for various electronic devices, including PCs.40  According to the 
complaint, Microsoft was tying Internet Explorer (a web browser) to Windows 
(an operating system). As a result of this, it prevented Opera’s web browser 
from competing on the merits with Internet Explorer. 41  The Commission 
initiated proceedings and adopted a statement of objections setting out its 
concerns.42 The final commitments were delivered on the 16th of December 
2009. 
 
3.2. Product markets 
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Like the first Microsoft decision, the Microsoft II commitments decision related 
to two product markets. The first was for PC operating systems which the 
Commission categorised as ‘system software’ that controls the basic functions 
of a computer. The second was for web browsers. Web browsers are used by 
individual users to access and interact with World Wide Web content. The 
content is hosted on computers connected by networks such as the internet. 
Web browsers enable users to access this information and navigate from one 
page to another easily.43 The Commission listed44 a number of other attributes 
that web browsers have before going on to conclude that “by reason of its 
specific characteristics and the lack of realistic substitutes, the market for web 
browsers … constitutes a separate relevant product market”.45 
 
3.3. Practices raising concerns 
 
The Commission took the preliminary view in its statement of objections that 
Microsoft was infringing Article 102 of the TFEU by tying its web browser 
Internet Explorer to its Windows operating system. The Commission restated 
the test articulated in the Microsoft I decision.46 This test required that: 
 
(a) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; 
(b) the undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product market; 
(c) the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to obtain the 
tying product without the tied product; 
(d) the tie is liable to foreclose competition. 
 
Requirements (a) and (c) appear to have been dealt with in a single 
paragraph where the Commission merely states that it found Internet Explorer 
and Windows were separate products and that computer manufacturers and 
end users could not technically and legally obtain Windows without Internet 
Explorer.47 Little explanation is given why this is the case. Which does nothing 
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to clarify the ambiguity surrounding “two separate products” as left by the 
Microsoft I decision. This is unfortunate. What is considered in greater detail is 
the issue of foreclosure. 
 
The Commission stated that in accordance with established case law it could 
normally assume the tying of a product with a dominant product led to de 
facto foreclosure. However, as in Microsoft I, the Commission chose to 
examine the effects of the tie more closely.48 The Commission explained its 
theory of foreclosure, which was very similar to that which was used in the 
Microsoft I case.49 
 
3.4. The initial conditions giving rise to foreclosure 
 
First the Commission stated that tying gave “Internet Explorer an artificial 
distribution advantage that other browsers were unable to match”. 50  This 
made Internet Explorer as ubiquitous as Windows.51 The Commission then 
went on to explain that there were two main ways for competitors to reach 
customers with their web browsers: distribution through Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) and through internet downloads.52 The Commission 
considered that distribution through OEMs could not offset Internet Explorer’s 
ubiquity since this meant browsers could only be installed in addition to 
Internet Explorer rather than in place of it.53 The Commission took the view 
that as long as Microsoft could ship Windows with Internet Explorer, OEMs 
faced negative incentives to bundle an additional web browser due to the 
additional costs associated with provision of additional software, such as 
support and testing costs.54 Internet downloads were also considered not to 
offset the “artificial distribution advantage” of Internet Explorer being tied to 
Windows. 55  For example, the Commission highlighted issues such as 
overcoming users’ inertia to get them to change browser from that which was 
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pre-installed,56 and other more market specific issues such as the users being 
able to search, choose and install competing web browsers, which can be 
difficult if the users’ lack the required skills, understanding or confidence to do 
so. 57  The Commission supported this supposition with market surveys. 58 
These surveys stated that of all Windows users who had never or had only 
once downloaded a web browser, 31% said they did not know how to install or 
download software, 15% replied that they consider downloading or installing 
software as difficult or complicated, 8% fear security risks and 7% were not 
aware that they could download a web browser.59 It should be borne in mind 
that while 7% is not a large proportion of Microsoft users, due to the 
magnitude of the absolute numbers involved this is still a significant number of 
users. The consumer survey was all the more stark in its findings. It reported 
that:  
 
“84% of Windows users who use Internet Explorer as their primary web 
browser never use another web browser on their computer because 
they are unaware of the other options, or because they do not want to 
[download] or do not know how to download.”60 
 
This Commission felt that this indicated that consumers in particular needed 
further information on available web browsers before they would download. 
This raised the idea that Microsoft could maintain its market share for 
browsers by tying, even though their offering was an inferior product, because 
users were not able to, or confident enough or not aware of the opportunity to 
install other browsers.61 
  
                                            
56
 An issue that arguably applies to most entrants in many markets. 
57
 Microsoft (n 38) para 48 
58
 ibid para 51-53 
59
 ibid para 51 
60
 ibid para 52 
61
 ibid para 54 
EU Tying Law Post-Microsoft I 
231 
 
3.5. Foreclosure through network effects 
 
The following is the Commission’s explanation of foreclosure. 62  It will be 
argued later that this explanation is flawed and in fact Microsoft’s tie of 
Windows and Internet Explorer was never likely to foreclose the market.  
 
Step 1 
Web content providers and software developers look to installation shares 
when deciding which browser they should develop web applications and 
content for.63 
 
Step 2 
Content and software developers produce applications and content tailored to 
Internet Explorer due to Microsoft’s tie making Internet Explorer present on 
around 90% of systems worldwide. Their choice of Internet Explorer as their 
preferred platform is not related to the merits of Internet Explorer itself per se, 
but rather based solely on its ubiquitous presence due to being tied to 
Microsoft’s Windows.64 
 
Step 3 
Although not expressly contained in the decision, it is also presumably the 
case that this provision of content and software means that customers find 
Internet Explorer more desirable, are more likely to use it and as such further 
reinforce the effect whereby software and content developers code primarily 
for Internet Explorer, knowing that it is the most popular browser. Thus, 
completing a feedback loop. 
 
The view was taken that this limited innovation in web development.65 
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3.6. Protecting Microsoft’s position in the operating system market 
 
The Commission also explained that part of the reason why Microsoft has 
been able to maintain its incredible dominance for so long is due to its 
“applications barrier to entry”. What this means is that users tend to buy 
Windows because there is so much software that is written for it. Any software 
developer that wrote a new operating system would have trouble selling it. 
This is because even if it was superior, those who bought the operating 
system would have to re-purchase all the software they already use, but in a 
format that works on their new system. In addition, many pieces of software 
may not even exist for a new operating system because no software 
developer is going to write software for an operating system that has a tiny 
market share, as the market for sales could only equal the size of the of the 
market share of that particular operating system. This application barrier 
makes it difficult for users to switch operating system and deters entry and 
therefore means there is little competition in the operating system market. 
 
The Commission considered that the development of modern web 
applications poses a threat to Microsoft’s operating system market share. 
Essentially, many of the software applications that users require in a computer 
can now be carried out over the internet through a web browser. That is to say, 
that instead of using a word processor that is installed on a computer itself, for 
example, users can log onto the web and access a word processor through 
the internet that is installed on a server. These applications can be accessed 
by the user regardless of the operating system being used on the computer. 
So a user could be running Windows or any other operating system such as 
Apple’s OS or Linux and they could access the same programmes. This 
reduces the importance attached to which operating system a user installs 
and therefore reduces the applications barrier that protects Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system. Instead users depend upon their web browser as 
a gateway to access these applications. Therefore the Commission believed 
that web browsers could pose a threat to Microsoft’s dominance in the 
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operating system market66 and did not want Microsoft to be able to restrict 
competition in this area through the use of the market power they still retained 
through their operating system. 
 
The Commission took the view that through the use of tying, Microsoft 
“countered the perceived ‘platform threat’ from other web browsers because 
no application written specifically for Microsoft’s web browser … would give its 
users an option to switch web browsers or even the underlying operating 
system”. In other words, if software and content providers wrote content just 
for Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, then this would require users to use Internet 
Explorer and as a consequence the only operating system that IE runs on: 
Microsoft Windows. This would protect Microsoft’s operating system market 
share.67 
 
3.7. The flaw in the Commission’s assessment of foreclosure 
 
While Microsoft I can be said to have a cohesive theory of foreclosure but 
failed due to the implementation of a poor remedy, Microsoft II is the reverse. 
Its assessment of foreclosure was flawed even if the commitments required to 
be implemented were well chosen. As previously stated the concept of 
foreclosure envisaged by the Commission was that Web content providers 
and software developers would look to installation shares when deciding for 
which browser to develop web applications and content. Since Internet 
Explorer is tied to Windows these developers would tailor their applications 
and content to Internet Explorer because of its 90% market share around the 
world.  
 
These arguments are similar to the concept of foreclosure articulated by the 
Commission and confirmed by the then Court of First Instance in the Microsoft 
I decision. There is however a fundamental difference between Microsoft I 
and Microsoft II, namely a difference between browsers and media players. 
Media players play content in a particular format. These formats are generally 
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not interchangeable. What will play on one player does not play on another 
media player. Consumers expected this as it has largely been the case since 
streaming media players began to be popular. The complete reverse is true of 
browsers and web content. HTML (Hyper Text Mark-up language) is the 
coding language used to encode webpages. It can be interpreted by any 
browser. Consumers expect their browser to be able to access any web-
page.68  As a consequence it is likely that if a user cannot access a web-page 
because it only works with one particular browser, the web-page will be 
considered inferior rather than the browser. Therefore the expectations of 
consumers are completely different. Media content has historically been 
coded in proprietary formats that only work with certain media players.  In 
contrast, web-pages have been programmed to work with as many browsers 
as possible.  
 
Further, there is another difference between media players and browsers. 
Suppose there is a computer user who uses Real Player media player. They 
are browsing the web and the come across content encoded in Windows 
Media Player format. When they click on it, the producer of that content is 
assured that even though the user generally uses Real Player, when they 
click on the content, Windows Media Player will pop up and load their content. 
Since 90% of computers run Windows, they are almost guaranteed the user 
can access their content. Now consider a similar situation in the context of 
browsers. There is a user who generally uses Firefox to surf the internet. They 
click on a link taking them to a web-page that is written so that it only works in 
conjunction with IE. Nothing happens. The web-page appears not to load 
properly. The user may just assume the host’s server is not functioning 
correctly, that it is a badly programmed web-site or some other malfunction is 
occurring. What will not happen is IE automatically loading up and displaying 
the web-page. At best, a message will explain that the web-page is not 
compatible with the browser being used and the user should download IE. 
The user may look through their computer and find IE, copy the link into 
browser and look at the web-page from there, but the user is just as likely to 
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bypass this process and just search for a similar web-page without having to 
switch browsers or give up completely. 
 
The practical consequence of this is that Microsoft’s attempts to create 
technical barriers to users switching web browser, and thus operating system, 
by providing a “reach” 69  incentive for content producers and software 
application developers to code “for” Microsoft IE,70 were doomed to fail.  This 
is because content developers would not want to risk excluding the 40% of 
internet users 71  who used non-IE browsers. Without content developers 
gradually writing more and more web-pages and content that works 
exclusively with IE, there would never be any real foreclosure effect. 
Hypothetically, regardless of the percentage of users with IE installed on their 
computer, without web pages being written to run only on IE, there would be 
nothing to prevent a new entrant from releasing a new browser that would be 
compatible with the same percentage of the market as Microsoft’s IE. 
Therefore if the new browser was technically superior and marketed 
effectively there would be no barriers to prevent people switching from IE to 
their new browser. Once again contrasting this with the situation in Microsoft I, 
if content producers did use Microsoft’s proprietary WMP format to encode 
their content, then a new entrant to the media player market would be trying to 
promote a product that was unable to play all the content that was coded in 
WMP, and all other proprietary formats. If this was a high percentage, they 
would be foreclosed from the market. As such the situation regarding 
foreclosure was markedly different in Microsoft I to Microsoft II and as a result, 
it is argued that the theory of foreclosure given in Microsoft II was not a 
genuine risk. 
 
                                            
69
 “Reach” here means the ability of an application or web content to reach the greatest 
number of possible customers 
70
 It was noted by the Commission that programmes written for Microsoft IE would not 
function on other browsers; Microsoft (tying) (Case COMP/C-3/39.530), para 58 
71
 In December 2009, the same month as the commitments were published IE was used by 
44.84% of European users, even earlier when IE’s position was greater, in July 2008, 58.19% 
of European users used IE making the market share of non-IE browsers 41.81%, statistics 
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One argument that was raised in the previous chapter in relation to Microsoft 
tying Windows and WMP was that since there was a single charge for both 
Window and WMP, the cost of WMP was part of the price of Windows and 
therefore it may not have been fair for those who did not want to purchase 
WMP to be required to pay for its development. Does this argument also 
apply to the situation here with Windows and IE? No. Even if a user of 
Microsoft Windows does not want to use IE there is still a good reason for IE 
to be included. This is because, as the Commission noted, one of the main 
methods of distributing web browsers is through internet downloads. 72 
Therefore if Microsoft sold Windows without a web browser it would mean that 
users would be deprived of the very software necessary to download 
alternative browsers. 73  As a consequence, if a user only intends to use 
Microsoft IE once in order to download a new browser this alone is arguably 
sufficient justification for it being made available with Windows. As such, 
unlike in Microsoft I, the argument that users should not have to pay for 
Microsoft to develop software that they do not wish to use does not apply. 
 
In light of this it is ostensibly very difficult to understand why the Microsoft II 
decision was necessary at all. Unlike Microsoft I, there was no foreclosure of 
the market and there were valid reasons for the inclusion of the browser. 
Further, unlike Microsoft I where it was by no means certain how the market 
would develop over the long term under the tying behaviour, the Commission 
was able to see from almost every available data source74 that Microsoft’s IE 
was losing market share to its rivals, not just in Europe, but around the world. 
This further suggests that there was either no foreclosure effect from the tie or 
that the foreclosure affects were so weak that they could not prevent 
Microsoft’s web browser from losing market share. 
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 Microsoft (n 38), para 46-47 
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4.0 The Commitments 
 
The commitments offered by Microsoft and accepted by the Commission are 
of importance because they demonstrate that the Commission has learned 
from the failure of the Microsoft I remedy and is now using innovative and 
novel methods of bringing tying behaviour to an end and spurring competition 
in markets it considers to be subject to limited competition, such as the use of 
the choice screen. In complex software markets this is necessary as a simple 
requirement to make software available separately as well as tied may not be 
enough to undermine the restrictive effect of the tie. 
 
4.1. General commitments 
 
Under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission can accept and make 
binding commitments offered by a dominant undertaking under investigation 
to meet its concerns.75 The following describes the commitments to which 
Microsoft agreed to be bound. 
 
1. Microsoft enabled OEMs and end users to turn off and on Internet 
Explorer, when off, it would not be activated by any means other than 
the user choosing to turn it back on again; 
2. OEMs would be free to pre-install any web browser/s of their choice 
and set them as default; 
3. Microsoft would not use its productivity software or Windows update to 
distribute new versions of IE, unless IE was turned on; 
4. Microsoft would not retaliate against any OEM for developing, using 
distributing, promoting or supporting software that competes with IE; 
5. Microsoft would not enter into agreements granting consideration to an 
OEM for avoiding software that competes with IE; and, 
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6. Microsoft would not terminate a direct OEM licence without having first 
given written notice of the reasons for the proposed termination and at 
least 30 days to resolve those issues.76 
 
4.2. The Choice screen 
 
In addition to this, the major commitment offered by Microsoft was that it 
would provide a “choice screen” for users. This would be a piece of software 
sent to computers in the European Economic Area running Windows through 
the Windows update mechanism. If the user had Microsoft IE set as the 
default web browser, it would display to the user two windows, one informing 
the user of the importance of web browsers and what they do, and a second  
giving the user the option of downloading one of twelve of the most popular 
browsers (by market share). The list of browsers would be updated every six 
months.77 The list would be populated in accordance with market share, but 
the order of the browsers in the list would be randomised so as not to produce 
a bias in favour of those browsers in one particular position.78 
 
4.3. Reception of the decision 
 
Microsoft II has received in many ways a positive response. Dolmans et al 
stated that the browser commitments were “very welcome developments” and 
sought to congratulate the Commission for its awareness in bringing the 
investigation, and its effort to resolve the issues in a co-operative and speedy 
manner. 79  Hobbelen and Jablan stated that the choice screen solution 
appeared to be satisfactory in their view. They opined that the solution would 
enhance consumer choice, innovation and competition.80 However, Robinson 
argues that the Commission still paid too much attention to likely effects on 
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competition rather than actual.81 But he does not criticise the choice screen 
itself. So generally the concept of a choice screen in particular has been well 
received. 
 
The criticism that does exist generally relates to the details of the 
commitments. For example, Dolmans et al focus on the lack of a monitoring 
system to ensure Microsoft was faithful in the implementation of the 
commitments.82 Hobbelen and Jablan and Aleixo83 were more concerned with 
the number of browsers that were included in the choice screen. 
 
Therefore while the Microsoft II commitments have been subject to scrutiny 
and some commentators have suggested that there are weaknesses, the 
basic concepts underlying the decision have generally met with approval. 
Further it is submitted by this author that this form of resolution is both 
intelligent and carefully balanced. It maximises the chance of users making a 
decision on the merits of the product rather than blindly accepting the default 
browser. It does so without using disproportionate solutions like “must carry” 
remedies that would cause problems such as requiring Microsoft to appear to 
be guarantors of the functionality and interoperability of other competitors’ 
programmes. Further this shows the Commission has learned from the failure 
of the Microsoft I decision’s remedies. 
5.0 Customer Choice 
 
The commitments decision remained true to the principle of customer choice. 
Like the case law before it, it is argued that the decision in Microsoft II was 
underpinned by a desire to uphold the primacy of the customer’s freedom to 
choose the combination of products that they deem best. The most obvious 
demonstration of this is in the name of the remedy itself, the customer choice 
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screen. But throughout the commitments decision, there are constant 
reminders that the aim of the decision is to ensure that the freedom of choice 
of the customer takes precedence, and is not manipulated by the dominant 
undertaking. This includes ensuring OEMs are able to ship Windows with “the 
browser of their choice”,84 seeking to ensure users have a specific opportunity 
to choose their browser in a “technically straightforward environment”.85 This, 
the Commission believed, would undermine the artificial distribution 
advantage held by Microsoft, facilitating competition on the merits and as a 
consequence “improving choice and encouraging innovation”.86 In explaining 
the reason why the commitments were to extend for five years the 
Commission stated that this was the time necessary for users to inform 
themselves and “exercise choice and for those choices to have an impact on 
the market”.87  
 
When discussing potential review of the commitments it was stated that 
Microsoft or the Commission could request a review of the commitments two 
or more years after the adoption of the decision where either the market 
circumstances had changed fundamentally or the choice screen had 
manifestly failed to provide consumers with an effective choice.88 Therefore it 
appears that the Commission would consider the commitments to have failed 
their purpose if they did not provide consumers with free choice. This gives a 
particularly clear display that the Commission’s aim was to provide consumers 
with freedom of choice.  
 
Therefore it can be seen that throughout the commitments decision the 
concern of the Commission was to ensure that customer choice was not 
undermined by the artificial distribution advantage that it attributed to 
Microsoft’s tie. Its remedy was designed to reduce the impact of Microsoft’s 
dominance on the operating system market, by giving greater effect to the 
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customer’s choice and to allow that choice to influence the browser market 
driving greater competition and innovation.   
 
This does not mean that the Commission was accurate in its initial 
assessment of the foreclosure threat, but it is important to highlight that the 
underlying aims of the Commission since the original Microsoft I decision (and 
earlier) have remained the same. 
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6.0 Choice evasion: An alternative source of 
foreclosure 
 
So far it has been argued that while the motivation behind the Commission’s 
Microsoft II decision was legally valid (the protection of customer choice) the 
assessment of foreclosure given by the Commission was not accurate. Due to 
the differences between media players and web browsers, Microsoft’s tie 
would not cause a feedback loop that would foreclose other browsers. There 
is however another type of foreclosure that is tacitly expressed in the 
Microsoft II commitments decision that seems to be a far more convincing 
source of foreclosure. This novel type of foreclosure is what the author calls 
“choice evasion”. 
 
Choice evasion appears to have played a key part in the Microsoft II decision. 
This is where by not giving customers the option to install or uninstall the tied 
software, consumers remain unaware that there is any distinction between89 
the dominant software and the tied software in the first place. Consequently, 
the user is less likely to realise there are other alternatives because they do 
not realise that they are actually using two different types of software. This 
illusion means that customers do not realise they have a choice of 
applications and, as a result, they will not exercise it. They will be less likely to 
search out alternatives and pick a different, possibly superior software 
configuration. Hence the dominant company has evaded the customer’s 
exercise of choice by hiding the fact that it exists. 
 
While the term “choice evasion” is never used in the Microsoft II decision by 
the Commission, there is evidence that this was a key concern. When 
discussing, potential foreclosure effects, the Commission states “users are 
prevented from switching from Internet Explorer to competing web 
browsers … due to the barriers associated with such a switch, such as 
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searching, choosing and installing such a competing web browser, which can 
stem from a lack of technical skills…” 90  As already mentioned, the 
Commission referred to surveys indicating that of all the Windows users who 
had never or had only once downloaded a web browser, 31% did not know 
how to install or download software, 15% replied that they consider 
downloading or installing software as difficult or complicated, 8% feared 
security risks and 7% were not aware that they could download a web 
browser.91 It would be interesting to know how many consumers did not fill in 
the survey because they did not understand what the terms meant. The 
consumer survey indicated that 84% of Windows users who use Internet 
Explorer as their main web browser never used another web browser on their 
computer because they are unaware of the other options, or because they do 
not want to or do not know how to download alternatives.92 This demonstrates 
a general lack of knowledge regarding browsers and the associated 
technologies. As such, the more Microsoft can blur the distinctions between 
Windows and IE, the less consumers will be likely to consider alternatives. 
 
The commitments agreed between Microsoft and the Commission also 
demonstrate that the Commission was concerned about more than just 
ensuring Microsoft offered Windows without IE. If that was the Commission’s 
only concern all that would be required as a commitment would be for 
Microsoft to offer a version of Windows without IE. The Commission however 
appears to have learnt from the failure of Windows N93 that resolving tying 
issues in software markets is far more complex that just offering the tying 
product alone at the same price. As such the Commission needed 
commitments that would not only provide Windows free of Internet Explorer 
but also overcome choice evasion. This is why Microsoft was required to, not 
only allow customers to turn IE off, but further to inform them about what a 
browser did and give them choices about which alternative browsers they 
could download. This would help overcome user lethargy and reverse choice 
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evasion by making users aware of the distinction between operating systems 
and browsers (like Windows and IE) in a safe, technologically unchallenging 
environment, rather than subtly hiding it. 
 
The argument that choice evasion is at the heart of the Commission’s 
software tying policy is also strongly confirmed by the most recent tying issue 
raised by the Commission that relates to Google.94 Here the Commission is 
seeking to require Google to inform users when Google’s own specialised 
search services are being displayed, and also to display alternative search 
providers on its web page when users make use of its specialised search 
services, such as for hotels, restaurants and flight services. This shows the 
Commission’s concern that consumers should know when they are using a 
piece of software that provides a separate function and that they should be 
able to choose to access alternatives easily. 
 
6.1. Rationale behind choice evasion 
 
It is argued there are logical reasons for this particular type of foreclosure to 
be a unique concern within the tying law relating to software. These are as 
follows: 
 
1. Software markets are characterised by high fixed costs and 
exceptionally low marginal costs. This is because the cost of 
programming a piece of software is very high but once programmed 
the cost of making a second copy is virtually £0.00 As a result there 
can be cost savings by tying software.95 As a consequence it can be 
cheaper for a dominant undertaking to put their software together and 
charge the same price than to market and distribute each piece 
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individually. This is rarely the case with normal traded goods such as 
cars or computers themselves;96  
 
2. Software markets are often subject to network effects, this means that 
having a wide distribution of client software can help capture further 
market share;  
 
3. Software can often be programmed to be activated automatically. As 
such a user who does not want to use the software or was not even 
aware that the software was installed on their computer can find that 
the software activates itself when the user tries to access particular 
formats or inadvertently engages some other trigger mechanism (this 
reinforces the second element); 
 
4. Users of software often have a limited understanding of how software 
works, little confidence in changing it and are unable to distinguish 
between various pieces of software and their functions. As a result of 
this they are less likely to be aware that there are competing goods that 
can perform the same functions as well as, or better than the software 
they already have. They are also less likely to make use of this 
software even if they know it exists if they are not confident in doing so. 
 
This combination of characteristics can allow dominant undertakings to 
perform choice evasion: utilizing the characteristics above to minimise the 
chance that consumers will realise they have the choice to access various 
different versions of the software they are using, whilst capitalising on the 
network benefits that such a tie provides to made entry more difficult for 
competitors. It is quite possible that it is these concerns that have led the 
Commission to pursue the decisions against Microsoft that it has. It is also 
possible, that the Commission is only starting to discover this form of 
foreclosure due to the failure of its previous remedies, such as in Microsoft I, 
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and this explains why the Commission has not yet articulated the threat 
clearly; it is only just learning of its existence. Nonetheless, it appears that by 
carefully examining the particular characteristics of each market in a post-
Chicago style of analysis, the Commission is learning how to spur competition 
in software markets and through “trial and error” the Commission is learning 
how to craft remedies (or commitments) that are better suited to this aim.  
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7.0 The Commission’s policy on tying: into the 
future 
 
What can be expected from the Commission’s tying policy approach in future? 
It is argued that what is clear is that the Commission will be targeting ties 
made by dominant undertakings where it sees the consumers’ freedom to 
choose their preferred combination of products under threat and, where there 
is the possibility of foreclosing the market in so doing. In order to predict when 
this is a particular threat, the Commission will analyse the behaviour of the 
undertaking within the context of that particular market. Commission decisions 
are likely to contain increasing use of surveys to ascertain what behavioural 
responses other market actors would be likely to pursue as a result of the tie. 
Post-Chicago economic theories are also going to be studied carefully by the 
Commission and used to assess if a dominant undertaking is using tying to 
exclude competitors or make entry more difficult. The Commission will not 
depend solely on established post-Chicago theories, but will be looking to 
evaluate each alleged instance of tying within the circumstances present to 
see whether there is a likely exclusionary effect. 
 
7.1. Compliance: Avoiding tying litigation in non-software markets 
 
In the vast majority of cases avoiding the Commission’s disapproval will be 
relatively simple. Even if it will be difficult to predict what the Commission 
considers to be foreclosure, a simple focus on aspects (a) and (c) of the 
following requirements would alleviate any doubt: 
 
(a) there is independent demand for the tying and tied goods; 
(b) the undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product market; 
(c) the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product; 
(d) the tying is liable to foreclose competition 
 
Simply put, an undertaking seeking to avoid litigation should always ensure 
there is the option to buy goods separately while there is still independent 
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customer demand. Even if it appears that in a short period of time there will be 
demand for only one combined product, a dominant undertaking should make 
both available until consumer purchase patterns have changed. That is to say; 
customer purchase patterns should lead undertaking supply patterns, not the 
other way around. This way consumer demand will govern what products are 
available and customer choice will not be impeded. This may require offering 
“legacy” products for a short time, but if consumer patterns really do change, 
this should not be required for too long, and if they do not change then this 
means that costly litigation has been avoided. 
 
7.2. Avoiding litigation in software markets: evading choice 
evasion 
 
As stated in the last section, generally if a dominant undertaking makes their 
products available independently for as long as independent customer 
demand exists, they will be able to ensure compliance with Article 102 TFEU 
and avoid tying litigation. The exception to this rule is the software market. In 
the software market avoiding tying litigation is more complicated. 
 
The choice evasion threat is based on tying software so that it is installed 
without users’ knowledge or request, and is called upon automatically without 
the user needing to select that program for installation. It capitalises on the 
users’ ignorance of software distinctions and alternative programmes. 
Therefore, while in most industries, the dominant undertaking should make 
their goods available separately if they want to avoid infringing the law on 
tying, software must be treated differently. While a dominant software 
undertaking can take advantage of distribution efficiencies etc. by providing 
software together, it should not seek to exploit the ignorance of 
users/consumers in this fast moving sector. Rather when providing two or 
more pieces of software together a dominant software undertaking should 
always ensure that they: 
 
1. Provide users with the choice not to install/activate their additional 
software; 
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2. Require the user to make a positive/active choice for the software to be 
installed, such as ticking a box or re-entering a CD (a default ticked box 
will not suffice); 
3. Inform users accurately of the purpose, generic term for and utility of 
their software at the time the choice is made; 
4. Inform users that the software is separate and explain that separate 
function; 
5. Prevent the software from being started automatically unless the 
consumer chooses to activate/install their software. 
 
The purpose of this is: 
 Point 1 gives customers a choice; 
 Point 2 highlights that choice; 
 Point 3 and 4 informs the customer so that they are able to make that 
choice and search for alternatives in they desire; 
 Point 5 gives effect to that choice and prevents network effects from 
causing foreclosure in markets subject to these effects. 
 
If these steps are followed, it is likely that the Commission will find that the 
consumer has made an informed choice to accept the additional software. As 
such the undertaking can demonstrate that is has not taken advantage of the 
user’s lack of understanding, or tied the products in such a fashion as to 
convince the user that the software cannot be acquired separately from other 
providers with differing features and differing attributes and therefore has not 
prevented consumer demand developing or prevented consumers from 
exercising their freedom of choice. Also since the installation is contingent on 
the consumer making an active decision, it is likely to reduce any foreclosure 
of markets subject to network effects since it is not guaranteed that every user 
will install/activate the additional software. The only further aspect that the 
Commission is likely to be concerned with is customers’ knowledge of 
competing products. 
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What can be seen then is where a dominant software firm follows each of 
these five points it less likely to be found to contravene Article 102 TFEU and 
where an undertaking does not follow these points it will be more likely to be 
found to contravene Article 102 TFEU. 
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8.0 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates by reference to the Guidance and Microsoft II two 
main themes. First the Commission is, as it has been before, concerned with 
the preservation of customer freedom and their ability to choose the products 
that they want and that suits them best. Second it has been shown that the 
Commission is integrating post-Chicago models, and post-Chicago style 
economic analysis into its assessment of foreclosure. This is moving it away 
from a per se assumption of foreclosure as soon as it is established that a 
dominant undertaking has tied two products that customers would rather 
source separately, and moving it towards finding a tie only after an applicable 
theory of economic harm has also been established. This is likely to make 
findings of abuse less predictable and also require far greater economic 
assessment, such as business and consumer surveys, as the Commission 
seeks to consider what impact a tie will have on the behaviour of consumers, 
competitors and other market actors. What remains the same is that any 
behaviour that is found to directly or indirectly inhibit the ability of customers to 
choose technically superior products will not be viewed likely by the 
Commission. 
 
The Commission’s remedies and commitment decisions have and are going 
to continue in future to aim to increase the ease with which customers are 
able to recognise and execute their freedom of choice. It has been argued 
that this is because the Commission is concerned with a particular type of 
foreclosure in software markets. While not articulated as the formal theory of 
foreclosure it has been argued that the Commission’s concern with choice 
evasion is key to understanding its behaviour in pursuing dominant software 
undertakings and as a consequence it is key to understanding how such 
undertakings can avoid being penalised. Firms that are dominant in the 
software market will need to take special considerations into account in order 
not to be found to foreclosure the market. This includes ensuring that they 
give consumers the option not to install their tied software, highlighting the 
differing functions of the software and requiring positive action from the 
consumer for the software to be activated or installed. 
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This all shows that the Commission is, both in its Guidance and in practice, 
incorporating post-Chicago theory into its tying assessment to support and 
preserve customer choice and market entry. The Commission is willing to 
consider the specific characteristics of a market, such as software, and 
analyse what causes customers’ freedom to be curtailed or competitors 
excluded in that particularly market and act accordingly. It is also starting to 
create remedies (or accept commitments) that deal with these issues in novel 
ways that again take into account the nature of the market and the impact the 
remedies are likely to have in practice. The consequence of this is that 
dominant undertakings, particularly in software markets, need to understand 
the Commission and courts’ methods and aims and adjust their behaviour in 
order to ensure that market entry is unrestricted and customers’ freedom 
protected. 
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Conclusion 
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This thesis, through the use of qualitative methods, has assessed the economic 
foundations of the EU approach to tying. This analysis has yielded an explanation of 
how the EU approach has changed since its inception to the present. It offers a new 
interdisciplinary account of how the prohibition of tying came into EU law and how it 
has changed through three particular periods. The results of this assessment have 
allowed the author to provide guidance, not just on how the law has been interpreted, 
but predicting the way the law will be applied in future. 
 
Through the comparison of three leading schools of thought on competition/antitrust 
analysis, this thesis has explored the European Commission and Union courts’ 
approach to tying. This has shown that the decisions and judgments contain 
statements that are antithetical to the Chicago School approach. Rejecting accepted 
tenets of the Chicago School’s adherents, the decisions and judgments follow 
practices that are either informed by or, at the very least, reflect a strong Ordoliberal 
influence. The strongest element of this that relates to tying law is the aim of 
upholding customer choice. This theme runs through the all three periods discussed 
and consequently continues to play a primary role within tying law. However, this is 
not the only economic theory that has influenced the Commission and Union courts. 
While it is argued that ordoliberalism was the only economic theory that informed the 
aims and application of EU tying law in the first period, the second and third periods, 
namely the Microsoft I and post-Microsoft periods, a secondary supporting influence 
is present. It is argued in this thesis that during the second and third periods, the 
Commission’s application of the law has been informed and directed by post-
Chicago thinking. This has not supplanted the primacy of Ordoliberal theory within 
the Commission’s thinking, but rather it has become a tool that has aided the 
Commission in determining when the aims, established by Ordoliberal theory, are 
most likely to be under threat. The introduction of post-Chicago theory has honed 
and sharpened the Commission’s approach leading to a more economically 
grounded assessment of when competition will or will not be likely to be restricted by 
a particular conduct on a particular market by an undertaking in a dominant position. 
 
Chapter one has explored the development of tying law in Germany. Its contribution 
to the thesis is twofold; first it establishes how tying law developed in Germany and 
second it sets out Ordoliberal economic theory and analyses how it made the 
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transition from esoteric economic theory to German law, and ultimately to the original  
EEC Treaty. Establishing the source of EU tying law is of great significance as it 
allows greater understanding of the Commission’s decision and the jurisprudence of 
the EU courts.  It allows judgments to be evaluated by their own standard, in asking 
whether they accomplish what they are theoretically intending to achieve. Further 
understanding the theory behind the decisions allows the theory itself to be assessed 
from an economic perspective. Therefore implementing a historic legal approach has 
provided an analysis of the impact of Ordoliberalism in the foundation and formation 
of EU tying law. 
 
Chapter two has considered the Chicago School of thought. It has set out the most 
relevant aspects that relate to tying and the economic justification behind the position. 
The position of the Chicago School on the restriction of competition, tying and their 
approach to issues such as barriers to entry1 have been explained. This chapter 
provided a foundation for later chapters where the Chicago School theories are 
compared with the EU approach to tying. In later chapters, the views of the Chicago 
School are also used to critique the approach of the EU competition enforcement 
authorities. 
 
In chapter three, the work of the post-Chicago School has been considered and the 
post-Chicago economic theories that have been established since 1990 have been 
expounded. These theories are not general or broadly applicable to all markets; 
rather the chapter sets out the models that have been used to show that tying can 
indeed lead to negative competitive effects in specific circumstances. This chapter 
has also set out the post-Chicago view of the measure of efficiency, again this is 
pertinent for  later chapters where it is necessary to understand both the models of 
harm and the measure of efficiency that post-Chicago espouses in order to compare 
this with the EU approach itself. It has also been argued in this chapter that the 
accuracy of these theories is generally accepted.2 
 
                                            
1
 The views of the Chicago School are represented as they were before 1990. This time frame is 
important as it presents an opportunity to consider whether this School of thought was influential 
within Commission and the courts’ decisions before post-Chicago economics began to impact the way 
economists viewed tying and its risk of competitive harm. 
2
 That is not to say that these theories are without criticism, instead such criticism tends to centre on 
whether they can be applied in court, rather than whether they are economically valid. 
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Chapter four starts the qualitative analysis of the decisions of the Commission and 
the Union courts. This chapter has studied the period from the very first tying 
decisions issued within the EU jurisdiction, to 2004; the mono-theoretical period. 
Through careful and thorough analysis, this research has found that the Commission 
and Union courts, during this period, have pursued a tying policy that has focused on 
the preservation of customer freedom. This aim is based on the belief that the 
customer in the best position to choose the combination of products that they prefer 
and that to hinder that choice restricts competitors’ access to the market. In terms of 
establishing the economic theory that informs the law on tying; customer freedom is 
a concept that is highly prized within Ordoliberal thinking. This analysis is a 
significant contribution to the present state of knowledge. It provides further evidence 
that tying theory in the EU has been strongly influenced by Ordoliberal thinking. 
Aside from customer freedom, the chapter further argues that a number of other 
concepts present in EU competition law are also consonant with Ordoliberal theory. 
It also shows that there are economic arguments that have been rejected and other 
arguments that have been accepted by the Commission and Union courts that are 
contrary to the thinking established by the Chicago School of thought, demonstrating 
that Chicago School thinking has not had a significant impact of the execution of EU 
tying law. 
 
Chapter five uses the case of Microsoft I as a watershed to demonstrate the 
emergence of a di-theoretical period. This is where through the express inclusion of 
a foreclosure requirement the Commission and Union courts begin to adopt a market 
by market approach where they seek to not only establish a tie but further assess 
whether the tie will have anti-competitive effects in that particular instance. This, the 
author has argued, is the start of a new period where the aims of the EU courts are 
still Ordoliberal in nature (with aims such as customer freedom and exclusion of 
competitors), but the way in which these aims are pursued begins to require the 
presence of credible economic theories of harm. It is significant that the manner in 
which economic theories of harm are proffered by the Commission is not dissimilar 
to the style of the post-Chicago authors considered in chapter three. This is a 
significant contribution to the broader debate that has been taking place between 
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commentators such as Gerber, 3  Akman, 4  Warlouzet 5  and others 6  regarding the 
theoretical inspiration and foundation of EU competition law. 
 
The chapter has also made a normative argument based on the test articulated in 
the Microsoft I decision. This related specifically to the “separate products” element 
of the test.  The author has argued that while this is technically in keeping with the 
prior case law on tying, it is flawed in that it misdirects attention from the importance 
of customer demand. Customer demand is important because it expresses how 
customers chose to purchase their products when freely able to do so. By concealing 
the importance of customer demand this obscures the fundamental aim of protecting 
customer freedom. Therefore, in this thesis, it is argued that the legal test, while with 
technically accurate, was articulated in an unhelpful manner and a new test has 
been proposed which provides greater clarity. 
 
Chapter six also focused on the Microsoft I decision. This chapter first set out the 
substantive economic failure of the Microsoft I remedy. Through economic analysis it 
has been reasoned that two particular factors that relate to the price structure and 
the integration costs of the media player market are responsible for this failure. The 
chapter then provides a number of normative proposals to illustrate how the 
Commission could have sought to resolve the tie. This normative discussion 
provides insight into both the advantages and disadvantages of each possible 
remedy and sets out a novel remedy that is inspired by Ordoliberal theory and its 
aims. This contributes to the thesis by demonstrating that the failure of the Microsoft 
I is a consequence of the remedy failing to take into account particular market 
specific issues that arose on the facts, not necessarily a flaw in the law or its 
application. It has further provided new types of potential remedies that are more 
nuanced and market specific than those that have been traditionally associated with 
tying. It is argued that these innovative models are more suited to achieving 
                                            
3
 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus (first 
published 1998, OUP 2001) 
4
 Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the long-lost soul of art.82 EC’ (2009) 29 OJLS 267; see also Pinar 
Akman, Hussein Kassim, ‘Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The Institutionalization and 
Interpretation of EU Competition Policy’ (2010) 48(1)  Journal of Common Market Studies 111 
5
 Laurent Warlouzet, ‘The Rise of European Competition Policy, 1950-1991: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Survey of a Contested Policy Sphere’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/80 
6
 K. K. Patel, H Schweitzer (ed), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 2013) 
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compliance with Article 102 (d) TFEU, in particular the final two remedies7 are most 
favoured. These require either: the installation of a media player choice screen with 
each Windows installation, or the dominant undertaking to act “as if” subject to 
competition, which in this present situation would require Microsoft to integrate WMP 
with only 20-33% of the copies of Windows sold. 
 
Chapter seven considered the period after Microsoft I until the present. This again 
has been shown to be a di-theoretical period. This chapter has investigated the 
Guidance and the tying decisions that have been issued by the Commission during 
this period. The chapter has made two major contributions to the thesis. The first 
contribution is to establish that the Guidance given by the Commission has made 
deliberate allusions to post-Chicago models of anti-competitive tying when explaining 
how it will prioritise the pursuit of tying arrangements. This provides strong evidence 
of the Commission incorporating post-Chicago analysis into its approach, so that it 
not only follows a post-Chicago style of analysis (as in Microsoft I), but moreover 
actually takes established post-Chicago models of competitive harm into account 
when assessing when the risk to competition is greatest. The second contribution 
has been to establish, through the assessment of the tying decisions that have been 
made during both the mono- and the di-theoretical periods, that the Commission has 
two modes of analysis in tying law. The first is already established and essentially 
seeks to make products available separately if customers desire to purchase them 
independently. The second mode applies only to the software industry. This mode of 
analysis is based on what the author has called “choice evasion”. By isolating the 
true concerns of the Commission, the chapter gives a new explanation of the 
theoretical reasoning behind the Commission’s tying decisions in the software 
industry. This new theory has also provided the basis for defining behaviour that will 
be caught by the Commission. From this, guidance to dominant software 
undertakings has been given that provides software firms with clear direction on the 
behaviour they must avert if they wish to avoid competition scrutiny, litigation and the 
associated substantial fines and/or claims for damages.  
 
                                            
7
 Altogether the remedies considered include; Microsoft: 1. Must not carry Windows Media Player; 2. 
Must not integrate Windows Media Player; 3. Must only carry a basic version of Windows Media 
Player; 4. Must carry a/multiple competitors’ media players; 5. Must not cross subsidise Windows 
Media Player; 6.Must offer a screen choice; 7. Must behave ‘as if’ subject to competition. 
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This thesis constitutes a historical and economic analysis of EU competition tying 
law. Its contributions are to explain how tying entered into EU competition law, to 
identify the economic theories that informed it, to trace how the developing state of 
economic knowledge has altered the application of the law, and finally to 
demonstrate how this law has been applied and how it is likely to be applied in the 
near future, particularly with regard to the software market.  
 
This author has identified further research on this topic that could be carried out, but 
which is beyond the ambit of this thesis. There are two specific  pathways  that merit 
investigation. The first relates to the state of knowledge of Ordoliberalism. Many of 
the concepts expounded by the Ordoliberal school are not well known and it would 
be beneficial, particularly for those in the Anglo-sphere of competition studies to 
have access to detailed assessment of the Ordoliberal principles.  This would help in 
the identification of these principles in other areas of EU competition where they may 
be present. This would lead to further benefits akin to those of the present research, 
such as providing dominant undertakings, law firms and judges with a better 
understanding of the economic theory upon which EU competition law is and was 
originally based. It would provide them with greater understanding of the aims of EU 
competition law. This would provide commentators, such as academic lawyers and 
economists, with a greater understanding of why the law is applied in the manner it is 
and consequentially this will make it easier for them to assess whether the law is 
achieving or failing to achieve those aims, allowing them to propose improvements 
where necessary. 
 
The second aspect relates to the empirical confirmation of certain concerns 
associated with tying, specifically, empirical research to demonstrate whether  
dominant undertakings use tying to exclude competitors from markets closely related 
to their primary market. It has already been established8 that if two products are tied 
it can make market entry more difficult by forcing competitors to enter both markets 
at the same time. But separately the argument has been made that by tying two 
products (one dominant, one competitive) and excluding competitors that make the 
competitive element, an undertaking can protect its primary market, the aim being to 
                                            
8
 See Dennis W. Carlton, Michael Waldman, ‘The Strategic use of tying to preserve and create market 
power in evolving industries’ (2002) 33 RandJEcon 194 
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make it less likely that they will enter their primary, dominant market in future. This 
appears to be based on the assumption that an undertaking on a neighbouring 
market is more likely to enter the dominant undertaking’s primary market than an 
undertaking from an unrelated market. If it is empirically established that market 
entry is more likely to come from competitors based on closely related markets as 
opposed to those that are unrelated, this would suggest that there could be an 
anticompetitive benefit to be achieved by dominant undertakings excluding 
competitors in related markets even if they do not increase prices in the short term. 
Rather such behaviour would be intended to preserve the monopoly price of their 
dominant good/service in the long term. This research would also be of great value 
to those seeking to understand the anticompetitive benefits that can be obtained 
through the use of tying, and as a consequence provide further guidance and 
economic direction to enforcement authorities regulators and courts seeking to 
maintain competition in the market. 
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